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ABSTRACT

“When We Demand Our Share of This World”: Struggles for Space, New Possibilities of
Planning, and Municipalist Politics in Mumbai
by
Malav Jayesh Kanuga
Advisor: Michael Blim
This dissertation presents an urban history of Bombay/Mumbai from the perspective of a politics
of plurality, arguing that while the city has emerged from governmental control and planning, its
development has also been shaped by myriad popular productive forces of urban society. The
dissertation traces the uneven development of the city through significant planning policies,
popular movements, and lived experiences of various struggles against regimes of
developmentalism—the governing ideologies of development, techniques, policies, and rules of
law through which the city has been planned and governed. These ideologies and practices have
shifted over time, but since the earliest days of Bombay’s urban development, they have marked
the space of the city. Colonial and imperial projects were based on planned abandonment and the
governance of differentiated vulnerability that was inherently anti-democratic and depoliticizing
(even as it used the rhetoric and machinery of democracy). Myriad popular cultures of the city
have nonetheless marked the space of city with a variety of political responses to
developmentalist projects. This selected history, indeed the often-antagonistic interplay between
two histories of the city, allows us to understand that planning has long been a terrain of struggle
over not only the city’s development but also the city’s functional democracy. It shows that
planning and development are the domains of both state and popular practice, however uneven
and divergent those practices are.
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Through in-depth ethnography, this dissertation connects the historical investigation of
Mumbai’s development to the contemporary politics animating a range of urban movements in
recent years that have mobilized working-class and populist visions of the city, its past, and
present and possible futures. This dissertation chronicles a five-year popular cycle of struggle to
establish a more hopeful vision of the future for the city by responding to, and seeking to
reshape, the municipal government’s official twenty-year Development Plan 2014–2034. In the
process, a spirited municipalist politics has emerged in Mumbai undergirded by a rupture of
those experiences and knowledges that define the dominant regime of urbanization. These
politics demonstrate that the prospect for dismantling the anti-democratic forms of
developmentalism that plan and govern the city emerges from attempts to forge collectivist and
popular urban consciousness.
By tracing this history, the dissertation argues that Mumbai’s contested cultures of
planning offer important insights into the heterogeneity and plurality of the city’s futures. In so
doing, the dissertation places Mumbai as a significant site for the investigation of the diverse
trajectories in which the developmental futures of capital emerge. Finally, the dissertation calls
for renewed theorization of the Indian city from the perspective of urban movements—the places
of social mobilization, spatial politics, and articulations of social subjectivity and heterogeneity.
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INTRODUCTION
“When we labourers demand our share of this world, not just an orchard, not merely a
field, we will demand the entire world.” —Sahir Ludhianavi
This dissertation chronicles the rise of a five-year citywide campaign in Mumbai seeking to
transform municipal and national urban governance programs, housing schemes, and land use
policies—and in doing so, challenges the “juggernaut” of developmentalism and the pervasive
production of urban informality in one of the world’s most populous, diverse and unequal
metropoles. I interrogate the development of the city through significant policies and popular
moments of its urban development, through various “regimes of developmentalism”—the
governing ideology of development, techniques, policies, and rules of law through which the city
has been planned and governed. I show how these regimes evolved in order to trace a genealogy
of the present question confronting the city of Mumbai, namely: how did a city shaped by a
deep history of popular and working-class movements come to be governed by such an antidemocratic form of urban development? Lastly, I chronicle how the five-year mobilization of the
citywide network of people’s campaigns called Hamara Shehar Mumbai (Our City Mumbai)
sought to collectively imagine an alternative vision of development.
Mumbai is India’s financial capital and is one of the top ten centers of commerce in the
world. It is also the subcontinent’s most unequal city according to income and wealth
distribution, in the second most unequal country in the world. Human development figures paint
a bleak story: 60 percent of the city’s households live on only 8 percent of the land in informal
settlements and slums; many of its residents are pavement dwellers or live in extremely
congested and deteriorating tenements (chawls) while nearly 500,000 (4.79 lakh) houses are
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lying vacant.1 It is estimated that every monsoon season, between one hundred and two hundred
homeless people die for want of shelters and healthcare.
Municipal water and waste services are not guaranteed to the majority of the population
but accessed conditionally through complicated negotiations with municipal councilors and local
area bosses; and some informal residents begin queuing for water at the community tap as early
as 3:30 in the morning. As many as 277 people share a single toilet, and women especially are
hard pressed to find time and privacy. Mumbai has less than half the required number of schools;
60 percent of the city’s children are not even in school. (In the ward with the highest dropout rate
in Mumbai, there is one school per 11,065 children).2 There is one health center per 92,000
people. Trains operate at triple their capacity causing unbearable overcrowding and routine
death. Mumbai has the greatest population densities in the world and the least open space.3
All of these realities have been planned. That is to say that Mumbai’s informality did not
arise due to a lack of planning; but rather as a result of the economic, political, and spatial
planning regimes carried out by the city’s colonial and postcolonial governments over the last
three centuries. As Ananya Roy (2005) has described, informality is a key mode of the
production of space. This informality and fragmentation has intensified dramatically since 1991,
when the city’s development plan was revised as Mumbai was undergoing a process of economic
liberalization.

1

Figures according to 2011 census utilized in Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action (YUVA) report, “An
Exhibition on People’s Participation in the Mumbai Development Plan, 2014–2034,” April 2014, Mumbai.
2
These figures are reported for Govandi by Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) in a multi-year survey project
called the Transforming M Ward. See Mustafa Shaikh and Vikrant Dadawala, “Hell, Revisited.” Mumbai Mirror,
Apr 6, 2015, https://mumbaimirror.indiatimes.com/mumbai/other/hell-revisited/articleshow/46819842.cms
3
According to 2011 census, Mumbai District Population is 33,38,031 persons and the Mumbai suburban population
is 86,40,419. Population densities on average are 30,000 / km2 and in some slums 200,000 / km2. These figures are
averages that become starker when broken out to account for the unequal access that women and other marginalized
groups have to the city’s resources; meanwhile there are endless other indices one can look at.
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H.L.T. Quan (2012) describes “savage developmentalism” as the “undevelopment” of life
through neglect, repression, violence, and improvement schemes, which are all part of the “telos”
of development. I expand the concept to investigate a dynamic ideology of space and a planning
paradigm in Mumbai as it has evolved with the development of the city and changing relations of
governance and the politics of the governed. The ideologies and practices that enable
development’s “tendentious propensity to secure order and capitalist expansion” have shifted
over time. I trace the origins of savage developmentalism in eighteenth century colonial
Bombay,4 when it marked the space of the city for colonial and imperial projects. Beginning in
the mid-nineteenth century, developmentalism then facilitated the conditions for industrial
expansion. It once again transformed in the liberalization period, beginning in the 1990s, to drive
the city’s neoliberal urbanization through finance and real estate speculation. Attempts to direct
urban development according to the needs of growth and accumulation continually changed the
relationship of planning to the development of social life in Bombay.5 In all, the machinery of
savage development has been a dynamic tool for elite orderings of space as well as a decisive
terrain of struggle by popular classes against it.
Crucially, I demonstrate how urban development in Mumbai operates as a juggernaut that
churns up a number of contradictory forms of urbanism while delimiting and foreclosing
alternative futures. The concept of juggernaut has Indian origins. The Hindu deity Jagannath (in
Sanskrit jagannaatha, or “world-lord”) is believed by many to be endowed with world-making
powers. For centuries, thousands of devotees have together pulled towering and intricately
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The city’s name was officially changed from Bombay to Mumbai in 1995. Like other scholarly accounts of the
city’s history, I use Bombay when referring to the city prior to 1995 and Mumbai after. When referring to broad
historical arc of the city’s development that encompasses both eras, I employ the term Bombay/Mumbai. This name
change and the “vernacular struggles” of identity that propelled it are discussed in Chapter Three (cf Hansen 2004).
5
See Swapna Banerjee-Guha “Urban Development Process in Bombay: Planning for Whom?” from Sujata Patel,
and Alice Thorner. Bombay: Metaphor for Modern India. Oxford University Press, USA. 1995.
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carved wooden chariots displaying the deity with ropes in street processions (yatra) of hundreds
of thousands of worshippers. Occasionally, it is said, the devout offer themselves to be crushed
under the chariot’s enormous spoked wheels. Juggernaut developmentalism’s expressive, worldmaking capacities require routine and cruel sacrifice. Yet the connotations of an unstoppable and
merciless sovereign territorializing of the earth it crushes underneath also suggests an
inescapable dialectic of creativity and hope trapped inside the destructive forces of its
development. Like the notion of progress that Walter Benjamin describes in “Theses on the
Philosophy of History,” developmentalism “irresistibly propels” us into a future and leaves
catastrophe in its wake.

Figure 1: Jagannath Puri Rath Yatra, the procession of Jagannath. Image credit: The Festival of the Chariots by
Jagajivana Dasa, Jun 1, 1978. Jagajivana Dasa, Volume-13 Number 06 (accessible at
http://www.backtogodhead.in/the-festival-of-the-chariots-by-jagajivana-dasa/)

Developmentalism is so often directed by elite imaginings and enacted by ordinary
bureaucracies. It offers the promise of a future but moors the aspirations of most in an endlessly
expanding present, imposing the depoliticized sense of a certain promised future for the city that
cannot be attained except through development. In the contemporary period, this
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developmentalism has centered on the processes and relations in urban society that constitute
informality, extremely differentiated relationships to labor and polity, and eligibility for
“recognized” urban life. It is here we find a situation of democratic institution-based planned
development and selective abandonment.
I investigate the categories and practices of political life in Mumbai that pertain to this
form of savage developmentalism and within them, locate the visions of alternative futures
emerging from various parts of the city. In the process, I offer a definition of informality as a
terrain of conflict and antagonism that arises from, and further shapes, an already-historically
constituted uneven landscape of social inequality, masked and manifested violence, and struggles
over life’s possibilities. In this regard, I demonstrate how urban identity and violence have been
central to the growing informalization of Bombay/Mumbai. How these contradictions can and
will be “developed” is the fundamental question of the city and its future.
The juggernaut of developmentalism is made unstable by the complex and contradictory
forms of life that exceed its interventions and attempts to reorder society. The city’s myriad
contestations around spatial and social claims on planning’s disbursements in one way or another
reflect the instability of the very forms and politics of its development as well as the categories
of political thought necessary to mobilize desired forms of urbanism. I argue that the traditional
categories of planning—of labor and the city itself—have been rendered inoperable by its very
historical, economic, political, and spatial uneven development of the city. What kinds of
developmental politics and imaginaries have arisen in its place? The dissertation argues that our
understanding of planning in Indian cities has to be rethought and that an anthropology of
planning can help us reframe planning as a terrain of antagonism over what is possible and
desirable—and most importantly, what kind of shared future people can promise each other.
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Development and Democracy
This dissertation calls for renewed theorization of the Indian city from the perspective of urban
movements—the places of social mobilization, spatial politics, and articulations of social
subjectivity and heterogeneity. I present a history of the evolving forms of developmentalism
that have governed the sociospatial conditions of life in Bombay. I write a selective urban history
of Bombay/Mumbai from the perspective of a politics of collectivism and plurality, arguing that
while the city’s development has been shaped by governmental control and planning, the space,
politics, and culture of the city also emerges from myriad popular productive forces of urban
society. The interplay between these two histories allows us to understand that planning has
always been a terrain of struggle over not only the city’s development but also the city’s
functional democracy.
I also argue that Mumbai’s contested cultures of planning offer important insights into
the heterogeneity and plurality of the city’s futures. As I discuss in detail, beginning in 2011,
tens of thousands of the city’s residents mobilized their visions of the city, its past, and present
and possible futures. In the process, their movements demanded an alternative form of
democratic development and city planning in Mumbai.
At a time when savage developmentalism is the ruling and, it appears, unbreakable
ideology of much of the world’s urban spaces, recognizing the conditions of possibility of a
popular, democratic, and plural vision of development is an urgent task that extends far beyond
Mumbai. Neither people nor governments make cities under conditions wholly of their choosing:
ripping through those contested and possible futures are the immanent demands of capital. As the
bulk of future urban growth is projected to occur in Asia and Africa, Mumbai and many other
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Global South cities are dynamic settings for the diverse trajectories in which the developmental
futures of capital emerge. The grand promise of planning is that it coordinates time and space
and brings into actuality the possibilities embedded in each. Development is thereby called to
answer capital’s most anxious questions: when and where? The recent mobilizations in Mumbai
demonstrate that there is no prospect for true development without the dismantling of this
capitalist development machine, and that such a task is both necessary and possible.

Planning as Terrain of Urban Struggle
Throughout the history of Bombay’s land use and planning, restructuring schemes have been
proposed as a response to a crisis or perceived crisis in which the city and its economy were
understood to be assailed by internal threats. In each case, new and drastic institutional thinking
and planning was the order of the day. The first major institution of planning, the Bombay
Improvement Trust (BIT), was introduced in 1898 after the city’s devastating plague epidemic
led to a citywide crisis of governability and the first general strike. Throughout the next decades
of “social governance,” from 1906–1925, authorities used police repression and land acquisition
to confront growing labor struggles and consolidate class power and land holdings. The
evolution of these struggles from the 1930s and 1960s, during the “age of labor,” however,
produced a “distinctive urban character and civic tradition” in Bombay that paralleled the rise of
peasant radicalism in the countryside (Chandavarkar 2009: 24). Both were regarded by colonial
administrators as a significant political threat given the rising nationalist Independence
movement, and therefore were made the targets of state policies and the subjects of
underdevelopment. In the 1960s, proposals for an entire new city, Navi Mumbai, to the east of
old Bombay, emerged amid anti-poor and anti-worker fears of congestion and overuse of scarce
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public amenities. In the 1990s, after the historic defeat of Bombay’s mill workers strikes and a
turn toward economic liberalization, increasing fervor for foreign investment and vitriol against
the growing informal population inaugurated an era of evictions, slum demolitions, and an
overall restructuring of the spatial economy.
In the face of these schemes, Bombay’s working classes have made compact and
enduring claims on urban space and resources, countering capital and state development in urban
uprisings, revolts, dramatic strike waves, and the building of everyday cultures of solidarity.
Workers occupied space for themselves, shaped daily life in neighborhoods, and imprinted
Bombay with its popular cultures. Since industrialization began in the 1850s, the daily
experiences and political aspirations of Bombay’s working classes—the industrial workers and
other strata of the city’s economy—comprised an important force in the rise of the city, including
in town planning, sanitation, housing provisions, its popular cultures and political organizations.
For the city’s colonial elite, an increasingly crucial component of planning and labor relations
had to do with to concerns about growing militancy in the factories. Regulatory mechanisms that
determined housing provision and municipal services as well as transportation were established
in the field of town and regional planning and served as an extension of labor relations in the
workplace to the neighborhood and home.6 In the post-Independence period, a state-centered,
corporativist labor regime which emphasized legal rights, partially implemented and selectively
granted, to small sectors of the working population coalesced with an urban planning regime that
selectively distributed reservations of housing and other basic amenities in the form of working
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The city, insofar as it was home to the working class, was regarded a key domain for planning the “social factory.”
Cf Tronti (1966) for a theoretical discussion of capitalist planning in the realm of social life as central to the
mediation of class struggle. Though informed by the historic development of class struggle in industrial capitalist
societies of Europe and the United States, the concept of the “social factory” is also relevant to describe planning in
the Indian case, as evidenced by the coterminous evolution of industrial and urban struggles in spite of uneven world
development of capital and its region and global differences.
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class tenements (chawls). Throughout, the astounding growth of working class militancy in
Bombay in this long century was a clear indication that the planning strategies implicit in the
state corporatist labor regime were not effectively containing popular political demands on the
city.
Workers’ politics, practices, and proposals left a lasting legacy on the culture and
memory of the city, during times of rising class action and through historic defeat. These
legacies endure even past the historic decline of the industrial workers movement of the 1980s.
The city has since been home to strong neighborhood-based movements and organizations,
though many have not been able to recast their specific struggles into citywide coordination. This
dissertation investigates how that historic sense of working class transformation has shifted to a
terrain of planning and development locked in place by a developmentalist juggernaut, and how
contemporary urban movements navigate with their own possible future of the city. What
inheritances of the antagonistic past—the narratives of struggle, collective emotional valences,
and memories of possibilities, all conditional but material artifacts—are available to those who
struggle in the city today? How do Mumbai’s residents draw on the city’s past experiences of
popular cultures and collectivist mobilizations as they face an increasingly privatized urban
future? Understanding these legacies and how they related to the planning cultures of
contemporary Mumbai is one of the tasks of the dissertation.

Planning Informality
It is a popular conception in India that its cities are far too overcome by informality and everyday
insurgences to be effectively planned (Roy 2009a), and that consequently, beyond enclaves and
slums, there can be no shared future. In Mumbai, planning is most often perceived as absent. It is
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often assumed that either the wholesale lack or ineffectiveness of planning is what leads to the
city’s chaos and disorder. Consequently, the optimistic approach suggests that more planning can
serve as an injunction against informality and will be a solution to the city’s underdevelopment.
Despite appearances to the contrary, planning in Mumbai is central to governing the
present order of things, “the formal inequality of capitalism” as a social reality (Gilmore 2007:
78).7 Planning’s influence on the management of the present and the future is at the heart of
questions that the recent citywide popular campaign Hamara Shehar Mumbai sought to address
in its elaboration of a number of modes of engagement and mobilization with the city and its
citizens. Planning is most easily identified with land use and the spatial distribution of a desired
built environment. But so too is it the active concrescence of the imagined city, the commingling
of bodies, and the fixity of built materials that give shape to the commotion of daily life.
Planning, by directing resources toward certain kinds of futures, reveals the existing imagination
of the urban order of things.
This dissertation critically analyzes the development histories of Mumbai and
demonstrates how planning mediates and differentiates the city’s populations. It details how
planning is a relation of power between urban populations and the developmental state (Roy and
AlSayyad 2004). Rather than suggesting the incapacity of the state in maintaining formal and
governable relations, informality actually enhances the reach of formal state arrangements (Li
2007). The operations of the state at all levels of its vertical structures decide the conditions of
“recognized” life and determine who will remain vulnerable to “premature and untimely death”
(Gupta 2012: 4). Informality remains a persistent feature of the urban condition in Mumbai due,
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“Insofar as the capitalist state must both help capital be profitable, and keep the formal inequality of capitalism
acceptable to the polity, it develops fiscal, institutional, and ideological means to carry out these tasks.” (Gilmore
2007: 78)
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in part, because of the “arbitrary outcomes” (Gupta 2012:8–14) that emerge from the encounters
between people and the lowest levels of the bureaucratic state. These registers of state
domination produce informality as the vernacular form of Mumbai’s planning and development
regimes. It is the production of urban difference, of subjectivities comprising the multiplicity of
urban lives inhered in a system of competing hegemonies that both give and take away from
capital and state its appearance of stability. These two aspects—the production of space and the
production of difference—were of central importance to colonial and commodity rule in the
early development of the city, and remain central to the present day.
While Bombay’s contemporary informality has long historical roots, I argue that the
nature of this informality has fundamentally changed since the historic defeat of the mill workers
strike in 1982. Under conditions of expanding informality, the very historical, economic,
political, and spatial development of the city has rendered inoperable the twin categories of
planning—planning labor and planning the city itself. The effects of these changes on modes of
production of space, on urban governance, on the daily experience of life in the city and the
possibilities of recognized life and protected citizenship are reflected in the city’s myriad
contestations. These struggles reflect the instability of the very forms and politics of its
development as well as the categories of political thought necessary to mobilize desired forms of
urbanism. This kind of urban development, which produces such extensive informality, is
inherently depoliticizing. Planning in this regard has historically institutionalizing abandonment
while depoliticizing the resulting popular discontent and demands for redress.
Mumbai’s neoliberal economy has meanwhile failed to deliver on its promises of
becoming a “global city”: globalism has led to new forms of provincialism, regional nativism,
and class revanchism, aided in part by a right-wing culturalist agenda. Informality extends across
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the urban landscape, from housing and water provisions, labor and land use, to the very illicit
modes and practices of governance and widespread corruption and graft. Decades of
development that exclude and marginalize differently the majority of the city’s populations have
led to what activists describe as “critical levels of social alienation and apathy” that has dispersed
rather than aggregated people’s energies and worldview.8
Yet, we can find within planning’s dominant concerns, a hidden history of the social
mobilities and movements that precede the planning. If we look at planning from the perspective
of urban social mobilizations and the nature of these mobilizations from the perspective of
planning movements, as this dissertation does, we begin to grasp the questions that planning
opens up about how people attend to each other; how they govern and are governed; and what
people do to shape their environment so they may dream intimately, imagine collectively, and
ultimately recoup rather than abandon more just and human ways to live together. The visions
and imaginations of these mobilizations, the viscera of urban social movements, point to a
wholly different conception of planning, as this dissertation shows.
Municipalism
What kinds of new social movements are emerging in contemporary Indian cities around
planning and urban life? Do they have the potential to bring together groups of the dispossessed,
those abandoned in place and informalized on the one hand, and those who are more fully market
subjects and liberal democratic citizens fortified through forms of entitled municipal inclusion—
in short, those regarded as populations who are to be governed as exception and those citizens
who retain rights? If so, what do these types of social movements promise for the future of
India—and postcolonial cities around the world?
8

See architect-activist PK Das, 2015: 92.
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This research advances understanding of claims-making on the state in the Indian and
postcolonial urban context in both form and content. In its form, populist organizations such as
Hamara Shehar Mumbai suggest a challenge to the production of state-space by attempting to
appropriate major functions of urban planning normally reserved for state agencies. This would
counter recent claims that participation in state and urban governance programs in Indian cities is
increasingly “gentrified” by elite classes and interests (Ghertner 2010, Zérah 2009, Harriss
2007).
In its content, Hamara Shehar Mumbai dispels assumptions that urban mobilizations
among the subaltern remain fragmented, limited and sectoral in terms of caste, occupation or
interest (Chatterjee 2004, Appadurai 2001). It is true that the long arc of development in Mumbai
has been shaped by an instituted abandonment that has prompted a multiplicity of political
expressions in slum community resistance, frustration and resentment among the poor aimed
against one another on religious, regional, and caste lines, as well as political capture by lowlevel bosses who assert control over neighborhood associations that have not been able to recast
their specific struggles into citywide coordination.9 Popular expressions are increasingly
associated with narrowly defined communal forms of politics, whereas progressive social justice
campaigns are canalized by a non-confrontational infrastructure of non-profit organizations that
depoliticize the discourses and practices of social movements attempting to organize against
long-term abandonment of infrastructure and other public goods. Yet, Hamara Shehar shows us
that a subaltern-led multi-class movement is capable of mobilizing its differences, overcoming
fragmentation, and challenging Mumbai’s planning regime. The campaign claims its popular
legitimacy because the content of its demands is informed not by a single sector or demographic

9

There are however ruptures of experiences and knowledges not wholly contained, disciplined, counted, or even
planned for by dominant regimes of development’s abandonment and depoliticization.
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group seeking exception and accommodation for its “narrow economic-corporate interests,” but
through the forging of a new, ostensibly democratic, bloc in the Gramscian sense of cross-class
and sector alliance (Gramsci 1971, Green 2011).
This bloc is populist in name and municipalist in substance. I argue that as campaign
participants’ experiences in the city attain a political perspective of the city, they begin to address
planning issues that are otherwise routinely limited to the compromised realm of urban
citizenship as increasingly expressed through market mechanisms for the distribution of public
goods and services, security and law and order, environmental sustainability, public
infrastructure, and cultural recognition.
Savage developmentalism is most often the way postcolonial cities are enlisted into the
global project of capital accumulation. Given the deep historical production of difference in state
and urban space through evolving forms of savage developmentalism, what makes the
emergence of this citywide participatory effort in Mumbai so extraordinary is the nature of its
organizing directly on this terrain. That is why the forms of commonalities—shared urban
imaginaries and spatial consciousness that serve to connect individuals and communities through
their differences—are so significant.
Mumbai is one of the world’s most populous cities and among the most diverse in terms
of ethnicity, class, caste and language. It is also one of the most unevenly developed urban
spaces in the world. Its trajectory is largely determined by the central government’s far-right
Hindu supremacist political coalition, which is currently mobilizing the state machinery to enact
a particularly brutal juggernaut of developmentalism across the country. It is all the more
significant that this democratic, popular, and plural citywide mobilization emerged across
religious, caste, class, and linguistic differences in an xenophobic urban culture long-dominated
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by institutionalized forms of nativism and ethnic chauvinism. This dissertation reveals both the
dramatic challenges that a renewal of working class, popular, and pluralist mobilizations had to
overcome—and suggests that this mobilization emerged precisely because the stakes are so high.
This research aims to intervene in a watershed moment in urban planning and governance
in Indian cities. The government of India has made the building of one hundred new smart cities
the cornerstone of its grand vision for unrivaled economic growth. Streamlined technocratic
governance by experts is the administration’s strategy to enact India’s “urban revolution.” The
capitalist urbanization of cities as well as popular consciousness of its discontents are
increasingly connected and common conditions. The dissertation presents an analysis of the
specific ethnographic and historical circumstances of a unique case study of Mumbai, yet it
contributes significant findings to ongoing debates about the social forces arrayed in many
Indian and other postcolonial cities.
In an era of rising nationalism and xenophobic rightwing populism, a number of cities
around the world are demonstrating the transformative power of municipalism through popular
efforts to fundamentally rethink and reshape residents’ relationships with their cities. This
movement connects an array of cities—from Barcelona, Spain to Jackson, Mississippi; from
Jemna, Tunisia, to Mumbai, India—where residents across social, religious, class, and ethnic
lines have united in their shared recognition that those who control city planning control the
future of the city itself. Their municipalism, moreover, revolves around a renewed politics of the
dispossessed, the informalized, and retrenched working classes, for whom the city is both
workshop and neighborhood, marginal and popular, precarious and surplus, production and
reproduction, identity and difference.
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Chapter Outline
The passage toward understanding the present planning regime and its social, spatial, and
cultural ramifications for city life in Mumbai begins with the earliest attempts at planning and
social control in the city at the outset of colonial urban development. Combined, Chapters One,
Two, and Three tell the story of Mumbai’s urban development from two perspectives: (a) the
colonial and post-colonial state’s spatial administration and plan for its populations, and (b) the
everyday lived realities of various communities and classes in the bourgeoning city. What this
frame of interpretation reveals is a different history of Mumbai, one that views the city not as
layers of personal and public cultures but rather as an archeology of social struggles in which
people articulated and agitated for different but common-sense notions about the city and their
world. It is from both vantages that a sense of the political cultures that emerged at various
moments and sites of resistance in the city’s history may be recovered. The histories of these
social struggles and the contingencies of the possibilities that emerged from them, moreover, do
not stay put in a simple “past.” They remain scattered, yet potentially activated across layers of
the city’s structures of meaning. This urban history assembles key moments in the long arc of
urban colonial and postcolonial relations as they shaped the city and various social relations of
subordination and resistance. This arc importantly coincides with a process of political and
capitalist development that drove class and social (ethnic, religious, caste-based) differentiation
and determined a unique spatial “pattern of patterns” written into the planned and unplanned
landscape of the city.
In Chapter One, I trace the history of Mumbai from an undeveloped Portuguese colonial
outpost to the British Empire’s most prized port city, and the industrialization and immigration
that accompanied this transformation. In Chapter Two, I detail the eclipse of an earlier colonial
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economy by a rising industrial mill economy and its colonial and native bourgeoisies: from the
first wave of enclosures that drove proletarianization; to the newer forms of enclosures that
further entrenched sections of the working classes of the city and brought great numbers into
pauperization; and throughout, the punctuated histories of worker and popular resistances that
characterized much of everyday life in the city. In Chapter Three, I examine the postIndependence period for the continued tensions between the Indian bourgeoisie and worker
movements, which culminated in a wave of historic strikes in the 1980s, the collapse of the
workers’ movements, and an increasing rush by elites toward new forms of capitalist
accumulation and financialization of the city.
Chapter Two and Three detail how the development of working-class urbanism became a
political matter of governance and planning. They also trace the development of various streams
of collective consciousness during moments of rising urban dissatisfaction and ensuing crises of
government in the making of Bombay as India’s premiere metropolis. This perspective offers a
way of both investigating the urban histories of city life and a way of understanding the
fragmented and unpredictable nature of contemporary city politics, in which a developmentalist
regime has created the conditions of splintered urbanism (Graham and Marvin 2001) as well as
the conditions of political recomposition through new municipalist imaginations.
Taken together, the first three chapters argue that from the beginning of the city’s history,
colonial elites, both English and Indian, developed Mumbai as a city dedicated to the success of
various capitalist projects, from mercantilism to industrialism and financial extraction. Yet,
urban development depended not only on colonial and elite interests, but also on the interplay
between various social classes as well as economic development arising from the array of
mercantilism, land speculation, and informal laboring practices unique to the contours of the
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development of colonial rule and capitalist accumulation in the city. I argue that this dynamic has
endured into the present, historically linking an internal economy to rural hinterlands as well as
far-flung coordinates of an imperial world-economy, and thereby is an important feature in the
telling of Mumbai’s history. These chapters explore this relationship with special attention to the
nature of the articulations and mobilizations of various working classes on a changing urban
landscape.
In Chapter Four, I investigate the contemporary form of developmentalism at work in
Mumbai, which has facilitated a rise in informality. I argue that the relationship between state
developmentalism and Mumbai’s informal economy has extended to its official planning
cultures. I trace the origins of this developmentalism through the colonial and postcolonial
urbanization projects that required drastic transformations of land and labor unfolded through the
logic of differentiation. These transformations can be understood as the historical production of a
series of “group differentiated vulnerabilities” that exaggerate regional, subcultural and linguistic
differences into outcomes and probabilities for class, caste, gendered, ethnic and spatial
subdivision and reconstruction (Gilmore 2007, Robinson 2000). Bombay’s developmental
histories have repeatedly involved processes of differentiation that continue to shape the
contemporary experience of development. Understanding how planning in the context of
widespread informality became a terrain of political mobilization in Mumbai is also the task of
this chapter. Mumbai’s Development Plan has been revised only once in the last fifty years. That
occurred in 1991, as the city was undergoing a process of economic liberalization. It was a
momentous year for the foundations of Mumbai’s urban economy and has had tremendous
consequences for how the city was planned for years to come. The effects of these changes on
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modes of production of space, on urban governance, on the daily experience of life in the city
and the possibilities of citizenship, are all crucial aspects of the urban question.
How the urban question may be answered is the central focus of Chapter Five, which
focuses on the emergence of the citywide campaign Hamara Shehar Mumbai as it responds to the
municipal government’s twenty-year Development Plan and attempts to challenge the
established planning regimes with a popular imagination for the lived city and the city to come.
In the process of this struggle, the city’s histories of development come to life. So too do its
possible futures. From this vantage, we can better determine the conditions of emergence and
suppression of certain forms of what might be referred to as “collective spatial consciousness” in
the city today around the key questions framing the city’s future. (Cf Soja 2010.) I show how
urban imaginations and senses of possibility are significant, embodied, and material features of
practical popular politics and urban life. Given the heterogeneous nature of urban life, spatial
consciousness does not assume a unitary character, and as the ethnographic study of the Hamara
Shehar Mumbai campaign demonstrates, consciousness is created by the composition of myriad
spatial experiences and imaginations of the city—what sections, aspects, dimensions of the city
is, for whom, and for what. Nevertheless, the chapter also details how spatial consciousness can
be fragmented by the very forces that produce it. This does not negate its existence and the
political possibilities that emerge from it. Indeed, however infrequent and ephemeral it may
seem, when collective spatial consciousness does take political form, its conditions of emergence
must be understood in the contradictory nature of urban life. The chapter finds that while popular
planning imaginations do mobilize material forces in urban society, they do so within and against
a long tradition of state developmentalism that captures, deflects, and depoliticizes its
resistances.
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Chapter Six brings further attention to the urban commons in Mumbai as a significant
lens for understanding urbanism in its cultural, political, as well as economic aspects. These
urban commons illuminate the contemporary context of what I refer to as manifold planning
“crises” and “impasses” that emerge in questions of infrastructure, governance, access and use,
organization as well as how the city serves is the space for livelihoods, subsistence, labor,
reproduction, surplus production. The commons also offer a perspective on Mumbai’s urbanism
in its everyday dimensions and as the lived relations in the city. The chapter discusses how the
commons is situated at the center of a number of recent urban developments, mobilizations, and
imaginaries in Mumbai that challenge the prevalence of neoliberal ideology and practice in the
government and lived experience of cities. New political imaginations and organizations
constitute vocabularies of the commons as specifically urban questions. The chapter draws its
analysis on the nature of the commons in Mumbai in order to raise questions of livelihood, land
use, sociospatial difference, and organization. Both point to the significance of the urban
commons for a possible post-neoliberal urban agenda in Mumbai and elsewhere. By identifying
and investigating a range of urban commons in Mumbai, the chapter then investigates the
emergence of a commons perspective in a range of popular articulations and mobilizations
around “people’s planning” stemming from Hamara Shehar’s campaign.
Chapters Four, Five, and Six together engage with the question of the reconfiguration of
class in the contemporary condition of urban life. These investigate the class nature of commons
as found in experiences of subsistence and reproduction as well as collective consumption
(housing, health and education amenities, transportation, water and social infrastructure, open
space), governance, and questions of exclusion.
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In Chapter Seven, I investigate the question of what constitutes spatial justice in cities of
the Global South. My central aim is to rethink the potential of dominant “subaltern urbanist”
theories for the critical project of understanding urban society today and to pose significant
questions about the resonance of subaltern studies as a descriptive tool, an explanatory
framework, and as a radical analysis in understanding urban politics.
Is subaltern urbanism a theory of urbanism or a theory of subalterns in urban contexts?
This chapter tries to show that it can and should be both, requiring careful ethnography of urban
life, but also endeavoring to produce urban theory of power relations as useful interventions that
accompany many social struggles on the ground. At the same time, its theory of power remains
largely skewed and limited. New tools of analysis that situate power differently and are up to the
task of critique and action are not only possible steps forward in subaltern urbanist research—
but necessary ones.
This chapter asks many questions about the subaltern urbanist project and in doing so,
tries to suggest new approaches wherein subaltern urbanism may contribute more effectively to
the critical task of understanding politics from below in contemporary urbanizing India while
also making important contributions to radical urban methodology that may help facilitate
connections of critique, solidarity, and collective intervention alongside a range of urban social
movements where they arise in diverse urban contexts. As such, the chapter develops a basis for
comparison of how subaltern urbanist literature relates to recent critical “urban social
movements” literature.
What are the prospects of social justice in the Indian city? The dominant planning
paradigms in Mumbai and elsewhere show little interest in an answer. Other approaches to the
planning and development of cities must emerge, however much they appear unwritten and
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unknown in the present. This dissertation demonstrates the contingent and conflictual nature of
urban development. It lays the ground for an urban analysis of collective spatial consciousness.
Both, I argue, are aspects of a heterogeneous class and social project of claiming the city’s
future.

Historical and Ethnographic Methods
I combine urban historical and ethnographic approaches in the research and writing of this
dissertation. What does writing Mumbai’s spatial history from these perspectives entail? 10
Combining the insights and approaches of Marxist geography, postcolonial anthropology, and
anthrohistory, my analysis of planning, popular politics, and the uses of imagination mobilizes a
politics of space to grapple with colonial difference as well as urbanization as a process of
capitalist development on a world scale. My writing of urban history relies a modality of
relationships, and a reconstruction of the thoughts and events that give structure to history as a
material force, and furthermore, that can grapple with “the ambiguities of the symbolic world,
the plurality of possible interpretations of it and the struggle which takes place over symbolic as
much as over material resources.” (Stieber 1999:383, White 1978, 1986)
Temporalization is also an aspect of spatial struggle. Mumbai’s urban fabric is found in
multiple dimensions of time, unfolding through the integuments of space and social power as

10. There are many levels of representation in which the city is involved: spatial, building, and architectural
practices; material, physical and spatial forms, human action, behavior, protests, celebration, and contestations; the
landscape is a cultural image—in all, space is a site through which social relations are manifest; this implies a urban
historical approach that attends to, e.g. the means which architectural and urbanist form and political, economic, and
social forces produce the city; and the ways they interact with other systems of meaning and social discourse (e.g.
land ownership patterns, bureaucratic interests, and governmental policy as well as institutional contexts that give
rise to the meaning embedded in the built environment). This also requires an attentiveness to the city as a place of
meaning making, through but also beyond the artifacts of the city (streets, squares, buildings, all visible signs of
social, economic and political processes) in the way they mediated popular engagement in the city; the city as a
composite of “representational acts.”
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well as in symbolic processes of temporalization through which changes in city life are produced
in everyday spatial and cultural practices. Time, like space, exists through forms of state
spatialization found in its planning regimes, in both the verticality (where the state acts “above”
society) and horizontality (where the state encompasses its localities) of state practices (Ferguson
and Gupta 2002). The collective character of time is also embodied in experiences of time in the
city and consequently form a composite of the city’s temporal ontology, both ephemeral and
durable. As we see in the following chapters, changing notions of time and spatial practices also
serve to interrogate how state functions of verticality and encompassment that have led to a crisis
of political imagination in which the “states’ authority over ‘the local’” appears natural (ibid.).
The historical components of the dissertation were shaped by a “history from below”
approach that I situated dialectically with the dominant forces structuring urban and capitalist
development in Bombay. So too was my ethnography guided by a reading of developmentalism
from the experience of struggles and the antagonisms that arise in the fields of development. My
ethnography of the city relied on the extensive observations and participation I conducted during
fifteen months of fieldwork among participants in three urban people’s campaigns located in
Mumbai and other Indian cities: the first was Hamara Shehar Mumbai, a diverse class, caste, and
religious consortium of slum dwellers, informal workers, planners, architects, and activists from
across Mumbai who sought to appropriate authorship of the twenty-year Development Plan
2014–2034 from the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai; the second was the recently
inaugurated national Right to the City Campaign, comprised of sixteen “people’s organizations”
across India who aim to collectively challenge and transform municipal and national urban
governance programs, housing schemes, and land use policies. I also worked with Ghar Bachao
Ghar Banao (Defend Homes, Build Homes), a member of the National Alliance of People’s
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Movements (NAPM), which coordinated direct action and legal struggles for housing among
slum dwellers, redevelopment-affected people, and informal workers in Mumbai.
As an activist-researcher involved in the everyday life of these campaigns, I realized that
the most critical and compelling view of the city, state actors, and important processes of
development emerged not from elite visionaries and media accounts but crucially from
grassroots meetings, interviews, and collective inquiries. As I learned from their experiences and
activities and attempted to make sense of them, I learned to adopt the tools of participant
observation central to ethnographies in the city for use in my goal of conducting an ethnography
of the city—its collective urban politics, urban processes, and contested forms of urban
development.
My research combines ethnographic methods established in both qualitative social
movement as well as urban ethnographic research (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002, della
Porta 2014) with analysis of documentary evidence on the campaign’s history, objectives, and
actions. I employed a combination of participant observation of the everyday life of the
campaign, collection of organizational survey data and semi-structured interviews, oral histories
as well as content analysis of the group’s communication and media. This allowed me to (a)
collect data based on a wide variety of experiences, and (b) enable comparison based on the
unique histories as well as personal and shared accounts of daily life of participants in the
campaign.
I also employ a method of urban investigation based on co-research and collective
inquiry to root my analysis in the ethnographic participation and collective experience of the
citywide campaign (Roggero 2011).11 It is here that new forms of experience and knowledge of

11

According to Woodcock, “This idea of co-research builds on the traditions of workers’ inquiry, starting with
Marx’s (1880) call for a survey of working conditions. This inspired a critical Marxist approach that sought to
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the city emerged. As such, I have focused largely on collective representations of the city that
have arisen from the campaign. This, I hope will be of greatest use to the many I met and
observed who participated in the campaign.
Urban anthropology has long offered detailed and extensive understandings of social life
in the city and also contributed enormously to our theorization of cities (Cf Hannerz 1980, Susser
1982, Mulling 1987, Lynch 1994, Low 1996). It was a challenge to utilize such rich theorization
and field methods to understand the city itself without obscuring direct experience and narrative,
social meaning of action, and interpretative frames. I have also attempted to read my own
ethnographic notes against the macro and mesoanalytic approaches of urban theory such as
political economy, cultural studies, or discourse and media analysis. By centering the
development of the campaign as the lens from which to analyze the city and its development
prospects, this dissertation responds to the need to expand the resources with which we can
organize our collective imaginations of what the urban world can and should look like (Robinson
2004). It also stems from the desire to elaborate a political reorientation toward the project of
developing what Lefebvre referred to as “a comprehensive theory of the production of space,” by
taking spatial and social struggles as an important key for unlocking the enigma of contemporary
urbanization.
My research investigates the contested nature of planning imaginaries as a means of
thinking about what it means to live together in the city and as a central determination of the
conditions of possibility and impossibility of city life. I interrogate the political nature of
developmentalism in South Asia and the ways it conceptualizes and orders urban life as a method

combine the construction of knowledge about workplaces with new experiments in organizing.” Woodcock, Jamie
(2018) Digital labour in the university: understanding the transformations of academic work in the UK. TripleC, 16
(1). pp. 129–142.
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of uncovering layers of meaning, conflict, and action presently suffusing and interrupting urban
modes of development and governance.
Informed by a historical approach to the contemporary form and meaning of city life, my
research on urbanism addresses the temporality of city life; value and difference in urban
lifeworlds; popular imaginaries and movements; territorial contestations and state spatialities;
and uneven urban histories of informality. I view these as vital issues for urban anthropologists
and those in related disciplines who contribute to ethnographically driven theories of spatial
politics, whether working in a global, postcolonial, subaltern, or comparative urbanism
framework. The task of understanding and connecting the plurality of urban political expressions
against the juggernaut of developmentalism across the world remains critical.
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CHAPTER 1
The Colonial Disorder of Things:
Early Urban Development in Bombay
“Autobiography has to do with time, with sequence and with what makes up the continuous flow of life. Here, I am
talking of a space, of moments and discontinuities.” —Walter Benjamin, One Way Street (1932)

Introduction
The urban history of Mumbai detailed in this chapter situates the complex story of colonial and
capitalist development on the Indian subcontinent and in a world context, and the vortex-like
nature of its urbanization that has connected and reshaped the lives and histories of countless
millions of people. This chapter identifies the historical origins of contemporary planning
paradoxes and politics, exploring the vicissitudes of urban politics and policies since the colonial
era that have produced the space and politics of the city. It reveals the structures, processes, and
class politics that undergirded Bombay’s uneven development. The chapter highlights the
various outcomes of uneven urbanization enabled by selective and class-driven planning and
governance policies and what impact those have had on the people of Bombay over the past
three-hundred-and-fifty years of its history since the 1660s. This uneven development has also
shaped the strange and paradoxical urban world from which many city dwellers to this day
attempt to fashion individual and collective life “after their own desire.”12 In short, the history
presented here sketches out complex contestations over space and sovereignty that have shaped
the city.

12

Harvey, David. “The Right to the City.” New Left Review. 53, September-October 2008. Quoted from Robert
Park, On Social Control and Collective Behavior, Chicago 1967, p. 3.
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“The Cinderella of English Settlements in India”
The seven islands that were to eventually become present-day Mumbai were little more than an
“inhospitable fishing hamlet” surrounded by mud flats when it came into British possession in
February 1665 as a royal gift on the marriage of Charles II.13 Indeed, the Crown quickly
transferred its “worthless possession” to the East India Company for an annual rent of £10 in
1668, who in turn considered abandoning it on several occasions. In all likelihood, that should
have been the end of an unremarkable beginning, and indeed, it was so for a century and a half as
“Bombay remained ‘the Cinderella of the English settlements in India: the poorest, unhealthiest
and most despised’” (Chandavarkar 2009:31).
Yet this perception of Bombay was almost certainly at odds with those earliest colonial
administrators and collaborators whose self-ascribed task was to develop the city ‘by God’s
assistance.” Parsi barrister Phiroze Malabari zealously referred in his legal accounts of the city
from 1661–1726 to the earliest days of Bombay as “one of the best governed and certainly the
healthiest city in the East (1910: 11).14 Such was the assessment at a time when it was said that

13. The island’s earliest moments of “development” began with noble Portuguese subjects who first leased the
Island of the Good Life (“Ilha da Boa Vida”) in 1554 from the King of Portugal under agreement that they
“improve” it. Development existed mainly to facilitate trading along Portugal’s trade routes across the subcontinent.
Trading of silk, muslin, chintz, onyx, rice, cotton and tobacco occurred between the Portuguese and indigenous
inhabitants. Thus Portuguese development was limited to a warehouse, a monastery, a fort, and a shipbuilding yard
on the main island. There were scattered mansions for the wealthy as well. In 1661, the seven islands were granted
to the British as part of Portuguese crown’s dowry to Charles II, which at the time of his marriage to Catherine of
Braganza, also included Tangiers as well as trading privileges in Brazil and the East Indies. The Portuguese retained
possession of Salsette, Mazagaon, Parel, Worli, Sion, Dharavi, and Wadala for some years, making the transition to
British rule difficult.
14. According to The Spectator September 24 1910, No. 4291: “Sir George Clarke wrote, ‘of the early days with
which Mr. Malabari deals, and man has laid a heavy hand upon the natural beauties which many visitors have
recorded. A thick pall of smoke, the wasteful outpouring of numberless chimneys, overhangs the island and obscures
the splendid background of the Western Ghats. Yet when the sunset paints the waters of the harbour and tinges the
sails of the old world craft that still ply their trade unchanged since the time of the Angrias, or when at night the
necklace of lights embraces the noble sweep of Back Bay under the stars, none can deny the fascinations of the great
Eastern Gate of India, of the city which, in Gerald Aungier’s words, was to be built ‘by God’s assistance’. . . . While
the wealth of Bombay tends more and more to flow to Indians of many classes, British administration has left an
indelible impress upon the great city, although the guiding hand is now lightly felt.”
http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/24th-september-1910/24/the-beginnings-of-bombay
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“three years was the average duration of European life”; “two mussouns (monsoons) are the age
of a man”; and of children born there “not one in twenty live beyond their infant days.”15 Praise,
in ready circulation by those who benefited from the city’s economic and political development,
was heaped particularly on the “Father of Bombay” Gerald Aungier, Governor of the Island in
1669. The Governor presided over East India Company’s schemes for Bombay. He was handed
London’s city plans following the Plague Year and Great Fire in 1666, and with that, established
Bombay’s first commercial and political credentials, founding a mint and court system,
recruiting traders and artisans from Surat to settle on the islands, and also forming Bombay’s
first police force, the Bhandari Militia, in 1672.16

Figure 2: Demonstração da Fortaleza de Mombaim (Demonstration of the Fortress of Mumbai), 1635, a Portuguese
map of Bombay indicates the early urban infrastructure (warehouses, fort, ship building year, houses and mansions).
[Harvard University holdings]. Source: “Bombay: History of a City” in Trading Places , British Library
Archives,http://www.bl.uk/learning/histcitizen/trading/bombay/history.html.
15

Source: “Bombay: History of a City” in Trading Places, British Library Archives,
http://www.bl.uk/learning/histcitizen/trading/bombay/history.html
16
According to commentary in the British weeklies, “Aungier strove to supplement the British laws in force in his
factory by the employment of indigenous panchayats for the settlement of disputes, and thus anticipated an
administrative device which has been revived in our own time” (“The Beginnings of Bombay.” The Spectator
September 24, 1910, no. 4291).
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As an early colonial city, Bombay was imagined as little more than an imperial base for
securing maritime trade and as a major node in an expanding export-oriented network for
communications and military operations in India. As such, the development of political
organization and the economic systems in Bombay would remain subordinate to commercial
trading and remained largely so in 1687 when it was made headquarters of the British East India
Company on India’s west coast.17
This commercial objective is reflected in the earliest planning of the city. Spatially, the
town originated as a fortified harbor area on the southeastern tip of the island within and largely
against a more dispersed eastern coastal region arrayed with the imposing and antagonistic
Mughal, Maratha, Sidhi populations as well as Portuguese and Dutch trading communities that
posed a threat to the Company’s holdings and tradings.18 A fortified area for European settlement
in the southeast corner of the main island, with walls and sea-facing defenses from earlier
Portuguese manors, gardens, and “factories” (trading posts), was the nucleus of early colonial
development driven by commercial trade. Yet this was not a city built on a blank slate. There
was agricultural cultivation on oarts (farms) “of coconut, date and brab (palmyra or tadgola)” as
well as rice paddies and saltpans on the central and northern parts of the island. These were
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As the imperial lines of urban development were being drawn at the dawn of the Victorian era, Bombay
developed in relation to a larger territorial ambition to bring various urban centers in India into a coordinated
network of capitalist relations of wealth and resource extraction and colonial administration. Indian towns and cities
were central to the British Empire, and as such, colonization was central to the process of Indian urbanization. The
British drove a wave of urbanization through the establishment of new towns and cities that both diverged from
indigenous towns and created new towns whole cloth—varying in type and scale from small hill stations and canal
colony, to the Presidency towns where territorial administration was concentrated, and eventually metropolitan port
centers of Calcutta (Kolkata), Madras (Chennai), and Bombay (Mumbai). The control and use of “urban” and
“rural” land undergirded these twin processes of imperial expansion and indigenous urbanization, and served as the
foundational linkage between the city, the village, wealth and revenue extraction and apparatuses of administrative
control.
18
The Dutch attacked Bombay in 1673; piracy was barely resisted by fortification; between 1678 and 1690, Moghul
armies repeatedly attacked Bombay, torching Mahim and razing the Mazagon Fort in June 1690 before British
payments to the Moghul Empire concluded the affair. In 1737, Salsette was captured by the Maratha Empire and
most of the Portuguese provinces in Bombay was ceded to the Marathas in 1739.
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inhabited by koliwadas and sonkolis (fisherfolk), agris (cultivators), and bhandaris (toddy
tappers), kunbis (tillers), all among the earliest settlers of Bombay. Precolonial settlements
beyond the fortified area presented few barriers for land appropriation and reclamation, and
existing developments largely yielded to the wholesale reorganization of space for colonial rule.
Inscribed within Portuguese-built walls was “Fort town,” the British-occupied quarter divided
since the beginning of the colonial era by an informal residential segregation. Europeans
dominated the south of town; to the north were native elites—traders, merchants, and artisans.
The town itself was the scene of both residential and commercial affairs. This mixed
town settlement belies the class logic of segregation that otherwise divided Europeans, native
elite, and native workers. Thus, the European colonial quarter was home to natives as well, but
was separated from the Indian quarter of lower strata by an open square (maidan). This was the
site of growing tension and mutual mistrust in the coming years. The old and new “Native
Town” was populated by a heterogeneous mix of class, caste, and religious communities:
merchants and financiers from Gujarat, artisans, petty commodity producers and informal
laborers from Deccan, Konkan and Gujarat.
Bombay, as other port cities of the Indian Ocean, was a plural society (Ho 2006). As such
there were many actors in the vast drama of land and wealth accumulation that accompanied
early urban development. There were Parsis who settled in the nascent city during the Portuguese
era mainly acting as brokers for labor and construction materials. It was the subsequent arrival of
many Indian and British merchants of cotton cloth that led to the development of Bombay’s trade
by the end of the seventeenth century. Between 1661 and 1675, there was a sixfold increase in
the city population from ten thousand to sixty thousand. By 1676, the British policy of getting
Parsi weavers to settle in the city was well established. “Cloth investment” on the island city

31

“was one of Company’s principal concerns” (Dobbin 1996: 82). Recruitment to the city of
various classes and masses was selective, based on the requirements of early British commerce
and industry. Yet want and opportunity drew people into the city from all over the South Asian
subcontinent. The city quickly became a home to a number of different lived experiences of
labor and subsistence in the city. This more than anything else created the conditions for a
heterogeneous population that gave Bombay its early cosmopolitan character.
The British at this time counted less than one percent of the population. By the late
eighteenth century, native overcrowding on the prized lands of Fort, with its wall security and
proximity to the harbor, pushed the town to settlements beyond the fortifications. As the city
grew more congested with residents, laborers, and merchants, native elites inched into other
predominantly European areas, from Malabar and Cumballa Hills, to Breach Candy and
Mahalaxmi. The poorer parts of the Native town, however, grew disordered as it became
increasingly congested. “Offensive” and “polluting” industries were relocated to areas just north
of Town, where in the coming decades a bourgeoning laboring class would increasingly find
their survival in both home and industry (this was where, in the 1850s, the first mills cropped
up).

Commercial and Spatial Development
The East India Company largely confined its control and use of the narrow peninsula to the
concentrated area of the fort and eventually “port town” in the south, sequestered from insecure
lands to the north by a wall built between 1716 to 1723. It eventually expanded from Fort to
Salselle; from the sea to the coast; and then from the coast inwardly. This was the first in a
number of spatial paradoxes in the city’s development: fortifications and wall constructions, the
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development of a fort within of a port town, and the inward concentration of colonial settlements
here necessarily imposed isolation and self-protection.
The character of urban development in this period arose through a tenuous balance of
defense and confrontation as well as integration and dependency. While the British Company
eventually came to rule large areas of India with its own private armies, exercising military
power and assuming administrative functions, it was not particularly keen on disrupting the
balance of powers with the Marathas, who in large part regained control of the mainland to the
east (from Mughal rule in 1533) and Salsette (from the Portuguese in 1737–1739), when they
became neighbors to the Company. It was only the annexed Peshwa lands in the Deccan
following the third Anglo-Maratha war in 1819 that propelled Bombay to the seat of British
power in western India. Historian Rajat Kanta Ray (1998) argues that the emergent economy
stoked by the British in the eighteenth century was a form of “plunder” (depleting the food and
money stocks and of imposing high taxes that in part caused a series of great famines) and was
no doubt a catastrophe for the traditional economies during the preceding Mughal Empire.
Tellingly, the colloquial Hindustani word for plunder, “loot,” entered the English lexicon in the
late eighteenth century and came into common usage in Britain and its empires abroad.
As economic opportunities gradually emerged against an otherwise insecure climate of
trading and defense, the Company set about the task of opening up the islands for the further
development of Bombay for trade and commerce by constructing a quay, customs houses,
warehouses, ramparts (forts) and a port (where the Gateway of India now stands), market places,
and housing, and a harbor that could berth up to twenty ships. The introduction of civil lines for
colonial officials and cantonment for military quarters to the planning of the built environment
radically changed the use and conception of the traditional city. With administrative and defense
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infrastructure more secure, South Bombay soon became a commercial hub as new warehouses
were established.
The colonial administration undertook land reclamations as early as 1698, with major
works beginning in 1710 when breaches in the north closed tidal waters of Mahim bay and creek,
to be followed by the closing of the breaches between Worli and Mahim, and still later the
Hornby Vellard. By 1710, the construction of Bombay Castle was complete, which fortified the
islands from sea attacks by European pirates and the Marathas. In 1728, a Mayor’s court was
established in Bombay and a Judge-Advocate was appointed for the purpose of civil
administration, which extended to city limits. The first reclamation was a temporary work in
Mahalaxmi on the creek separating Bombay from Worli.
Between 1716 and 1725, the crescent-shaped enclosed area of the fort was home to
British colonials and natives alike. Reliance on imported Surati traders (Buniyas) for trade
ensured the extension of property rights to Indian elite merchant communities. The Gujarati
mercantile class was poised to be partners in the commercial development of the city. Their
asking price was a list of demands centered on free land, ethnic autonomy, and respectability.
B.R. Ambedkar details such demands in his 1948 Maharashtra As a Linguistic Province: “that
no Englishman, Portuguese, or other Christian nor Muhammadan shall be permitted to live
within their compound or offer to kill any living creature there; the right to carry an umbrella
(presumably to glorify the aura of their status).” Most importantly was their demand for “land in
South Bombay free of rent to build a house or warehouse.”
The fortified harbor town’s utility in the 1730s as a natural harbor was assessed for
shipbuilding and deployment for the security of trade routes across the Indian Ocean less
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dominated by Mughul trade in Surat, but still otherwise threatened by piracy.19 The shipbuilding
industry started in Bombay in 1735. The Naval Dockyard was established in the same year, with
the Bombay Dock built in 1750, the first dry-dock to be commissioned in Asia. Under new
building rules set up in 1748, many houses were demolished and the population was
redistributed, partially on newly reclaimed land. Between 1784 and 1845, four raised causeways
were constructed that welded together the disconnected islands.
Linebaugh (2014) suggests that the city and the commons appear as contrasting historical
formations, the first antagonism appearing between the city and the productive hinterlands from
which it draws surplus. He speaks of the logic of enclosure manifest in the function and built
landscape of the town as an “urban theater of power” whose operations centered around
principles of law (the court, the prison), money (the bank), and the commodity (the port and the
factory), what he calls the “threefold essence of the city” (Linebaugh 2014: 28). In its forts,
courts, and ports, as well as its factories, prisons, and other institutions of administrative power,
from a burgeoning colonial station to a teeming metropolis, Bombay’s development “has
embodied in all of these functions the principle of enclosure. . . .The great age of confinement
begins—the hospital, the factory, the barracoon, the prison, the ship, insane asylum, old age
home, the crèche, the school, barracks—become sealed capsules where the commanding
principle (as Bentham termed it) prevailed.” (2014: 24, 26) The urban spatial production of
empire in the form of walls and enclosures built to protect commerce and trade from an outside,
to transfer wealth from the Indian interior to the city on the bay, and from the port and fort to the
British metropole oceans away, have evolved into the formal and informal sites of contemporary
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See Ho 2006, “Ecumenical Islam in an Oceanic World,” for context on Indian Ocean trade routes.
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power from which, as Linebaugh states, were “interiorized to enclose urban wealth from the
creation of commons in the city by workers who had lost their commons in the country.” (26)
As an outpost and port, Bombay played a key role in the history of colonial rule that
facilitated primitive accumulation in India. The commons of the swamp, the sea, and the
countryside were not only “outside” the early colonial city, but its original location. We find
commoners who were not merely rural transplants, but also original inhabitants who fished and
foraged in Mumbai’s island villages. While many have been separated from their commons over
this long period, it is significant to note how centuries of primitive accumulation, after which
followed more than a half century of managerial and entrepreneurial urban governance regimes,
have not managed to completely destroy communal and subsistence laboring practices, nor
displace them from the city itself.20 Indeed, they remain crucial sites of development struggles in
Mumbai to this day.
Dispossession and displacement have a long history as tools of economic and urban
development that facilitated the transformation of “nature” into urban space, from commons to
capitalist formation. This history is written through the “invisibility of the commons” arising
from “bourgeois vision. . . transmuted into the superiority of western economic ‘development’”
(Linebaugh 2014: 249, 251). We can also trace this history through competing sensibilities
around land use, namely the trajectory of divergences between Koliwadas (fisherfolks) and
Adivasis (tribal) self-administration of settlements, their spatial and social relations with regard
to life, livelihood, and planning; and the military and town planners of the British Empire.
Indeed, the contemporary urban commons of Mumbai are layered with these clashing histories.

20

Nor are their livelihood practices constitutive of isolated rural economies transposed to the city but in some cases
link to commodity and value chains that supply the entire city, region, and national economy (often through
“contracts with supermarket chains, restaurants and wholesalers whose super profits are based on workers’ selfexploitation.” Parthasarathy 2011: 57).
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A Cosmopolitan Collaboration
By 1780, Bombay had over thirty thousand inhabitants, of whom nearly 10 percent were Parsis,
while the European population was not more than one thousand (Dobbin 1996: 82). Failing to
realize adequate profits in its commercial trade of woven textiles to British markets and finding
few prospects for selling British goods in India, the British East India Company had considerable
debts owed worldwide. Exports of raw cotton from the Gujarati hinterland to China fomented a
“commercial revolution” that changed this bleak scenario and ushered in a stage of urbanization
into the hinterland that would revolutionize the urban-rural landscape.
The ethnic and communal composition of competitive Indian entrepreneurs who had a
hand in the development of Bombay explains the dynamism found in the business community
and its sway over municipal affairs. Ismaili muslims, Baghdadi and Bombay Jews, and Parsis
have had an important role in economic life of the city since its inception and indeed commanded
substantial amounts of land and capital. In addition to Parsis, there were Vanis and Bhatia caste
Hindus, Muslim Bohras, Khojas and Memons, as well as Sindh and Marwar businessmen. Even
Swiss and Japanese traders called Bombay home (Markovitz 1996: 42). In the context of weak
colonial administration and economic power, where isolation was not possible, it could not be
otherwise. The shetias [merchant princes] of Bombay were important to the British Raj in
Western India for both economic and political power. It was in collaboration in matters of wealth
that loyalty could be counted. Governer Sir Bartle Frere in 1862 noted of the Baghdadi Jews,
“They are like the Parsees [sic], a most valuable link between us and the natives—oriental in
origin and appreciation—but English in their objects and associations, and almost of necessity,
loyal” (quoted in Dobbin 1996: 94). British reliance on Indian merchants and financiers for
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commercial partnership and political collaboration compelled colonialist to cede space for a
dynamic and diverse class, ethnic, and religious composition of elite ruling class to emerge that
would command spatial and economic resources over the bourgeoning town and region the mideighteenth century onward. Early on, Bombay’s various elite classes enjoyed relative autonomy
in governance, planning, and business affairs in this manner. As such, economic and
administrative contact between British and variously composed Indian classes was key to
Bombay’s development.
Indian elites claimed their share of the city’s institution, allowing them from the 1830s
onward to be firmly entrenched in the public and political culture of the city as well as local
government, the Governor’s Court, and by 1880, wider representation in the Municipal
Corporation. Municipal affairs were governed by mostly autonomous—and sporadically
unmanageable—town councils, all composed of merchants. These councils had barely enough
powers for the effective management of their local affairs, and the ensuing lack of oversight of
the overall Company operations in India led to some grave abuses by Company officers or their
allies (physical assault, looting, theft, and other crimes associated with an occupying settler
protected by a rapidly growing security force). Nevertheless, these alliances between various
Indian groups and the British that formed the basis of an elite bloc in the city staved off crisis
and conflict by aligning along class and property lines rather than caste, race, and religion
difference.21 In this way, merchants, bankers, and industrialists who amassed power in the early

21. British policy since the beginning was to encourage self-governing councils (panchayats) amongst groups of
Indians (the Parsi panchayat was established between 1673 and 1728, ending in 1830).
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colonial development of Bombay would retain their power over the ensuing decades of imperial
rule, consolidating their sway over the direction of urban development.22

“A swarming, vivid, various humanity”
That is not to say that racism did not exist or that racial polarization did not impinge on a healthy
business environment in the late eighteenth century. It is just that a greater quest for money and
power united Indians and Britishers alike and as such both elite formations deployed racist and
class polarizing attitudes and strategies to suppress Bombay’s toiling classes. The British went
into partnership with Indian bankers and raised revenue through local tax administrators and kept
the old Mughal rates of taxation. This was piled on top of an onerous taxation system that
already took one-third of the produce of Indian cultivators. These same cultivators would be the
newcomers who arrived principally from Gujarat and Maharashtra in search of new economic
opportunities. Villagers from the Konkan coast and the Western Ghats manned the docks and
cotton textile mills. There were few incentives to disrupt the indigenous fisher villages and the
agrarian and communal settlements of the Koliwadas and Adivasis (who had inhabited the other
seven islands of Bombay more or less uninterrupted from 1000–1661 during the Magadhan
empire, Konkan Silhara family reign, and during the Gujarat Sultanate starting in 1343).
Municipal services and infrastructure, such as the city water system, were only proposed when
Bombay’s poorer residents protested and demanded water. The elites already had their own
private wells and opposed municipal public works that would service the lower strata of the city.
Philanthropy was their substitute for entitlements through the redistribution of wealth via taxes.

22. These same Indian capitalists traversed the Indian Ocean in search of greater profits, seeking into the 1920s to
turn East Africa, namely Kenya and Uganda, into an Indian sub-colony. Indeed, British colonialism was not British
alone.
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An account by a visitor to the Native town marveled at the “white men, brown men, yellow men,
chocolate men, and very nearly black men” and declared that ‘nowhere in London or in any other
European city that I know, except possibly Naples, have I ever seen anything like this swarming,
vivid, various humanity.”23 Thus did urbanization and urban governance depend upon racial and
class alliances between Indian merchants, clerks and petty colonial officers, as well as artisans
and migrant laborers.

The First Town Plan: Trial by Fire
A major fire in February 1803 devastated most of the city inside the old fort walls, its dense
markets and houses, and incited fervor among Company authorities for an effective spatial
reorganization of the town. This inaugurated the city’s first “deconcentration” efforts. Town
planning and nascent urban governance regimes sought effective barriers against unauthorized
settlement in the town and established a precedent of attacking the “right to reside in town.”
British administrators embraced the occasion to correct the large deficit in effective spatial
organization of the town by relocating parts of the native population to outside the walls.24
Attention was paid to questions of a rational and planned spatial use of the city. Entire
settlements in the inner city were demolished, and large cordons were created to segregate and
constrain the flow of natives into colonial quarters.
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J. A. Spencer, “Native Life,” in R.P. Arkaria (ed.) The Charm of Bombay: An Anthology of Writing in Praise of
the First City in India, quoted in Kidambi 2007: 22.
24
Robert Peckham describes in Empires of Panic: Epidemics and Colonial Anxieties (Columbia University Press,
2015) how colonial authorities interpreted and utilized moments of panic and crisis to further their colonial and
imperial ambitions. See also The Shek Kip Mei Myth: Squatters, Fires and Colonial Rule in Hong Kong, 1950–1963
by Alan Smart (Hong Kong University Press, 2005); and Anxieties, Fear and Panic in Colonial: Empires on the
Verge of a Nervous Breakdown, edited by Harald Fischer-Tiné (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
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Figure 3: A View of Bombay from Malabar Point during the Fire of 1803 (Engraver: Barth, J.S.; Medium: Aquatint,
coloured, Date: 1804). British Library.

Figure 4: Map of Bombay, 17 February 1803. Image taken from ‘Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency (pp 391).
Edited by Sir James M. Campbell. General index, by R. E. Enthoven.
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Separation but not segregation emerged as the paradigm of urban relations.25 Although
meaningful distinctions were long observed between Fort and town, the “English” and the
“Black” areas of the city, collaboration in business and politics took precedence over
segregationist tendencies practiced elsewhere in the subcontinent. This formalized the division of
social space into a European “Fort” and a “Native Town” to the north. The shift in spatial policy
was therefore not simply racial. As Chandavarkar states, “social segregation in Bombay was
always more fervently imagined than it was consistently practised” (2009: 19). The planning
concern with a thriving and productive built environment suitable to the needs of the Company
took precedent. A new town, based upon a grid, was to be built on reclaimed lands in
Bhuleshwar and Khara Talao, extending north toward Byculla. Rapid commercial and population
growth would defy the spatial order of the first imagined plan of Bombay. By 1849, 40 percent
of the entire population of Bombay island were contained within sections of Bhendi Bazaar alone
(Kidambi 2007: 33) From then on, the Indian town spread northward to Byculla and
Kamathipura and westwards through Khetwadi and Girguam towards Chaupati.
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Over the coming decades, planning was increasingly utilized to impose separation through the use of open spaces,
canals, and railway lines.
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Figure 5: Map of the Native Town of Bombay, 1855. London: Vacher & Sons, Stationers (84 x 102 cm). It is almost
certain that this map was created for reasons of governance and police operations. There are distinct sections on the
map which likely serve to delegate police forces to specific areas, as well as demarcation of water tanks and
religious institutions.

Capitalization of Land and Industry
Land has been decisive in Bombay’s history, the formation of a colonial state, and its
differentiated class relations. Control over the eighteen square miles was crucial for the stability
and expansion of British power, both in the city proper, eastward in the hinterlands and
eventually, across the entire territory of the subcontinent, and across the Indian Ocean. Bombay’s
most significant developments were tied to these shifts in territorial arrangements and their
ability to facilitate the advent of an industrial era.
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By the early 1800s, Bombay had a recognizable capitalist face with a high degree of class
differentiation (Farooqui 2006). The first land surveys on Bombay took place in 1811 and 1827;
and again in 1865 and 1872. Both sets of surveys provide us with reliable indications that the
population in this period grew considerably (Dossal 1995:90).26 More importantly, these surveys
were essential to the reorganization of land use in the city and furthering class differentiation.
Yet they sought to “rationalize” and constrain various land rights and obligations, customary
rights, communal rights, and inheritances. Colonial administrators imposed greater control
through uniform land tenure that converted previous tenure arrangements into a regime of
freeholding property that would enable British and Indian speculative land acquisition and urban
development. At the time, the surveys identified nine different types of land tenure and
ownership, and demarcated areas under each type. Thus did the surveys defined the legal claim
of “Company land” and established the category of “encroachments.” The 1872 survey
established all land on the island as “government” land, ending definitively the long-existing
controversy of ownership, placing the Company in a stronger position when dealing with
inhabitants of the island. “Resistance took the form of rioting and petitioning and reflected the
anxiety of various Indian communities as the State began to make its presence felt by replacing
traditional rights on land by a new dispensation” (Prakash 1993: 2119). Land was both the means
of more effective urban governance and the first sites of resistance. The whole mapping process
was deemed “the most complete survey of the whole island in every detail” and facilitated the
raising of land rents that would define the coming period of private ownership. (Quoted in
Dossal 1995:99)

26. According to the land surveys undertaken in 1811–27 and 1865–1872, the population increased form 230,000 to
500,000 in this first period; and from 500,000 to 816,000 in the latter.
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Capitalist property rights strengthened over time, enabling land rents and building
ownership to return vast profits, but also created a more expansive accumulation strategy based
on land revenues in the city. This gave rise to a significant “class faction” of landlords amongst
British and native owners. (Hazareesingh 2001) In 1855, Parsis owned approximately half the
land in Bombay predominantly because three or four Parsi families had acquired large portions
of land in the previous decade (Dobbin 1996: 90).
Shipbuilding in the city’s dockyards became another lucrative industry for collaboration
and profit amongst colonial and native elites (as in the earliest days of Bombay’s development).
Driven in part by innovations such as the steam engine in the shipbuilding industry (though still
repressed by British laws preventing Indian ships to sail), and in part by the Opium War in
China, Indian mercantilism inspired an early wave of industrialism. It was nascent Parsi
industrialists who ventured to establish cotton mills in Bombay while the British exported cotton
from India to Britain and then returned it via industrial Lancashire in the form of cotton textiles.
Already having amassed a fortune in earlier trade and acquired city lands through commercial
collaboration with the British, these Parsis were primed to take advantage of the vast supply of
raw cotton, ample demand in China, and an abundant supply of low-waged laborers who could
be recruited to the city from the hinterlands.27 Thus, it was the Parsi-led cotton industry that
“stimulated the formation of a modern Indian entrepreneurial class” (Dobbin 1996: 90).28
As such, colonial rule was not British alone. Indeed, the British were not in full control
but instead players in what was primarily an Indian drama of coordination and consolidation of
power; and in which the British rise to power was calibrated through their cooperation with

27

For more on India in a world context of imperial “war capitalism,” see Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global
History. Knopf, 2015.
28
“Of the thirteen cotton mills established in Bombay in the period 1854–1870, nine owed their existence to Parsi
entrepreneurs. (Dobbin 1996: 90)
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Indian elites.29 It is in this context that in 1855 Bombay became home to the Native Share and
Stock Brokers Association, Asia’s first stock exchange.

Bombay and its Hinterland
Bombay, from its improbable origins as a military trading post, was to become an imperial city
within a new world market poised to achieve dominance over both the Indian Ocean to the west
and a vast hinterland to the east. Early on in the nineteenth century, it was trading in salt, rice,
ivory, cloth, lead and sword blades with other Indian ports as well as with Arabian cities. The
British trading activities rose to account for half of the world’s trade, particularly trade in basic
commodities that included cotton, silk, indigo dye, salt, saltpeter, tea and opium. This great
outwardly expanding economy quickly necessitated much greater and more efficient use of land
and labor within the city.
The rising global connections to the urban economy certainly imprinted on Bombay a
distinct colonial urban form as a port city surrounded by native industries. Wealth in and from
the entrepôt, and from its surrounding hinterland, was largely driven by cultivation and trade of
two commodities: Afghani opium exports destined for China and Indian cotton primarily to
England. Trade with China of cotton and opium facilitated the only profitable part of the
Company’s early exploits in the region (Chandavarkar 2009). Both commodities played a large
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Nevertheless, achieving colonial control over India was a catalyst for the Industrial Revolution, which began less
than twenty years after the British conquest of India in 1757. The East India Company accelerated the British
Industrial Revolution, developing for the preceding several decades (from the 1780s until 1850), by providing
necessary capital in the form of collected revenues and seized raw cotton from indigenous cotton farmers. Both
capital and raw material would steadily flow from the subcontinent while prying open a vast South Asian and world
market for British manufactured textiles imported into India without duties or tariffs. This conjuncture gave rise to
modern industry, the engine of Britain’s Industrial Revolution being its textile industry. It was truly after the
American war of Independence that the British turned fuller attention to India as an imperial symbol of power as
“the jewel in the British crown. For more on this history as it pertains specifically to cotton and textiles, see Stephen
Yafa, Cotton: The Biography of a Revolutionary Fiber. Penguin, 2006.
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role in a process of urbanization driven by new technologies and infrastructures, such as
railways, ports and wharfing facilities, factories, and warehouses. In a few short years in the
early eighteenth century, the colonial port city was transformed into an industrial metropolis.
Even during the height of this influence, the urban character of Bombay emerged as
much from within a rural and village setting as it did from an outside colonial influence.30 This
hinterland would not cohere around the city until well after the successful annexation of Gujarat
in 1803 and the Maratha Empire in 1818. In 1830, the island city was connected to the Deccan
by roadway for the first time. Urbanization created an urban-rural continuum across a vast
hinterland. While geographically differentiated from rural life, commercial forays into the
countryside both preserved and transformed primarily agricultural labor economies while
cultivating occupations in the city. Improved communication with this hinterland and rising
opium prices were necessary for the urban expansion into the countryside that would allow
Bombay to truly become the “gateway” to India.
Urbanization and the related capitalist organization of cultivation in the hinterland drove
a wave of largely caste-based migration that altered the urban structure of labor organization and
thus the social composition of the city. In addition to distress migration after monsoon failures,
rapid economic growth opened the city to migrants from throughout Western Maharashtra
(Kunbi and Maratha castes from the Konkan coast and Deccan plateau, Ratnagari, Satara, and
south Gujarat) and beyond the Bombay Presidency (especially from the United Provinces).
Migration was structured through caste, kin, and village connections; mutual aid networks in the

30. “The Indian town in many cases is an extension of the village, carrying over the same social unities and
attitude…. The linkages are so close and so pervasive that it is myopic, misleading, to see the town apart from the
region from which brought it into being or sustained its economic activity (in fact the total dependence of the town
on the region which it serves; no one has expressed this more clearly than Lewis Mumford in Culture of Cities,
London, 1938:3).” (S.C. Misra in Banga 1991:2) Banga, Indu. 1991. The City in Indian History. New Delhi:
Manohar Publishers and Distributors. (S.C. Misra, “Urban History in India,” pp. 1–9).
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city generally grew out of these alliances. The explosion in the city’s population remained firmly
tied to villages and rural life, ensuring that the commercial and laboring culture of Bombay was
never the province of any one caste, linguistic, or religious group. According to the late historian
Rajnarayan Chandavarkar (1994), caste and kinship competition for labor in the city
consequently activated these same distinctions in the hinterland. Migration was mainly forced
through breakdown of the rural economy and a consequence of the city becoming a viable
alternative to the oppression of the landed upper caste in the villages. The urban identity of
Bombay grew out of these migratory trends, the city assuming the condescending image of
savior in its ability to absorb the desperate, make productive the destitute, and all the while
maintain a detached indifference to the lesser fortunes of the country.31
The different migrant lower caste experiences of work and opportunities (as well as
barriers) for mobility became part of the political landscape of the city as well as the caste
character of spatial politics of the city. Mahars, for example, enjoyed relative caste mobility and
were able to insert themselves into the industrial economy as coolies on the docks and in the
building trades, millworkers in the textile factories, and hired hands on the railways. They also
found their way into the ranks of police and military, as well as in municipal occupations such as
public works and sanitation.32 Deviating from typical processes of urbanization, these forms of
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Thus it drew factory workers and mill hands from the hinterlands of India in the way Walter Benjamin spoke of
the dark miasma of Marseilles in 1929 as a “yellow studded maw of a seal with salt water coming out between the
teeth…. When this gullet opens to catch the black and brown proletarian bodies thrown to it by ship’s companies
according to their timetables, it exhales a stink of oil, urine and printer’s ink …” (Benjamin [1929] 1999: 232).
32
Lower caste experiences in the industrial urban economy would later foster a movement against unequal status
and treatment in the 1920s. This caste identity based in a movement for dignity and rights would sustain itself for
decades. By the 1960s, the city would be the center of the Dalit movement, hosting conferences of the Depressed
classes and headquarters for its organizations and political parties. Though largely confined to electoral and
constitutional realms, the movement occasionally propelled itself into new and direct expressions in the city (such as
the burning of the Manusmitri (a Brahmanical text sanctifying caste discrimination). Where advances in the anticaste movement failed to push the boundaries of upper caste consciousness (for temple entry, inter-dining, sharing
community resources such as water), lower caste workers excelled in economic and political agitations, as well as
education and social improvements for lower castes. See chapter three and four for further discussion of the
mobilization of urban caste politics.
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labor however were not meaningfully separate from agrarian life. This too was a factor in the
city’s bourgeoning and differentiated cosmopolitanism.33 Educated lower caste workers would
relay their struggles back and forth to their poor peasant brethren in the countryside (Omvedt
1994: 142).
Chambhars, on the other hand, continued their traditional occupations as leather
craftsmen, but now performed their labor both directly to supply the factory system and for a
more urban and anonymous clientele whose tastes were influenced by the industrial economy; in
both, they faced conditions of wage and contractual work vastly different from the permanent
and servile jajmani system (wherein higher landed castes extract services from lower castes in
exchange for grain). Matangs, another part of the untouchable groups of Bombay, populated the
ranks of the largely unskilled labor force. In all cases, however, caste continued to shape
segregation in hiring practices, living conditions, and access to urban amenities.34

Infrastructural Development of the Mercantile City
As an expanding city, Bombay was able to absorb distress-driven rural migration and even
represent itself as a beacon for those “worthy destitutes” of the famine of 1820 (Masselos;
quoted in Prakash 1993:2119). Yet Bombay had not yet established a municipal corporation and
other city institutions when it was hit by its own water famine in 1824. Bombay City Hall was
built during the period from 1820 to 1835. New construction during this time transformed the

33

Cf Chandavarkar 2009: 17–18 (“Bombay’s perennial modernities”) for a corresponding description of the social
composition of Bombay at this time.
34
In the ensuing industrial period, they were often excluded from working class housing (chawls) by landlords and
residents alike, and therefore were often force into improvised huts and sheds (zavlis) of corrugated iron and wood,
without light or ventilation, taps, latrines, or water supply. Eventually, accommodations were made available, albeit
still along caste lines, in the municipal chawls built by the BDDB and BIT in 1924. These would serve as the home
of the Ambedkarite movement for generations to come, sustaining the Republican Party of India and the Dalit
Panthers in the post-Independence era.
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urban landscape, such as the Wilson College Chaupati (1832), Malabar Hill; the first access road
to Malabar Point was built in 1828 (the Governor moved there in 1885). The construction of the
new mint commenced in 1825, while the Bombay Chamber of Commerce was established in
1836 and the oldest bank in the city, the Bank of Bombay, was established in 1840.

Figure 6: Maps of the seven islands of Bombay before and after land reclamation, 1843 and 1893 (James Douglas,
Map of the Island of Bombay, “Bombay and Western India. A series of stray papers” (1893), British Library.
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Meanwhile, reclamation projects slowly connected the seven separate islands into one
land mass. In 1838, the islands of Colaba and Little Colaba were connected to Bombay by the
Colaba Causeway. Most of the reclaimed lands of what constituted the city had only a few
decades earlier been submerged by the sea. The expansion of physical land only exacerbated
planning pressures. Uneven economic and urban growth rapidly outpaced infrastructural
demands on the bourgeoning commercial, industrial, and international port city. Yet owing to
severe governmental and economic disinclination toward social development at odds with
commercial and industrial development, coherent social policy and planning was severely
lacking. The eschewing of social planning at the advent of industrializing Bombay represented
both an economic and aesthetic calculus as ruling class urban ambitions consolidated perceptions
about how the lower stratas lived, their customs and habits, and what might be considered
minimum standards of living.
Late eighteen-century Victorian values and imaginaries were pervasive in Bombay—from
the introduction of western education and law, leisure and industry, the twin growth of wealth
and the built environment from industrial colonial modernity and high architectural styles—and
increasingly symbolized the power and prowess of colonial rule over the city. These ideological
and aspirational effects on local elites, especially the “westernizing” Parsi propertied and
business class, is not to be underestimated, for it did a lot to forge the cosmopolitan and eclectic
political elite culture in Bombay. So too did it cause a radical bifurcation of the urban fabric into
poorer indigenous forms and experiences of city life, and the haute-style of the colonial
administration and its collaborationist strata of Indian elites.
The British could hardly finance municipal “improvement” through taxation of their
“favored collaborators: the city’s sheiks, merchant princes, and millowners”—“all fat, rich, and
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happy,” as one report to Queen Victoria phrased it (Chandavarkar 2009: 35). Nevertheless, elites
indulged their civic pride in governance and planning affairs mainly through philanthropy and
highly selective and self-serving legacy projects for Bombay’s “improvement,” endowing
hospitals, schools, libraries, and university buildings. This could not in the slightest address the
fact that the rate of economic growth spurred by cotton was quickly outpacing urban
development. At the same time, the role of Bombay’s mill owners and the expanding industrial
economy in influencing urban relations and political culture translated into bourgeois mistrust of
workers as unruly and undeserving across the city’s landscape. This would have a far-reaching
effect on elite understandings of what provisions and services were expected from local
government and simultaneously weakened the chances that Bombay’s working classes would be
able to successfully direct their concern for welfare to a receptive governing elite. Indeed, basic
urban infrastructure was allocated by the state along strict class lines. Not incidentally, one of the
first municipal funds was established in 1845 to finance the operation of the city police.

Territorial Colonialism and New State Spaces
The Indian Rebellion of 1857, what Marx once presciently referred to as the ‘First Indian War of
independence’, raised perhaps for the first time for the British the specter of widespread
ungovernability in colonial India.35 It led to a frantic reorganization of political power and, with
the Government of India Act 1858, the consolidation of state power in the form of the Raj.36

35

During Company rule over the city, Bombay was to become an important colonial “gateway” on the western coast
of India for wealth extraction from the hinterland and the rest of the subcontinent. Imperialist and mercantilist
ambitions were at the center of the class-nature of city’s development, largely unrestricted by preexisting settlement;
as such, colonial and elite interests took up desirable lands. Defense and confrontation emerged as twin strategies to
consolidate power in Bombay and establish control over the hinterlands, both vital to the colonial project. The
construction of territorial rule combined British countenance and hubris in matters of governance with industrial
ambitions.
36
“The suppression of the rebellion of 1857 marked the end of the protracted denouement of the East India
Company as a governing apparatus and consolidated the shift from mercantile to territorial colonialism. It also
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Following the dissolution of East India Company rule, the British government took on a different
approach to the form and function of the town, seeking to diminish the history of military
conquest and highlight instead the city as a lively center for imperial trade and commerce.
With regard to Bombay, the rebellion initiated an unprecedented and cautious process of
sanitary reform, understood as a requisite for economic and commercial prosperity. Bombay had
increasingly preoccupied and fascinated British administrators as both “a laboratory and
exemplar of urban planning” where accumulated urban knowledge from both metropolis and
colony could be assessed and mastered in the form of civic norms, practices, and statistics (e.g.
the strange fact that Bombay had a lower mortality rate than London in the 1860s and in some
cases a better health and hygiene record) (Varma 2011: 128).
A new “colonial state space” with both reform and sovereign repression at its center, was
created in the post-1857 era (Goswami 2004).37 The demolition of ramparts and reclamations of
the sea gave way to the use of additional lands for this ambition, utilizing imposing architectural
projects such as the Bombay High Court and the Municipal Corporation, as well as the Victoria
Terminus. As the commercial center of Bombay, the Fort district would now become the center
of an emerging colonial industrial modernism.
The antinomies of colonial urban development were there after better maintained in
institution, law, economy, and built environment, lest the specter of insurrection rise again. The
Raj strengthened and expanded its infrastructure via the court system, legal procedures, and
statutes which introduced new penal codes as well as new codes of civil and criminal procedure,

inaugurated a spectacular reworking of the institutional, political-economic, and spatial coordinates of the colonial
state, its technologies of power, and its material and epistemological modes of reproduction” (Goswami 2004: 8).
37
According to Goswami, “The making of colonial state space and the lived geographies it generated during the
post-1857 era—from railway journeys to the circulation of ever-more-reified money forms to the racialization of the
labor force to the localization of colonial pedagogical practices—framed the experience of colonial-domination- aslived for the vast majority of colonial subjects in colonial India” (2004:9).
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based largely on English law. It introduced many rules, regulations, and practices that aimed to
make Indian cities more easily manageable and legible to the British so that control over them
would be easier via the establishment of nominated municipal authorities. The Raj also took to
widening the roads, demolition of crowded areas, and the establishment of physical markers of
imperial colonial authority.38
Consider the changes that occurred within the city during this period of regional
connection and communication: the first-ever Indian railway line began operations between
Bombay and neighboring Thane over a distance of 21 miles on April 16, 1853. In 1857, the
University of Bombay was the first modern institution of higher education to be bestowed upon
India. In 1860, a central railway was established that connected Bombay to Gujarat via the
Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway (BB&CI) company, incorporated just five years
prior. This same company inaugurated the first suburban train line from Colaba in the southern
tip of the island to Virar, currently the northern most part of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region
(MMR). Meanwhile, telegraph lines were laid from 1850s onward, with five lines operating in
town by 1860. India’s first train embarked on its maiden voyage by steam from the Boree
Bunder Station in 1853. Expanding locomotive and communicative networks established deeper
connections to the hinterland that was essential to the city’s growth and to the development of
industrial capitalism in the region. The Bombay Port Trust was established in 1870 for the
development and administration of the port, and reclaimed 165 acres between 1873 and 1909 for
the improvement of the city’s docks (Chandvarkar 2009). Port facilities expanded between 1845
and 1859 to allow for steam shipping companies to serve Bombay. By 1847, there were nine

38

These dramatic events mirror the changes Haussmann ushered in from 1853 and 1870 after the French Revolution
of 1848 in which boulevards were introduced to make it easier for the army to maneuver and suppress armed
uprisings (six such uprisings happening between 1830 and 1848, all in the narrow, crowded streets).
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such steam ship operations, and with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, port activities
became even more robust. Imperial architectures in the following decades underscored British
dominion over the city: the telegraph office, the General Post Office, the Secretariat, the High
Court, and the University Library and Convocation Hall. Its loftiest of creations, the Victoria
Terminus, completed in 1888 and the Bombay Municipal Corporation, stamped the high style of
British architectural conquest on the city. The Government of India’s control over the railway
companies meant the colonial state had direct investments in urban land.
The central government acquired a substantial area of Mutunga for railway operations in
1904, sparking conflict amongst local government and landlords who derided the central
government for its “land hunger” that would seek “to turn the city into a station yard with a few
houses dotted about here and there” (Government of Bombay, ‘Medical proceedings, 1905’, 128,
as quoted in Hazareesingh 2001: 241). Land reclamation was necessary not only for the
commercial industrial propensity toward expansion, from which the need arose for new ports, as
well as drains, houses, and local markets, but also to conquer the pestilent swamps of the lowlying coastal islands.39 Over forty percent of the city of Bombay, especially its industrial and
dock areas and the commuting rail corridors, lay on low reclaimed land.40
The political will of the Bombay Presidency found the financial means to exert its rule
only when, due to the American Civil Wars’ effect on the global cotton market, a subsequent

39. The third phase of reclamations, launched by the Back Bay Reclamation Company, the most controversial of the
projects, came into being in 1863. Before East India Company rule came to an abrupt end it had reclaimed a
precious strip of land west of Queens Road (Maharishi Karve Road). Later, the Public Works Department stepped in
and committees and schemes proliferated.
40. The surface configuration and topography of present-day Mumbai and its suburbs is not natural but mostly
anthropogenic. The topographic contours of Brihan Mumbai (municipal city limits) have been visibly affected not
only by the creation of new land for urban settlement but also by the demolition and leveling of hills by quarrying to
meet the enormous needs for urban building material. Quarrying generated its own physiocultural landscape of pits
and depressions, overly steeped slopes liable for landslides (which occurs nearly every monsoon, mostly devastating
the precarious jopadpattis (squatter shanties) built upon them or in their wake).
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boom and general commercial expansion of 1861–1865 provided Bombay the capital requisite to
regulate and advance both industry and town alike. The British Raj invested heavily in
infrastructure such as canals and irrigation systems in addition to railways, telegraphy, roads and
ports. Tramway communication was instituted in Bombay by 1873. India built a modern railway
system in the late nineteenth century that was the fourth largest in the world. The railways at first
were privately owned and operated.41 Under Lord Elphinstone (1853–1860) and then Henry
Bartle Frere (1862–1867), administration was orderly, demand from Lancashire and Birmingham
and other cloth mills was rising “exponentially” and money was pouring in with the continuation
of the American war. The end of the war in 1865, however, ruined the biggest commercial
interests in “white gold” in the city. A speculation run (dubbed the Share Mania, 1864–1865)
fomented India’s first stock market crash, a commercial crisis and the ruin of the Bank of
Bombay, a key source for capital during the speculation mania, in 1866. The director of the bank,
Parsi industrialist Cowasji Jehanghir Readymoney, gifted the city a convocation hall, gave
handsomely to the university, an ophthalmic hospital, an art gallery and forty drinking water
fountains. Parsi and Gujarati brokers had already been trading in shares since 1850 at various
bureaus in Bombay, but the Bombay Stock Exchange would be born some seventeen years later.
The Back Bay Reclamation share, with face value of ₹ 5,000, traded at ₹ 50,000 in 1863 (shares
subsequently fell to under ₹ 2,000 in 1866). The entire city’s elite, the merchant princes of
Bombay, were—momentarily—in ruins.42

41

The railways were run by British administrators, engineers, and craftsmen. At first, only the unskilled workers
were Indians.
42
The city’s population dropped by 21 percent (There were estimated to be 816,000 people in Bombay in 1864; the
census of 1872 put the population at 644,000).
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Municipal Water
It was in this period that the first municipal water supply system in all of British India was
introduced (Dossal 1995, Anand 2011). In 1860, a debilitating drought forced the design and
construction of dams on the peripheries of the island city. Supply plans to exploit the water from
Vehar nala (canal) were in fact drawn a decade earlier, but the growth of the city’s population
instigated by the rate of industrial migration and rural distress meant that this scheme would
quickly be inadequate to the need. Otherwise and in earlier times of scarcity, such as 1854, water
would be brought by rail or boat to the city. Until 1860s, army peons (pukhalie) would bring
water to troops by bullock cart from wells in the Esplanade. British troops in Coloba were the
first to get piped water. Subsequent schemes to service other sections of the city (via water from
the river Tasso, Vehar and Tulsi lakes, and Bhandarwada reservoir) over the next twenty years
were also quickly found to be deficient for the needs wrought by the industrial expansion of the
city.
The development of water supplies and sanitation for the majority of the city’s
inhabitants had mostly been an afterthought in service first and foremost of the city’s business
interests. When water services were directed to the city’s toiling classes, it was mainly a
response to problems in management of labor and conditions of life (which was otherwise
largely a police issue). The majority of the city’s population could not afford the arrangements
necessary to ensure a steady flow of water. Most relied on dipping wells of water so impure they
were deemed according to health reports in 1875 to be “absolutely poisonous.”
The city was filled with the foul smells of an improper sewage system dependent on open
creeks and canals (nalas) that poured into the sea. In 1848, the two main roads most frequented
by Europeans in traversing the Native town (Girguam and Kalbaderee roads), were the first to
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have their gutters covered. But the interior arteries of the town remained neglected. Drains were
open and frequently clogged. Prior to 1860, when little of the ensuing reclamation had been done
in Bombay, a journey by rail, as an observer in 1855 put it, from “Bori Bunder to Byculla, or to
go into Mody Bay, was to see in the foreshore the latrine of the whole population of the native
town” (quoted in Chandavarkar 2009: 36).43 Pipe infrastructure in 1871, according to the Report
of the Health Officer for Bombay Town and Island, was: a “pitiable sight of men, women, and
children awaiting…eagerly and quarreling for the miserable dribble from it” (ibid.: 37) When, by
1925, Bombay had more sewers than any other city in the subcontinent, the poorest working
classes were afforded none. Sanitation was a labor issue in a more immediate sense, too.
Butchers and tanners, mainly low caste Hindu and Muslim, were perceived by town planning
officials as an acute threat to the unrelenting crises of health and hygiene and thus were the first
to be targets of denigration and regulation of “dangerous and offensive trades.” The
slaughterhouses were moved out of Bombay city to Bandra in the northern suburbs, where
special supply trains would satisfy the city’s needs.
In all, British attitudes (elites, police, salon humor, and journalistic accounts) derided
natives as lacking the propriety to maintain hygienic and orderly lives. This meant elites could
give a pass to wholesale urban improvement schemes because the people were simply not ready
for them. The menace of open defecation, for instance, would be addressed by stationing
“mounted policemen with hunting crops to keep a close eye on miscreants through poorer

43. Consider the metropolitan literature of related developments at the time: Friedrich Engels’ The Condition of the
Working Class in England [1845] (2009), a study of the industrial working class in Victorian England, similarly
highlights the slum housing and poor sanitation that Manchester’s industrial workings classes were made to submit
to. One can compare accounts to Manchester working class given by Engels, his critique of industrialization in
which the industrial workers had lower incomes than their pre-industrial peers and they lived in more unhealthy and
unpleasant environments. (The Condition of the Working Class in England, 1845; The Housing Question, 1872) The
Housing Question was published in 1872. A Tale of Two Cities (1859) by Charles Dickens picked up related themes
in London and Paris before and during the French Revolution.
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districts” (Chandavarkar 2009: 50). Even sympathetic colonial views on the laboring classes
identified the problem as the masses who “are utterly unacquainted with even elementary ideas
of hygiene and sanitation, and little improvement can take place until they have been educated to
a different standard of living.”44 The problem was framed as “the adaptation of peasant to city
life” wherein “municipal improvements can only provide the means of cleanliness to those who
are willing to avail themselves of them” (Ibid.). Thus was the city framed as pure, elevated, and
isolated from the lowly countryside, an icon of industry on a trajectory quite apart for the rest of
the subcontinent. Until such time, “sanitary cordons,” the restriction of travel (rural migrants,
devout pilgrims, industrial workers), became part of a hygienic apartheid regime in Bombay’s
early city planning days. And here in the hygienic character of the India lay the foundations the
urbanization agenda of India, as remarked upon by Sir Stanley Reed, early editor of The Times of
India: “The whole future of India, based as it must be on the efficient and contented labour force,
is bound up with an improvement in the hygienic conditions of the great industrial centers.”
(ibid.)
In this light, the determinations of social policy followed the development needs of
business interests (such as roads, etc.), the aesthetic judgments of various upper classes, as well
as the adjudication and discipline of labor through wages and provision of essential subsistence.
Questions of human development and urban improvement would be mediated through these
concerns. Housing, water and sanitation, as well as other social services not yet formally
submerged in the commodity sphere (such as spaces for worship, cremation, and burial) were
nonetheless pressing needs. Disease and epidemics emerging from the poorer quarters was not
only perceived as a matter of governance or municipal administration but seemed to threaten

44

From Alexander Robert Burnett-Hurst, Labour and housing in Bombay: a study in the economic conditions of the
wage-earning classes in Bombay in 1925, quoted in Chandavarkar 2009: 50.
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merchants (shetias) and bankers (shorffs), millowners and civil servants, of Indians and
Europeans alike, and therefore the very commercial character of the city.45
Yet attention to these large structural problems remained episodic, piecemeal, and
insincere. The rate of migration was quickening, the streets and neighborhoods were becoming
increasingly congested, and the frenzy of commerce only added to the cacophony.46 Avoidance or
neglect of the social conflicts prevailed amongst the city’s various upper strata, yet also placed
unwelcome pressure upon the expanding business sector and local authorities alike. Moreover,
the lack of social provisions distributed adequately to the growing laboring populations risked
the commercial viability of the city as a whole. Victorian economic sensibilities subsumed
improved governance, urban relations, population health and well-being to political and
economic factors of production and social order. Premature death was a calculated variable in
economic and urban equations. Henry Conybeare, a civil engineer and architect who would
become Superintendent of Repairs for Bombay in 1855, for instance, argued that “sanitary
reform is in itself a police improvement.” (Chandabarkar 2009: 42) As such, health and policing
were regarded as twin problems. In 1858, this calculus was laid bare: municipal investments
would be justified in the field of population health if they could reduce the death rate by 20
percent. This was a focal issue for the management of troops stationed in Colaba, who it was
reported in 1863, cost the Raj £97 per soldier annually while their infirmary cost £388,000
(ibid.). Sanitation certainly became a concern with regards to the growing mill industries in the
1870s and 80s, but it was the plagues that besieged the city from 1896–1900, which so radically
45

“It exercised the imagination, it threatened the very existence of shetias [merchants] and shorffs [bankers], of
millowners and civil servants, of Indians and Europeans alike.” (Chandavarkar 2009: 41)
46
According to historian Gordon Johnson, “The population of the city increased nearly nine times in as many
decades: between the early nineteenth century and the census of 1911 the number of people living in the city had
risen from 160,000 to over 900,000. Moreover, most of this increase was from immigration: in 1901 less than a
quarter of Bombay's citizens had been born there. Bombay was thus not only a new but a very cosmopolitan city.”
(1973: 112)
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threatened the health and wealth of the city’s magnates. Only mounting urban crisis would force
the reorganization of urban policy.
The needs for massive infrastructural outlays for the popular classes in the growing city
would not be met. The business classes and town officials of Bombay had much to gain from
their commercial excitement, administrative acumen, and conservative aesthetic desire to
prioritize the expansion of social provisions to the city’s laboring communities. For the most
part, governmental authorities were steadfast in their approach to business-oriented social
planning. A perceived lack of resources for development that was not commercially viable or did
not serve the accumulation needs of the city’s business sectors meant that the implementation of
these schemes would remain selective, “favoring those concerns which were the most relevant to
the late economic interests and the more immediate material needs of the dominant classes”
(Chandavarkar 2009: 46). Until that point, how the popular classes would provision muchneeded urban amenities and infrastructure, such as water or housing, were treated as problems of
public order, and therefore persisted as police problems. Meanwhile, transport of goods and
people in the service of the urban economy were the primary concerns from which much
development followed: roads from “dock to warehouse, from cotton fields to cotton greens,” and
drains for the army cantonments of Colaba and the elite residential areas of Parel and Malabar
Hill (Chandavarkar 2009: 35). Negotiations over the distribution of urban wealth, the resources
for infrastructural development, would only shift as workers increasingly took center stage in the
urban economy and demanded greater returns on the labor that built the city.
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CHAPTER 2
Struggles for Space:
The Fabric of Worker’s Urban Culture and Power
“Everywhere barbarous indifference, hard egotism on one hand, and nameless misery on the other,
everywhere social warfare, every. . . house in a state of siege, everywhere reciprocal plundering under the
protection of the law, and all so shameless, so openly avowed that one shrinks before the consequences of
our social state as they manifest themselves here undisguised, and one can only wonder that the whole
crazy fabric still hangs together.” —Frederick Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England

Bombay’s Mill Modernity
The role of mills in shaping Bombay’s modernity and its influence on urban cultures cannot be
overstated. With the help of fifty leading businessmen in the city, Parsi entrepreneur and former
dealer of raw cotton and opium, Cowasji Davar, founded the first cotton-textile mill in the city in
1854 in Tardeo, on the northern outskirts of the densely populated Native town. The advent of
limited liability corporation as well as the lifting of bans on the importation of British machines
to India were crucial factors in the rise of Indian industrial capitalism, but the cost of shipping
these machines, as well as the coal from Bengal needed to power them, would have been fateful
impediments to enterprise without Davar and the Indian business community’s confidence to
command labor and exploit the land for raw materials. So too did they envision an enormous
regional market barely perceptible to the British that would arise in the city’s vicinity. Thus did
Indian capitalism take root by the efforts of “creative middlemen” who would mediate between
the colonial state and Indian laboring society.
The 1850s and 1860s were a boom for Bombay. The development of an indigenous
cotton textile industry portended an illustrious and unprecedented rise of industrial capitalism
and an industrial working class in Bombay.47 In 1857, the first industrial weavers of Bombay

47

Cotton prices skyrocketed–between 1860 and 1863–1864 prices rose by a factor of four on average, and at times
by a factor of ten. As cotton exports from the United States fell, exports from Persia, Egypt and especially India
boomed.
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were housed under one roof. By 1865, ten mills employed nearly 6,600 laborers across the
Native town. By 1875, there were fifteen mills powered by 5,000 workers. Fifteen years later, in
1890, sixty-seven mills were home to 70,000 workers from sunup to sundown.48
The Bombay Baroda and Central Indian Railway and the Great Indian Peninsular
Railway companies employed a substantial portion of the working population in metal and
mechanical fabrication, maintenance, and repair. Additionally, they had workshops in Parel as
well as new lines and roads built through the marshy lands known as the Flats in 1860s, all of
which came to be know as the “mill district”—in addition to Parel—of Byculla, Tarwadi,
Mazagon, Sewri, Sion, Mahim, and Worli. Major civic institutions, such as the Bombay
Municipal Corporation and the Port Trust, as well as companies concerned with infrastructure,
such as the Bombay Electric Supply and Tramways Company (BEST) and Bombay Gas Works,
all had workshops employing workers. BEST brought select electricity to Bombay’s tramways in
1903, and soon also operated buses and trams on the widest road network of internal roads for
city travel in India; while Bombay Gas provided street lighting and household gas (following the
appointment in 1865 of Arthur Crawford as the city’s first municipal commissioner) and
eventually elsewhere via four hundred kilometers of pipes for coal gas (street lighting existed
earlier, in 1843, in the form of kerosene lamps).
The gas plant in Parel brought light and wonder to the city, but also a fine black dust and
intolerable fumes for workers in the vicinity. Marathi poet Dilip Chitre’s “The View from
Chinchpokli” describes the early industrial urban sensorium, “I breathe in the sulphur dioxide
emitted by the Bombay Gas Company, blended with specks of cotton / And carbon particles

48

Estimates put early figures at nearly 7.5 percent of the city’s population in 1890. The proportion of industrializing
workforce viz. workers in other established small-scale industries would grow to ten percent by the turn of the
century and even more dramatically in the first few decades of the twentieth century.
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discharged by the mills / That clothe millions of loins.” The first streets to receive light were
Esplanade Road (now Mahatma Gandhi Road), Churchgate Street (now Veer Nariman Road) and
Bhendi Bazaar, far from workers’ quarters. Electrification of street lamps began by 1882 in
Crawford Market.
The industrial force of development in the city included the development of
underdevelopment. As the presence of cotton mills expanded to the north of the Native town, the
spatial landscape reflected ever-sharper class divisions. Soon the cotton trade would determine
both urban spatial production and employment in the docks and on the railways. Workers began
living near the mills, leaving their historic grounds in the Native town to develop a distinctly
working-class neighborhood known as Girangaon (mill town). A culture of industrial labor and
town planning agreeable to British colonial authorities and Parsi industrialists alike kept workers
huddled near the factories—away from Fort and other wealthy areas—while encouraging the
city’s middle strata to spread north to Salsette. This coincided with the development of the
increasing commercial character of Fort, which became the city’s central business district after
its ramparts were leveled in the 1860s and a sanitary program initiated by Municipal
Commissioner Arthur Crawford to once again cleanse Fort of “offensive trades” such as tanners,
butchers, and dyers.
The development of southern Bombay as the commercially advanced “Island City” was
only possible because 80 percent of the population was housed in cramped tenements over a
century. This development ambition combined with a determined lack of interest in developing
public transportation systems that would be affordable and enable mobility across the city.
Meanwhile, land reclamation in Tarqeo was accomplished by dumping the town sweepings into
the sea. Thus the city’s industrially driven urbanization was achieved with a double colonization,

64

both of the sea and the land by filling in the swamps of lowland Bombay, and of the native labor
commanded in the process of dredging and dumping “reclaimed” natures in producing new
urban space of Bombay.

“A starvation diet”
At the end of the nineteenth century, the rise in industry accompanied a boom in colonial and
Indian finance. Bombay boasted more international banks than any other city in India, as well as
the country’s largest gold and silver markets. But, the poorer sections of the city “experienced
significant declines in living standards, worsening environmental conditions and escalating
death-rates” (Quoted in Kidambi 2007: 36). Workers survived on a “starvation diet” (Census of
India, 1901: vol x, Bombay (Town & Island), part iv, 151, 144; quoted in Hazareesingh 2001:
238). The influx of migration in the wake of the speculation boom excited by the American Civil
War did very little to inspire authorities to plan the city and allocate its resources for reasonable
growth. At the turn of the century, “two out of three coolies that came to Bombay for
employment [did] not return to their homes, but [were] carried off by fever or other diseases.”
(Ibid.)
Teetering on the edge of industry profit points and labor’s breaking points, with manifold
crises looming, Bombay was a city integrated in a world system hinged to a vast hinterland.
Commerce, industry, finance and colonial and native elite territorial power connected the various
worlds. But so too did the migratory patterns and laboring cultures of the city’s working classes
constitute Bombay as the meeting grounds for an unprecedented encounter between urban and
rural life. Bombay’s earliest mill workers originated in the peasantry. The mostly male migrant
workers came from the Deccan and Konkan coast and as far as hundreds of miles south in
Ratnagiri and Goa. Others came from the northern parts of the Bombay Presidency, from Sindh
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and Gujarat, as well as from eastern districts of the United Provinces. Many travelled seasonally
from October to December, and returned to their districts prior to the monsoon from April to
September during the agricultural season.
Working class culture also emerged across the space and time of the colonial capitalist
economy and in the struggles that determined the rhythms of life. The ways in which workers
adapted to the temporal demands of the length and conditions of the working day in the factory
system, if work could be found, shaped broader patterns of urbanization and urban culture during
Bombay’s industrial boom. Mills in the 1880s opened their gates at dawn. Since there were no
public clocks and mills were prohibited from blowing their steam whistles at dawn, workers took
to sleeping on the paths leading to the factories in hopes to be the first to rise in the day’s
competition for employment. The culture of living within proximity of factories that were
powered by day labor bought in daily markets remained for decades, transforming and
imprinting a unique worker culture upon industrial districts of the city where factories became
but an important node in an integrated sphere of workplace and neighborhood life.
The working poor mostly lived in Kamathipura, Nagpada, Chakla, Mandvi, Dongri,
Kumbharwada and Khara Taleo. “In 1872, barely five percent of all cotton mill workers in the
city lived in the sections that came to constitute the ‘mill districts’; by 1906, this figure had
increased to 82.1 percent” (Chandavarkar 1997: 169; Kidambi 2007: 37). The 1911 census
indicates that 69 percent of the population of Bombay lived in one-room tenement
accommodations (chawls) built by mill owners or municipal agencies. By the 1920s, 90 percent
of mill workers lived within fifteen minutes of their place of employment (Chandavakar 2009:
19).
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The proliferation of small workshops in town, of small-scale opportunities in the bazaars,
docks, warehouses, led also to swelling pressure on existing housing stock. A report to the Health
Officer in 1881 summarized their condition as: “poverty-stricken to the bone, and as a matter of
course they are glad to take any shelter or to get anywhere to lay their heads” (Quoted in
Kidambi 2007: 36). Those with housing were offered little relief. In the absence of available
housing, existing buildings were “sweated,” and every room available was subdivided from
multi-storied tenements, so that the ever-growing working class could be “physically absorbed”
in the city. Housing provision for workers, provided by factory owners, was subject to
constraints (cost, space, materials, etc.) dictated by private industry and municipal and city
planning and took the form of crowded single-room accommodation in chawls, which rapidly
sprang up in the suburbs to the north and east of town surrounding factories during the 1880s.
“Neglected by authorities and exploited by private builders, the workers lived in ill-lighted, illventilated dens in largely undeveloped, undrained areas.” (Upadhyay 1990: 87) These were at its
origins largely a private enterprise built at the discretion and calculus of mill owners.49 This
solution to the need for worker housing increased the density of living and the insanitary
conditions only, and aggravated disease and mortality, e.g. small pox, measles, tuberculosis, etc.,
caused by occupational conditions. Otherwise, workers found housing in self-constructed zavli
sheds composed of coconut palm and date leaves. So too were the streets appropriated for
sleeping on a massive scale. This conjuncture of interests and forces, class calculations, and class
antagonisms has made the chawl, the slum, and the street an indelible architectural feature of the
history of the working class housing.
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Meanwhile, industrial contaminants, found everywhere in the air, degraded workers and
their environments. “Coal-powered cotton mills, railway locomotives and government Mint
churned out thick black smoke. . . lingering dark clouds brought about [what the 1901 census
described as] a ‘marked change…over localities such as Byculla, Patel, Trade, Tarwadi, and
even remote Sewri.’” (Hazareesingh 2001: 238) Industrial pollutants in the air would blow in by
the breeze off the Arabian Sea toward the hills and settle over the town. Lack of adequate drains
and sewers meant most of the low-lying areas of the city remained waterlogged for much of the
city, and therefore making them breeding grounds for disease such as malaria and the plague.
Working conditions were physically, mentally, and morally exhausting both in the mill
factories and on the various trades and occupations that arose in conjunction with the textile
industry, from leather workshops and mechanical repair, to garment retail and tailoring, and in
the construction and warehousing sectors. Even the jailed population of Bombay was seen at that
time to be “healthier” than the mill workers.50 Alcohol consumption was prevalent among
workers, and fifteen percent of workers’ wages were routinely spent here, leading to money
lending with 75 percent interest. For those who could not find steady employment, there was
petty trading, hawking, and peddling—and if all else failed, begging. This was not merely a
description of one of several outcomes in the developing urban economy. Rather, it was its
consequence and the primary mechanism through which the city’s elites deliberately kept labor
casual, informal, and insecure and therefore also readily available and cheap.
The proletariat in the cotton-textile industry, the ancillary laboring communities in
workshops surrounding the factories, and those waiting for work, defined the city’s “toiling”
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culture.51 Most workers experienced casual employment based on the fluctuating demand for
labor and the flexible production cycles employed by mill owners. These owners devised
recruitment strategies that delegated responsibility to intermediaries, known as “jobbers,”
muccadmas, mistries, tindals, and serangs (Kidambi 2007: 31). Their task was also to undermine
organizing efforts amongst workers by constantly deploying and manipulating casual labor,
creating and exploiting a surplus labor pool around each trade, and encouraging dependency of
workers upon particular jobbers. Furthermore, a large substratum of the working classes of
Bombay consisted of various occupations whose labor was menial, whose prospects dim, and
whose circumstances were ever precarious. These masses routinely saw their image reflected in
industrial actions despite being ancillary to its core function. Bourgeois and colonial state
illiberality toward working and living conditions all but compelled nascent wage struggles and
industrial action within the factory system toward a larger political arena of the city. Thus, while
mill and dockworkers politicized the space of the city in a continuum of workplace and
neighborhood appropriations, the most generalized strikes in the city were not “merely trade
union actions but also community actions” (Pendse 1995: 24).52
Workers encountered a range of characters in the fray of competitive urban life, from
workplace to neighborhood, e.g. grain-dealers, landlords, and rent-collectors. These relations
were essentially antagonistic, characterized by both dependency and reciprocity, guided both by
moral expectation and at times outright conflict. Workers’ rural connections enabled them to
navigate the urban world, access housing, credit, and work. Despite the disruption of family life
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(some women remained in the fields to cultivate or came at different times according to
opportunities for work), adjustments to the nature of their working lives, experiences of the clear
distinction between working-time and leisure-time in factory settings, urban workers lived their
rural associations and cultures as part of the urban rhythm of work and rest, wage earning and
resistance.53
So too did the conditions of industrially organized work serve to modernize daily
experiences and encounters with otherwise entrenched relations of caste, religion, and
community—whether Muslims, Dalits, Harijans—which dictated occupation and life chances.
To a certain degree, these mixed relations in workshops and neighborhoods alike also
revolutionized a sense of freedom, cultural autonomy, and even at times inspired an emergent
class solidarity. Historian Rajnarayan Chandavarkar details how
“caste and kinship ties were vital to the social organization of workers: but so were the affinities of region and
religion, workplace and neighbourhood, trade unions and political parties, all of which cut across each other. To
insist that the culture of migrant workers was characterized by ‘strong primordial ties of community, language,
religion, caste and kinship’ is to obscure the extent to which their interaction produced something quite different and
it is to remain blind to the extent to which their ‘culture’ was also informed by work and by politics, and indeed, by
the daily struggles of workplace and neighbourhood” (1997:187).

This was in a sense a struggle over workers’ own cultural identity in the city. The organization of
work was part of worker’s sensorium and experience of the city (sight, feel, smell, sound) that
too affected their struggle for space and survival. Though for most it was their first experience in
city life, the pressures and desires expressed by the working classes and immigrants of the city
also determined the politics of housing and neighborhood. The development of workers politics
thus took place in the neighborhoods of Girangaon with increasing frequency in the 1880s.54 The
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cultural organization of workers’ lifeworld and their claim on the city was dialectically opposed
to the sense of rationalization in the dominant industrial processes commanding labor in the city.
Workers’ psychic life imprinted their experiences, their sense of diffusion and reintegration into
the neighborhood, the discipline at work and the improvisation in their everyday lives, onto the
city’s space-time rhythms and urban cultures. Proletarian public culture was lived and enacted on
the streets. Thus did a cultural identity as “toiler” emerge with the growth of both an industrial
and an unregulated informal economy—however mediated by regional, linguistic, and religious
difference—as a loosely shared and sometimes collective formation (Pendse 1995).
The rise of worker consciousness inside the factories and neighborhoods in the 1870s
raised colonial and native elites’ concern over workers in the city, their politics, and their ability
to effective control their way of life. From the 1890s onward, after a series of strikes and largescale urban riots in 1892–1893, police officials increasingly viewed the workers and the popular
masses as the source of urban unrest. Mill owners were uncompromising in the wake of workers’
demands and intolerant of their perspectives on the city, viewing strikes as a breach of contract
to be punished harshly lest indolence and indiscipline paralyze the factory system and
subordinate profit to workers’ wishes. The industrial bosses relied on the colonial state to put
down these strikes. Wages were suppressed so migrant laborers would not simply abandon their
posts at their will in favor of village life, while workers organizations were viewed as caustic
agents threatening bourgeois paternalism toward “reasonable” grievances. The business classes
of Bombay could only cling more tightly to their dependence on the state to smother the embers
of labor’s revolt. Certainly, it raised the antipathy of workers for both boss and state. A new tool
of mediation would be required. Planning the underdevelopment of the working classes in the
decades to come was key to the coordinated class responses of the bourgeoisie (Kidambi 2004).
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Plague and Famine during Boom Times
The rise of the factory system in the city extended into the countryside. The demands of
Bombay’s factories required further penetration into the hinterland for raw materials and for
labor. So too did the concomitant rise of technological capabilities such as trains and telephone
cables exacerbate and reorganize the spatial tensions within the region. As conditions worsened
in the countryside, the urban worker’s fate remained entangled with the rural fates of family,
village relations, and indeed, their own life and livelihood. Rural distress drove a wave of
migration into the city that gave steel to the strikes and insurgencies brewing around the factories
of Bombay. These same conditions inspired peasant revolt among those who remained in the
countryside.
The Deccan Riots of 1875 saw peasants (ryots) from Pune, Satara and Nagar districts,
where trains now linked Bombay to rural Maharashtra, seize and destroy the tools of their debt
peonage (kamiuti). The bonds and deeds held by moneylenders were the primary targets of their
attacks, but so too did they take aim at the general conditions of British rule concomitantly
threatening their communal ways of life (access to forests restricted which affected access to
common resources like food and fuel), “reduced to a miserable condition, so much so that their
ordinary wants cannot be supplied” (Quoted in Kumar 1965: 615).55 By 1876, signs of
“widespread unemployment and the high price of grain” were everywhere pointing to a “spectre
of hunger.” During the British Raj, India experienced some of the worst famines ever recorded,
including the Great Famine of 1876–1878, in which 6.1 million to 10.3 million people died and
the Indian famine of 1899–1900, in which an estimated ten million people died. Famines in India
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were made more severe by British policy in India. An El Niño event caused the Indian famine of
1876–1878. The colonial state could not manage the growing discontent of the population facing
a crisis of hunger and livelihood and “several million emaciated laborers and poor peasants
overwhelmed the relief works belatedly authorized by the Bombay and Madras governments”
(Davis 2002: 36).
Urban development in the city and its hinterland, proceeding apace with advances in the
rail, canal ways, and telegraph that deepened colonial extraction of surpluses (taken through
taxation and debt), crushed many villagers and footloose city dwellers alike. They faced
starvation or a thin chance of survival as proletarianized laborers rushing the city as drought and
famine refugees. Duplicitous colonial administrators argued that the expansion of transportation
and communication infrastructures would serve as protection against famine, for no sooner were
rail networks expanded than they were monopolized by merchants to transfer grains from
drought-strikes regions to hoards in central depots; meanwhile, the telegraph would ensure
speculation and ensuring price-hikes in grains would be executed simultaneously across
hundreds of villages regardless of supply. Modernization of such technologies and infrastructures
left millions devastated and dying from hunger, whose recourse to relief work manipulated
starving applicants deeper into their own (and others’) subordination as coolie labor on railroad
and canal projects (Krishan 2013). Even in such dire circumstances, coolies withheld their labor
and, in January 1877, famished peasants rejected orders to march to militarized work camps
where they would be separated from their families (Davis 2002: 41).
Such were the conditions in the countryside as a new industrial city was coming into
being at the turn of the twentieth century. In September 1896, Bombay was hit by a bubonic
plague epidemic. The death toll was estimated at 1,900 people per week. Around 850,000 people
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amounting to half of the population, fled Bombay during this time. Plague was the leading cause
of death in the city in the ten years spanning 1897–1907 (Hazareesing 2001: 239). The dock and
mill workers living in crowded chawls and slums amidst inadequate sewers and sanitation, and
who were already weakened by the effects of a price rise coinciding with a famine year, were all
too susceptible to a bubonic plague that spread from a dock worker’s quarters in Mandvi across
the city of one million in September 1896. Chandavarkar states, “it remained one of the most
dramatic and destructive manifestations of municipal failure in the nineteenth century” (2009:
52). By late 1897, Bombay’s population fell by half from death and exodus.
In the devastating wake of municipal failure, sudden and regular outbreaks of hostility
rose against measures adopted by the government for suppression of the plague, including police
searches, forced evacuations, forcible hospitalization, and isolation and detention of the ill. In
April 1897, handcart pullers (khatarawalas) and carriers (hamaals) of cotton struck against
official inspection and forcible entry into workers’ homes. It took the police, city officials from
the Plague Committee, as well as cotton merchants to put the strike down. By late 1897, the city
was facing a severe shortage of “cooks, tailors, barbers, coolies and mill workers” and officials
feared what would happen if municipal workers such as “scavengers, sweepers, sewer cleaners,”
as well as those who depended upon to remove the dead from the hospitals continued to either
flee or strike (Dossal 2005: 3898). Again, on March 9, 1898, a riot led to a strike of dock and
railway workers that paralyzed the city for a few days.
The convergence of a municipality failing to govern through the adequate satisfaction of
civic wants and needs and a growing citywide labor mutiny fomented a general crisis in the city.
Municipal commissioners backed off forced removals of workers’ homes. Police reports at the
end of the century indicate that police and administrative control was weakest in workers’
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districts and the chawls of the northern parts of the city nearest the factories. The abundance of
easily disciplined labor now turned scarce. Workers who did remain in the city enjoyed
unprecedented bargaining power. In 1897, there was “open bidding” for labor in the streets, as
well as in 1899, and during the mill strikes of 1900–1901 (Chandavarkar 2009). Moreover, the
first two years of the plague manifested as a drama of a wayward labor force whose presence in
the city the state could neither repress nor rehabilitate. The 1898 labor strike was a matter of life
and death in—and of—the city and, as such, prompted a drastic turn in colonial administration.
The event did more than any other event to crystallize the antagonistic class nature of city
development. The upheavals forced the colonial administration to rethink its relationship to the
neighborhood, identifying local “leaders” from which to extend their rule. The bubonic plague of
1896–1897 that gave rise to the first general strike in the city also inspired the imposition of new
planning institutions to contain them. Such were the conditions of the emergence of the most
widespread government planning in the city, under the aegis of its first and singular planning
institution, the Bombay Improvement Trust (BIT). 56

“Improvement” through land acquisition and social governance
The Government of Bombay inaugurated the Improvement Trust (BIT) in 1898 in the wake of
widespread death and civic devastation. It was comprised entirely of local elites, as a response to,
and in condemnation of, the failures of the Bombay Municipal Corporation in dealing with issues
of sanitation and social order. Though it was not a planning body in any traditional sense, it
would be the “sole [body] totally concerned with the development of the city” for the first
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decades of the twentieth century (Meller 1979: 337). Placed beyond the reach of municipal
authorities, the Trust was a private seizure of public administrative regulation.
British inquiry into the causes of both plague and unrest redoubled planners’
determination that social segregation would address the city’s insanitary conditions as well as
labor’s intransigence. Colonial officials conceptualized the city’s myriad problems as a spatial
one concerning the arrangement of its many social groupings. The BIT’s main task was to
improve the sanitary condition of the least developed areas of the city, clear slums, develop lands
in the north of the island (at the time, Parel was the island’s northern limits above which were the
rice fields, coconut gardens (oarts) salt pans, and fisher villages of Kolis, Agris, and Adivasis),
widen roads, and to provide better housing for the city’s workers. Under both the fear of workers
as pathological vectors and the segregationist fervor to separate such masses from elites, the
Epidemic Diseases Act of 1897 gave wide powers to the state to demolish buildings and claim
land. “The inhabitants of the initial slum target areas, in, Nagpada, Mandvi, Market and
Chandanvadi, found themselves compulsorily evicted without being offered alternative
accommodation; as a result, they attempted to rehouse themselves in tenements just outside the
targeted neighbourhoods” (Hazareesing 2001:239). Similar slum clearances occurred in
Nowrojee Hill, Bhatwadi, and East Agripada.
Though the Trust’s mandate was the provisioning of “‘sanitary’ housing for the ‘poorer
and working classes’,” it razed more tenements than it ever erected (Kidambi 2007: 80).57 The
housing question’s spatial fix was also internal to workers’ houses. The Act enabled municipal
collectors to remove the living rooms of insanitary buildings for the creation of a chowk [open
area] to facilitate air and light passage. Even as private interests routinely influenced law (as in
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the Epidemic Disease Act), it also routinely thwarted the deployment of legal statutes and
planning ordinances. Landlord control over the interests of the Municipal Corporation, for
instance, prevented the execution of a uniform sanitary building code. The piece-meal as well as
wholesale agency of landowners to demolish workers housing of course only created an increase
in demand for housing and therefore pressured the rise of rents. Landlords met this demand by
building additional stories in their insanitary slum buildings, increasing congestion and
intensifying housing demand. “As ‘many houses had chowks cut in them’ they ‘also had storeys
added’” (Hazareesingh 2001:239).
When the BIT’s accomplishments were reviewed a decade after its inauguration, an acute
shortage of workers’ housing was observed. The BIT’s focus on road widening, which created
more overcrowding, also remained at odds with its central task of alleviating untenable housing
and sanitation conditions among the poorer districts. The two main road projects it completed
prior to the First World War did little to facilitate movement in the city except for elites. Princess
Street (1905) and Sandhurst Road (1909) were both east-west thoroughfares in a town with
urgent need for north-south transport options. “Princess Street ran from Carnac Bridge, just north
of the Fort, to Queen’s Road on the south-western seafront,” allowing colonial and native elites
quicker access to the coast from Fort (Hazareesingh 2001:242). Displaced workers led to
overcrowding in nearby Cavel, where new stories were added to unsanitary housing, “making
light and ventilation in neighbouring houses even worse than before.” (Ibid.)
What the BIT inaugurated was a clear legacy of private interests’ usurpation of state’s
right to acquire land, a right that implied the right to demolition and the right to redevelopment.
These rights did not go uncontested. Koli fisherfolk in Mandvi-Koliwada, some of the oldest
inhabitants of the city, petitioned against the municipal agency’s claims over its lands, making
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arguments that their livelihoods for generations have depended on access and proximity to the
sea. The result of forced dispossession, they argued, would be that “we must disperse our
industry already languishing, [causing its] collapse, and a population numbering over a thousand
souls, [would] go to ruin” (Kidambi 2007: 80) For Trust officials, urban development was a fait
accompli for the Koliwadas. Since the city had already surrounded their fishing villages, officials
argued that their removal and relocation would find them in areas more “suited to their
calling.”58
In addition to Kolis, the Bhandari and Agri communities long-settled prior to
colonization, mobilized against the demotion of their traditional shrines in Lohar Chawl. They
too registered their dissent in 1905 in a petition stating that the shrines were over sixty years old
and part of the neighborhood’s history (they also took exception to the fact that no Muslim
shrines were affected by demolition). The Police Commissioner gave his promise that the shrines
would be reestablished. Even those who came seeking commercial opportunity with the
Portuguese and with the Bombay, and who had in their own way become property owners,
quarreled with the BIT over the suddenly perilous nature of their tenure. Communities in Dadar,
Matunga, and Sion organized their opposition when faced with the “loss of ancient possessions,
houses and occupations” despite tenure grants preceding BIT improvement schemes. Ratepayer
associations sprang up amongst those who felt, “the government was reneging on the ‘promise
given, the covenants entered into with them, by British Rulers and their predecessors the
Portuguese, Siddis, and other native Rulers of the Island when they were first invited to domicile
themselves in this Island.” Dispossession even for Indian petty bourgeois property owners was
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tantamount to “exile by thousands without any means of shelter or maintenance, and also without
any prospect of obtaining other lands or occupations.” (Ibid., 82) It was not only in self-interest
that these petitions were made. They also criticized the BIT’s approach to disease and sanitation
as suggesting a general inability to oversee necessary urban development. Moreover, they
recognized the antidemocratic nature of the BIT and called for greater transparency and
accountability in its proceedings, as well as greater representation for the Bombay Municipal
Corporation on the Trust Board. Indeed, when on occasion more diverse propertied interests
were entertained, there were multiple objections to the operations of the BIT with motions to
disband the Trust and integrate it into the Municipal Corporation occurring no less than three
times in ten years.
Meanwhile, the BIT had become a major player in the land market.59 The Trust was
shown repeatedly to surpass its writ, “willfully misinterpreting provisions of the [City
Improvement Trust Act] 1898 act” concerning the compulsory acquisition of lands required “on
sanitary grounds for Improvement Schemes or absolutely necessary for street schemes” (quoted
in Kidamni 2007: 83). All this led to fiercer competition amongst landlords over land and an
intensification of the commodification and regulation of land. Land prices spiraled in the early
twentieth century. Moreover, the Bombay Municipal Corporation was the greatest contributor to
the BIT’s coffers and also incurred a great municipal debt at the hands of an undemocratic
agency populated by colonial administrators and wealthy Indian landowners. Meanwhile, the
Trust grew to be one of the larger “public” landowners in the city, owning 10 percent of all land

59. Urban historian Helen Miller states, “The main function of the Improvement Trusts (though there were some
variations in different cities) was to purchase land outside the built-up areas, and to supervise its orderly
development. The profits made on the resale of plots of land to the builders and developers provided the income of
the Trust. In a sense, the Trusts were fulfilling the objectives outlined by the National Housing Reform Council in
Britain, though without the social purpose or concern for the quality of the housing of the poor which, alone, could
have lifted such development schemes into the realm of town planning” (1979: 337).
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by 1915.60 By 1917–1918, more than two-thirds of the land that the BIT had acquired for its
various schemes remained undeveloped. In 1920, the Trust leased some of its landholdings to
mill owners for a millennium, all for a pittance.
The Trust outlined its vision in its annual report in 1907: “It seems, for example, probable
that the middle classes will eventually find more suitable accommodation in the northern
sections of the island…; the upper classes, particularly the Europeans will perhaps find relief in
the reclamation of the western foreshore of the island; while the whole of the central belt of the
island between Grant Road and Jaigon Cross Road will this be reserved for the industrial and
lower classes.” (Hazareesingh 2001: 242) The BIT’s representations of the city went hand-inhand with the police, who had a more complex grasp of the moods and sentiments of inhabitants
of the city. Indeed, records indicate that the police were sensitive to how schemes would affect
local disposition and consequently prepared police tactics accordingly. The city’s millowners,
merchants, and land owners provided a layer of zeal to this vision, lending argument and
financial support for scheme after scheme to ensure both the city’s class segregation and the
preservation of the city’s elite economic and spatial privileges. Thus the BIT became another
mechanism of double dispossession, both of workers’ housing and the city’s resources, and of
consolidating space and social wealth for Bombay’s propertied and industrial and merchant
classes.
The years 1905–1925 marked a turn toward “social governance,” which would emphasize
reforms to the social environment “manifested by programmes of housing, sanitation and
primary education” (Aspengren 2013: 45). The improvement governance regime of this period
contrasted with the more brutal approaches of colonial administration to population management
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amidst plague and famine. Yet it also continued and intensified a cycle of housing instability and
worker precarity, as well as entrenched conditions of “make-do” squalor and revanchist
demolition and displacement, that was central to the municipal planners’ relationship to the city’s
workers.
Police continued to be workers’ first contact with state agents of Bombay’s urban
development. In 1902, a new police act that inaugurated wider discretionary powers brought the
colonial police further into the fabric of everyday life at the street and neighborhood level. This
would intensify antagonisms and conflicts between the working and urban poor and the police in
the decade prior the First World War. Meanwhile, the city’s attention to the urgent matters of
sanitation, health, and livability for the city’s masses dissipated as the threat of plague receded.
Yet the integral aspect of the relationship between planners and the popular classes in Bombay is
revealed in the only other objective planners achieved: to improve the infrastructure necessitated
by the city’s business elite to make their commercial ventures viable. It widened roads and
arterial thoroughfares, low-lying lands were drained, and a new commercial district was
established at Ballard Estate from 1908 to 1914. In short, “the city itself was to be restructured,
the contours of its social geography to be redrawn” to guarantee the commercial success of the
industrial city (Chandavarkar 2009: 54).
Former municipal commissioner Arthur Crawford was the first to make the argument for
comprehensive urban planning, in a pamphlet entitled “The Development of New Bombay” in
1908. But even if certain political and business classes so willed it, comprehensive urban
planning would remain lifeless amidst institutional fracture and state agencies mired in ruling
class fractions. Thus, while Crawford would argue that housing would only be adequately
addressed in relation to other pressing issues, such as water, drainage and waste management
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systems, he would rail against existing bureaus, including his own former municipal corporation,
for their inadequacies. Meanwhile his sweeping designs would be fiercely contested by certain
swaths of the city’s landlords singularly focused on extracting rents from workers. Nevertheless,
Crawford persevered. Interventions for the sake of public health, he argued, would once again
need to be centered in a Development Plan for the city if Bombay would be rid of “its unenviable
international reputation as a ‘cholera nest’” (Dossal 2005: 3899). Speaking of the success his
measures in the health department achieved, Crawford stated, “We had in 1867 stamped out
Cholera in the fair city; [but] soon after, the Corporation had become ‘muck makers’ filling the
area of the Flats with refuse and garbage on a large scale.” This, he claimed “…invited the
demon back and—as God lives above us!—produced the Bubonic plague! One or other of these
demons will now reign in ‘Urbs Prima in Indis’ for many a year to come” (quoted in Dossal
2005: 3899). Nevertheless, planning remained selective, indeed framed as a solution to select
problems. Despite the visions of bourgeois urban reformers, development would be “blocked” by
the divided attentions of a spectrum of competing class fractions (rentiers, industrialists,
financiers, merchants) whose economic interests often drew from ethnic, caste and regional
loyalties.
In 1920, Governor George Lloyd (1918–1923) established a new governmental bureau,
the Bombay Development Department (BDD), to tackle urban problems apart from the
Municipal Corporation as well as the Improvement Trust. Once again, workers’ housing was on
the agenda. The BDD scheme was an early attempt to bring millowners into the planning arena
of housing provision. Most industrialists were willing to accept this rapprochement with workers
during a time of major profit and relatively low unrest. Fifty thousand chawls meant to house
250,000 workers in compartmentalized rooms with recreation and shopping outlays intended to
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keep workers off the streets, were to be erected. By the close of the program, only 16,000
tenements were constructed, a lackluster performance but an astonishing repetition of the legacy
of previous urban development. The disappointment came with material consequences. Rents for
one-room accommodations from 1913–1915 rose by seventy percent, resulting in low occupancy
in these chawls. It was only the increasing occurrence of disturbances in worker districts that
lead to new provisions in rent regulation, made under the Defense of India Act of 1915 for “the
purpose of public safety” (Aspengren 2013). Insofar as planning regulations emerge as a
response to disturbances caused by workers, development continued to be a police matter even as
it was articulated through municipal policy.
As the industrial boom began to slow (coinciding with industry legislation and
regulations affecting working hours, compensation, and trade union activity), millowners became
less generous in their willingness to subsidize urban development through taxes. Moreover, as
with the BIT, the BDD too would quickly face a fiscal crisis in the course of its operations. Only
three years into its operations, by 1923, the BDD’s Back Bay scheme would encumber most of
its resources. Social improvement would not be the intellectual or practical domain of the BDD,
BIT, or the Municipal Corporation’s legacy. A master plan for the city would remain elusive for
decades to come.
The mill district was nonetheless a locus of physical infrastructure through mixed-use
development. Transportation investments in the built environment included two arterial
roadways and three new railway connections in nine stations. Public hospitals, educational and
cultural institutions, as well as squares (maidans) and gymnasia (vyayamshalas) were allocated
on reclaimed land. Further integrated into the fabric of neighborhood redevelopment were
provisions for community halls, village committees (gaonkari mandals), chawl committees, and
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even dining spaces run by women in their one room chawl tenements for migrant male workers
(khanavals). The spatial imprints of popular urban culture were recognized with the citysanctioned private development of bhajan mandals for song and ganesh mandals for worship.
One can see from this period of urban development in Bombay that the housing question
was embedded in the labor question. Labor and living conditions were the main arenas in which
workers made claims on the city. The development of class-consciousness to connect these
arenas would reveal the limits of immediate struggles in fostering a collective urban imagination.
Just as economic class conflict was fragmented through a web of relations on the job and in the
neighborhood (jobbers, shopkeepers), when workers turned their struggles toward housing and
other demands for adequate reproduction, a myriad of questions emerged. For one, who pays for
housing provision and to whom were agitations most effectively addressed? Who pays for
municipal improvement of services? In some cases, claims were made on the state’s various
agencies; in others it was the landlords, the moneylenders, and finally the employing classes.
Who represents those claims remains a political issue that as we see throughout the next few
chapters, is a century-long lineage of workers’ struggles that remains of paramount importance to
present-day organizations and campaigns.
There are related questions about the redistribution of the products of labor. From the
beginning, state-capital relations over the housing question and who builds housing for workers
were unstable. While mill owners believed the issue was lack of housing, the state conceived of
the problem as overcrowding, and landlords considered the issue one of supply and control over
rents. The responses coming from each faction—industrialists, landowners, and the state—only
intensified the crisis. As fragmented and competitive as they are, even in momentary instances
when their class interests align, they could not be relied upon to plan for the city.
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This is true today, despite a nexus of sympathies in reigning neoliberal ideology and the
orthodoxy of public-private planning in Mumbai, class-interested development by the elite and
state sectors do not maintain a coherent force. By 1980, as I shall discuss in Chapter Four, the
mill lands leased by the city were stripped of their industrial role and plunged into a growing real
estate market that has since driven a new wave of dispossession (again of house, land, and labor,
as well as of public assets). The notion that the state is the main loci of collective consumption
remains prevalent in urban theory. But as this history traces, and as I detail its resonances in the
contemporary period in later chapters, an understanding of the antagonist nature of the state
challenges the problematic view of the colonial and postcolonial state as guarantor of societal
reproduction. As we will see in later chapters, contemporary understandings of the state have
shifted in light of how societal mobilizations relate to collective demands in which the state is
just one part of the collective solution.

The City and Nation
For leaders of the Independence movement, such as Lokmanya Tilak, principal advocate of
Swadeshi in Bombay, the city was imagined as a growing center of nationalist independence in
the early twentieth century. The Indian independence movement in Bombay and Bengal was
inaugurated in 1905. A rising anti-colonial popular movement would take center stage in the city,
both drawing on existing cross-class affinities and spurning new fractions within a broad-based
movement for independence. On July 22, 1908, Tilak was sentenced to six years imprisonment
on the charge of writing inflammatory articles against the Government in his newspaper Kesari.
The arrest led to huge protests across the city, the frequency of which only increased in the
coming decade. The nationalist agitations and mobilizations were largely urban affairs and poor
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city dwellers played a significant part of the emerging anticolonial bloc, even as their immediate
interests were deferred in the name of independence.
In the coming decade, the energies of the city’s working-class movements in its
consistent claims on the city’s administration would be siphoned off by both the largely
professional nationalist movement and the additional colonial pressures placed on the industrial
working classes in a time of war. Indeed, British pressures on Bombay’s contribution to war
effort would exacerbate tensions within working class neighborhoods. Labor camps were opened
in 1917 in Dadar to aid in military recruitment amongst workers. Meanwhile, workers’
conditions certainly worsened during and immediately after the First World War, due to rising
prices, high rents, and general scarcity (Chandavarkar 1981). The state had to actively take
measures to prevent food riots as grain prices surged. The independence movements from 1917–
1922 contributed a nationalist politics steeped in cultural self-assertion to growing worker
resentment of the British and Indian elites as well as the ruling imperial culture.
The city was now an everyday locus of politics as well as national independence
movements. The great agitations after World War I culminated in the 1919 movement that surged
into two decades of resistance in the twenties and thirties. Bombay was the main center of the
Satyagraha movement started by Mahatma Gandhi from February to April 1919 as a result of the
Rowlatt Act, which indefinitely extended emergency measures during World War I in order to
control public unrest (Gordon 1973). Following World War I, which saw large movement of
Indian troops, supplies, arms and industrial goods to and from Bombay, city life was shut down
many times during the noncooperation movement from 1920 to 1922. Some of the same sections
of the city activated in the 1890s surged once again to life in in the Gandhian movement against
the Rowlatt Act and the general rise of the noncooperation as well as the Khilafat movement. But
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more often, workers found their interests ill-represented by the Indian National Congress-led
independence movement, the limiting ideologies of its “all-India politics,” or from religious
organizations deploying communal idioms (Johnson 1973: 197, Chandavarkar 1981).
The first important strike in the textile industry in Bombay occurred over eighteen days in
January 1919 involving about 150,000 workers. According to Chandavarkar (1981: 603), “the
Government of Bombay believed that ‘while the workers had no accepted leaders’ the conduct of
the dispute ‘appeared to indicate the probability of some controlling organ.” By now the city’s
power and politics were constituted by two realms routinely mixed together in unexpected ways:
the formal sector of politics (municipal/presidential (regional)), voluntary associations, a range
of media, “civil society” and an informal sector whose decision and distribution occurred
through associations and brokers operating in localities (mohallas and wadis), bazaars, factories,
mills, and other workplaces.
Dalit leader B.R. Ambedkar was also mobilizing for the annihilation of caste in the city.
The development of a concentrated Dalit political program was as much ideological as it was a
material struggle, with education and consciousness at the center. Ambedkar understood caste to
be central to the organization of Indian capitalism, serving not merely as an essential division of
labor, but rather as a deeply penetrating “division of laborers” ([1936], 2014). Moreover, it
served as a division of spatial relations that could only be effectively combatted in the city. Yet
his notion of urban modernity as an expanded realm of freedom for which Dalits could aspire
embraced the entanglements of urban culture and capitalist development. There were both
analytic and strategic tensions that emerged and would remain divisive issues between Ambedkar
and members of Marxist groups. Though he was critical of the exclusion of the Communist-led
movement of workers who neither divested themselves of their caste biases on the shop floor or
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in the neighborhood, his program was largely confined to a liberal democratic framework of
recognition and inclusion that could not render an adequate caste-class analysis of the city
(Jaffrelot 2003). Nonetheless, the movement to which Dalit consciousness and experiences of the
city gave rise was also steeped in a larger politics of the city as a universal realm of freedom
(Omvedt 2008). Throughout the 1920s, as both the city’s industries and urban worker cultures
matured, “the economism of Bombay together with its anonymity, its vibrant interactiveness,
public spaces, maidans, modes of transport and communication, all combined to create a
churning of peoples and lifestyles making the prescriptions of ritual purity and pollution
increasingly difficult to maintain” (Rodrigues and Gavaskar 2003: 139). Moreover, the pace of
industrialization, the swelling ranks of migrants in the city, and the planned scarcity of public
utilities created a situation of fragmentary class and caste competition for opportunities and
resources. Lower caste workers were shunted to the peripheries of the city and the margins of
urban society for both home and occupation.

A Wave of General Strikes
The long twentieth century in Bombay (from the late colonial era well into the days of Nehruvian
rule) can be described as the “age of labor” in which working class activity was regarded as both
a political force and as a target of state policy. As Chandavarkar states, “the powerful public
presence that the working classes had established in Bombay by the early twentieth century
exerted a determining influence on the formation and reproduction of the city’s distinctive urban
character and civic tradition” (2009: 24). Political conflict, militancy, and trade union activism
were rooted in the everyday lives of construction workers, artisans, of ‘untouchable’ tanners and
sweepers, seafarers, railway staff, and factory laborers, throughout the late colonial period.
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Moreover, the anticaste movement coincided with an upsurge of worker organization. While the
“age of labor” saw wages for work and solidarities expand as a mode of urban subsistence, the
specter of peasant insurgency and agrarian revolt loomed. “Between the 1930s and 1960s, it was
primarily the growth of peasant radicalism, sometimes precisely in those areas which lay beyond
the reaches of the party, which breathed new life and energy into Indian communism”
(Chandavarkar 1997: 181).
While urban governance and landscape underwent these dramatic changes in the 1920s,
labor discipline in the textile industry was also rapidly changing. Taylorist “rationalization”
schemes on the use of labor and “standardization” of wages gave rise to a wave of general strikes
against the intensification of work and loss of absolute wages. Workplace insurgency coincided
with growing anticolonial independence movements within working classes that would turn the
entire city into a stage for political contestation. There were over one thousand strikes in
individual mills and factory departments in the twenties and thirties in Bombay. Between 1918
and 1940, eight general strikes were waged in Girangaon alone, lasting more than a month each.
A police killing of a worker at a demonstration only fanned the flames. The mill district,
and to a certain extent all of Bombay, was brought to a standstill during two general strikes
between April 1928 and September 1929 and involved over 150,000 textile workers and as well
as sympathetic workers in informal occupations and social positions. The city’s elite came to
view Girangaon as an incubator of insurrection, believing that the very fabric of the
neighborhood would have to be undermined if these strikes were to be put down successfully
(Chandavarkar 2004).61
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As we shall see in chapter four in greater detail, “informalization” was the strategy, not only in sectors pertaining
to industrial production, but across the city in spheres of reproduction such as housing.
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The strikes came at the prospect of harder work for those able to retain textile
employment and no work for all others. It was a time when textile workers were paid more than
the rest of the industrial working classes of Bombay and yet their family nutrition and food
consumption was reportedly on average lower than those in prisons. According to surveys
reported in the Labor Gazette in 1923, “at that time (1921–22) the government had estimated that
‘industrial workers consume the maximum of cereals allowed by the Famine Code but less than
the diet prescribed in the Bombay Jail Manual’.”62 Nearly half of the workers families were in
debt of more than two months of earnings, often suffering interest rates of 75 percent or 150
percent annually. Most of the seventeen demands of the strike took aim to the intensification of
labor, the “rationalizing” of the industry, and redundancy wrought by technological shifts in both
machinery and production processes aimed at increasing “efficiency.” Other demands pertained
to the working conditions on the shop floor (e.g. machine cleaning, attendance records, etc.). In
all, the autonomy of the workers was expressed in each demand, which called for a
reorganization of “the government of the factory” through “consultation with representatives of
workers organizations” and “approval of workers through their own organizations” (Quoted in
Bhattacharya 1981: PE38–29).
The capitalist factions represented in the Millowners Association were perceptive in their
immediate fears of, and repulsed by, what they referred to as “Bolshevik inroads.” A political
organization for the Indian capitalist class rallied around a “national” option that supported
Independence, and sought to enlist labor in its own subordination as the best chance for defeating
62. The schedule of food consumption (which included salt, cereals, pulses, meat, oils) detailed in the Famine Code
was concerned with the measurement of food insecurity (near-scarcity, scarcity, and famine). The Code was a direct
outcome of the Victorian era famines (what Davis refers to as “late Victorian Holocausts”) that devastated India
from the 1880s onward. The 1923 study cited in the Labor Gazette was reported in G Findlay Shirras, “Report on an
Enquiry into Working Class Budgets in Bombay,” (Labour Office, Government of Bombay, 1923, p 21. Quoted in
S. Bhattacharya. “Capital and Labour in Bombay City, 1928-29.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 16, No.
42/43 (Oct. 17-24, 1981), pp. PE36-PE44).
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the upswell in communist agitation. Indeed, rational and national strategies guided the new labor
discipline. It was in this spirit then that Bombay’s captains of industry implored the police to
swiftly “remove” worker leaders, even trying to raise political support in the Legislative
Assembly for use of extraordinary powers while also agitating for the passing the Criminal
Intimidation law “to make picketing by strikers a cognisable offense.” Repressive and
reactionary sentiments against the ascendency of the working class were shared by Indian
industrialists and the colonial state alike and remained concerned with ridding the nation of the
“wickedness” of communists. “The best friends of India” it was argued, “have to concentrate on
this aspect with more earnestness rather than any other aspect” (quoted in Lieten 1982: 702).
Routinely, police reporters would spy on worker meetings, supervise pickets and escort
“blacklegs” (scabs) into the mills, and as pickets extended to worker neighborhoods, so too did
police presence. Most dramatically, the colonial state responded with the Bombay Special
Emergency Powers Act by arresting and framing communist leaders from Bombay, Calcutta,
Lahore, Jhansi, Allahabad, Gorakhpur, Dacca, Lucknow, Poona and other places in the Meerut
Conspiracy Case. Still others in the Independence movement fretted at the further arming of the
colonial state, yet balked at the independent worker movement, stating
“They ought to be made to understand that the more important struggle was between the British
government and the people rather than between labour and capital” [quote from Gordon
Polonskaya, 1964 p 215, in Lieten 1982: 703)].
There was certainly cause for concern amongst the diverse beneficiaries of British colonial
power as well as those in the ascendant Indian political classes who would seek to overthrow it,
with the mass uprisings that threated to push decolonization toward revolution.
The communist-led Girni Kamgar Union (GKU) was formed in 1927. The worker
militancy was in many ways self-organized and autonomous until the GKU took the mantle as
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the decisive workers organization of the city’s textile workers, serving as an effective agent of
organization, representing both factory and neighborhood life (from then until the 1960s).63 Prior
to that, organizations concerned with workers functioned more as self-help welfare associations
that advocated education as the solution to low wages, better hygiene to cope with inadequate
housing, and thrift in the face of poverty (Chandavarkar 1981). Because the communist-led
union spoke directly to the material needs of workers, it enrolled five times as many members as
the Congress Party in Bombay. Nonetheless, temporary and changing alliances between workers
within the GKU and other factions weakened internal cohesion due to splits within the union
itself as well as with other union leadership; meanwhile the solidity of external cross-class
alliances was vulnerable to the general hostility amongst Indian nationalists to communist
influence and their complicity in attacks on communist elements within the working class.
Meanwhile, the Congress party set up rival organizations aimed at reducing working class
autonomy, self-organization, independence, etc. The Times of India reported in 1920 that
“The textile workers of Bombay organised under the red flag will fight to the last for their
organised existence and for their legitimate rights, and they hope to be helped by all other
sections of the working class in this fight so that they will emerge victorious in the end.” [The
Times of India, September 10, 1920].
Two facets of worker mobilization in this time are important for how they would change
the everyday and lived relations in the city. First, women assumed prominent roles in factoryspecific and general strikes, expanding the political meaning of the wage as it connected
industrial labor to unpaid reproductive work. Middle class and working mill women alike were

63. The Bombay Textile Labour Union (BTLU), founded in 1926, and the Girni Kamgar Mahamandal (GKM), were
the only trade unions in the city when in early 1928 a surge of resentment of mill-hands against the rationalisation
scheme, consequent retrenchment, and coincident wage reduction created the union. It was the first general strike in
Bombay that was ideologically and strategically led by Communists, in part members of Bombay’s Workers’ and
Peasants’ Party (WPP), the name of the Communist Party of India at the time.
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influenced by Marxist ideologies and through association with Communists in everyday life.
Some sang at the gates at shift change while others defending these same gates against strike
breakers. Some cooked in the khanavals (public working-class kitchens) and smuggled
pamphlets and leaflets into the factories and pasted them on the walls while others still would
become shop floor and union leaders (Prakash 2010).
The second is the growth of militant class neighborhood associations that could
successfully socially reproduce workers despite steady pauperization and support their ability to
strike and enable large-scale coordination. During some eight hundred meetings that occurred at
mill gates and chawls, workers were able to raise the support to sustain a city-wide strike for six
months in 1928. They were also able to coordinate across workplaces, when for instance, 1929,
75,000 workers in different mills downed their tools and left their place of work. Several such
lightning strikes crippled the industry and embolden a larger proletarian spirit in the city that
linked mill committees, the union, party cells, chawl committees, and the neighborhood. Indeed,
neighborhood sentiments shifted toward the workers even amongst certain petty bourgeoisie.
Small grocers in the worker districts, for instance, supplied grain to the strikers while the
internationalist dimensions of support were evident in the strike fund established with support
from trade unions as far away as the Soviet Union, Britain, and across Europe (Prakash 2004).
The growth of the GKU from 1928 seemed inevitable as they swiftly assumed leadership
during the beginning of the strike years and changed the terrain of working-class urbanism for
decades to come. Police reports indicate a high degree of political education and revolutionary
content, with frequent references to the 1917 Russian revolution. If working class consciousness
developed steadily, its expression in autonomous class activity beyond the confining leadership
of its representative institutions, would be spasmodic. While it is reported that GKU led every
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strike following 1928, the union was also at times unable “to check wildcat strikes spontaneously
generated without reference to factory committees or the trade unions” (Chandavarkar 1981,
Lieten 1982). The strength of the trade union movement came from solidarities within and across
various working-class associations and those who acted on their behalf. But so too did caste and
religious divisions permeate the strike efforts (for instance along Brahmin-non-Brahmin, Hinduoutcaste, and Hindu-Muslim lines). While autonomous self-representation was important, as in
the case of Dalits within the labor movement, there were also ideological divisions that
undermined solidarities, as for instance when Ambedkar split workers along caste lines by
assisting outcaste workers into the mills; or when the recruitment of Muslim weavers and
picketers provoked Hindu worker insecurities. Additionally there were risks of aligning to calls
of unity in the Independence movement, as voiced by GKU union leader S V Deshpande who
wrote in Kranti, a Marathi-language workers’ weekly organ, on June 9, 1929 that “it would be
putting the rope round the necks if the workers were to give their destiny in the hands of Gandhi,
who is careless about workmen and always lives near rich capitalists” (Lieten 1982:702). The
demands of Independence also put unique pressures on Muslim workers due to communal
tensions within the nationalist movements for Independence.
The swelling class-consciousness during the strikes lingered in the sentiments and
attitudes of workers across the city. There were established in workers districts military
barricades during two communal riots (where Pathan moneylenders’ homes and their loan
ledgers were particularly targeted for destruction) that flared up during the strike that remained
even after the riots died, justified by the Police Report due to the “state of high nervous tension.”
So too did communalist tendencies, once provoked by mill managers and political parties alike,
become entrenched in the antinomies of the worker and the nationalist movements. Communal
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riots in the 1930s were an exception to the otherwise inter-communal political and civic culture
that the city enjoyed, precisely because of workers’ traditions of solidarity and collective action
around labor and general proletarian reproduction in the city (Chandavarkar 2004).
The industry had barely recovered from the 1928–1929 strikes when the fluctuating
world markets during the Great Depression caused a crisis of the economy. Starting in the 1930s,
the textile industry began casualizing labor and thereby more sharply distinguished between
permanent workers and a large mass of “informal” workers, not only in the mills but across the
wider urban labor market. While a few “protected” workers remained, the ranks of the informal
labor community swelled, receiving fewer benefits, greater discipline, and lower wages from
state and industry that felt no obligations toward them. Worker power was fragmented. Their
autonomous ability to directly assault their class enemies was stunted by myriad intermediaries
and contractors in the labor process, from “patrons, caste fellows, and assorted meddlers of
influence, power, and credit.” (Chandavarkar 2009: 25) A further round of wages cuts and
rationalization provoked another wave of strikes in 1933–1934 which briefly extended the
organization of the general strike of 1928–1929 and also deepened ties to workers’ neighborhood
associations. In addition to mill committees that were established in the previous cycle of worker
militancy, chawl committees played a vital role, something the police took direct notice of and
referred to as “communist cells.” While the state’s presence in the neighborhoods was not all
repressive in nature, the police were in fact the main contact workers had with the state.64
Leftist intellectuals articulated working class and popular sentiments in formations such
as the All India Progressive Writers’ Association (PWA), founded in 1936 and reflected in street

64. A police report bluntly stated, “They have gone to great trouble to establish ‘communist cells’ in mills and
industrial concerns, and in addition they have appointed Chawl Committees to influence the workers still.” Quoted
in Chandavarkar 1981: 638.
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theater (loknatya) such as the Indian People’s Theatre Association (IPTA), founded in 1942.
Strikes occurred in 1939 and 1940 led by Communist trade unionists who were able to take
control of the considerable All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) when its leaders were
jailed for their association with the nationalist independence movement (Kooiman 1980, Lieten
1982).
Nonetheless, the difficulties of building of workers’ collective autonomy fed directly into
a growing fragmentation of power along caste and communal lines that would give rise over the
next thirty years to a new political culture in the city. Workers militancy yielded to another more
reactionary force: communalism and parochialism. Although it would take a few decades to fully
express itself, by 1960, new street and party formations such as the Shiva Sena were able to
capture the restrained and frustrated worker energy (Pendse 1984).
Workers did achieve new housing legislation in the form of rent control and tenancy laws,
making it impossible for landlords to evict tenants or raise rents, but also enabling renters to pass
on leaseholds to succeeding generations. Possession of rights of succession to rental housing thus
conferred a higher status on the housed, and excluded the un-housed from the most crucial of
livelihood resources. This gave rise to a privatist urban formula of deteriorating social housing
schemes wherein an undisposed upper middle class increasingly felt only responsible for
maintenance and upkeep of their private dwellings and appealed to hired muscle rather than the
law to assert their rights or interests. Meanwhile, those who could afford neither maintenance nor
defensive muscle would find themselves evicted. In a languid regulatory environment, landlords
deemed large business corporations preferred tenants, for their reverence of property rights made
for an easy alliance with the upper and middle classes and they were relatively immune to both
statutory due process and informal intimidation. Thirty years of this policy culture yielded
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popular resentment that such tenancy laws served the rich instead of protecting the poor. As
property prices climbed, scarcity of “affordable” housing resulted in massive squatter
settlements.65

Struggles for Space
In the early 1930s, the nationwide civil disobedience movement against the British Salt tax
spread to Bombay. Vile Parle was the headquarters of the movement in Bombay under Jamnalal
Baja. Strikes and boycotts, aggravated by the salt satyagrahas (Gandhi-influenced civil
disobedience) and sit-down strikes begun in the thirties, gained greater power in the wartime
economy. Yet the war economy forced greater exploitation of workers. There was some
diversification of industries during this period, alongside a growth in manufacturing and
engineering. General strikes in 1940 and 1950 conveyed a sense of violent rejection of this
exploitation and the regimes of work imposed upon workers through the jobber system in which
jobbers, supervisors, and manager were routinely attacked. Worker militancy during this period
suggests that Indian labor was not easily subordinated by the British Raj’s war efforts and that
Independence would not necessarily be politically possible only after the conclusion of the war.
Given the intensity of workers’ strike actions, Bombay in the 1940s was considered the
“nerve centre of Communist agitation in India” alongside Bengal. The spread of popular support
for communists and workers struggles extended to an “impressive community of political
sentiments […] and sustained political expression” (Chandavarkar 1981:632). Yet the Quit India
movement was launched in 1942 without much expectation that workers would support the
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See Chandavarkar 2009: 21–25; Whitehead, Judy. “Rent gaps, revanchism and regimes of accumulation in
Mumbai.” Anthropologica (2008): 269-282.) Housing precarity would intensify in the context of the informalization
of labor.
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Congress-led effort. On the contrary, in large part, workers were ahead of their unions and
political party representations during the forties and indeed for the next few decades in their
decolonial and revolutionary ambitions for independence. The Quit India rebellion was first
promulgated on August 7, 1942 in Bombay by the Indian National Congress in a public meeting
at Gowalia Tank. A wave of repression followed in which nationalist leaders were jailed.
Communists were largely isolated from the nationalist movement, for which the British rewarded
them by legalizing their Party organization.
With World War II, the movements of thousands of troops, military and industrial goods
and the fleet of the Royal Indian Navy made Bombay an important military base for battles
fought in West Asia and South East Asia. The Royal Indian Navy mutiny, sparked by a thousand
sailors engaging a flash sit-down and hunger strike, marked a week-long revolt in Colaba, from
February 18 to 25 1946, as the first and most serious revolt by the Indian sailors of the Royal
Indian Navy against British rule. Agitators onboard Navy vessels flew the Congress tricolor,
Muslim League green, and Communist Red flags. The uprising quickly spread to every branch of
the British Indian armed services, not only in Bombay, but “every major naval establishment
(Karachi, Calcutta, Visakhapatnam, Cochin, Lonavala, and even New Delhi), Royal Indian Air
force stations (Sion, Madras, Kanpur, and Ambala), and even army units in Bombay, Karachi,
and Calcutta” (Lentin 2015).66 Workers, students from Dadar, small traders from Bhuleshwar
and Kalbadevi, Muslims from Mohammad Ali Road, wide sections of the city’s middle classes,
began gathering on the streets, stirring to the call by Communists to rally in support of the
striking low-ranking Naval officers (Prakash 2010:217). British tanks and troops roamed the
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streets of Bombay, while warships trained their guns on an insurgent city. Four days into the
rising tension, some three hundred workers were killed in police shootings.
The unrest only hastened the British timeline for departure of the subcontinent. On 15
August 1947, India declared independence. People of all caste and class celebrated in the streets
for two days while Nehru delivered his famous “Tryst with Destiny” speech in Delhi. The last
British troops to leave India, the First Battalion of the Somerset Light Infantry, passed through
the arcade of the Gateway of India on 28 February 1948, ending the 282-year period of the
British rule in Bombay. Partition of India and Pakistan drove refugees to existing and newly
emerging cities on a wide scale. Between 1947 and 1951, fourteen new towns were built, and in
that period the population of Indian cities grew by 41 per cent. In this regard (as others) the
effects of Partition on urbanization were far reaching: there was a three-fold increase in the urban
population of India between 1951–1981, from 62 million to 159 million, which then reached 217
million in 1991. Over one hundred thousand Sindhi refugees from the newly created Pakistan
were relocated in the military camps five kilometers from Kalyan in the Bombay metropolitan
region. It was converted into a township in 1949, and named Ulhasnagar by the then GovernorGeneral of India, C. Rajagopalachari. From 1945–1971, driven by migration due to Partition and
a wartime influx, the city grew five-fold: from one and half million, the city grew to eight
million (Chandavarkar 2009).
Conclusion
The working classes of Bombay took central stage politically, from the rise of industrialism in
the 1870s onward, to the vicissitudes of workers’ demands within the industrial and imperial
economy in a time of war, to the emergence of a contradictory and fraught class-alliance in the
nationalist independence movement. Workers in this period projected their demands onto the city

99

itself in multiple waves of general strikes, all the while imprinting their urban ways of life into
the fabric of the city. While multiple class forces were arrayed against them, workers managed to
shape the city and its developmental trajectories through decades of militancy.
Over all, a long century of such working-class mobilizations imprinted the city with its
largely pluralist and popular cultures. The business strategies of the industrial classes that relied
on the colonial state’s willingness to mobilize police repression to limit the concessions given to
workers on the job and in their neighborhoods, also indelibly imprinted the city with a legacy of
repression and selective concession. The struggles between these classes would only heighten in
the post-Independence era, as workers faced a sustained strategy of industrial uneven
development no longer fettered by the distractions of a nationalist bourgeoisie vying for workers’
allegiance.
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CHAPTER 3
A City for a Nation Yet to Come:
Class Identity and Difference in Post-Independence Bombay
“And now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially. At
the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes,
which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a
nation, long suppressed, finds utterance. . .” —Jawaharlal Nehru

The first decades of Independence, a period roughly between 1950 and 1970, during an importsubstitution manufacturing regime, were a decisive time for Indian capitalists, as
industrialization was expected to proceed at an eager and unfettered pace. Capitalists keen on a
stable and profitable productivity worked closely with the state in a new national climate,
granted concessions to workers, and accepted a degree of unionization. In general, they opted for
peaceful and legal measures to resolve industrial conflict (Pendse 1981). Yet they remained
apprehensive of any maneuver that would consolidate the power of workers at the political level
or to allow workers to recompose their power in their neighborhoods and across industry.
Workers’ struggles took a definitive turn in the increasingly tumultuous postIndependence period. These were not confined to textile and railway workers, but also included
workers employed by the Municipal Corporation, in transport, electricity, as well as hotels and
restaurants. As social struggles proliferated in this period, new lines of class solidarity were
drawn beyond official parties. Communist-led union power was already starting to decline by the
1950s as Congress was ushered into power upon Independence. Hoping to regain their influence
within agrarian and urban working-class struggles, communists eagerly joined a growing
coalition led by Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad (United Maharashtra Assembly) of nationalists
working to reorganize the administrative and territorial identity of the city and the region along
ethnic lines and to establish a Maharashtran state centered around ethnic Marathas and the
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dominance of the Marathi language. The Communist Party’s calculus was that the marathi manu
(Marathi man) would be a leading protagonist against moneylenders, industrialists, and other
exploiters largely from Parsi, Gujarati, and Malwari communities.67 The assumption, however,
held by intellectuals and activists alike, was flawed and fated for defeat. By reducing the
working classes to Maharashtran culture and by tying its struggles to the outcomes of a new
state, linguistic and communal ties took the place of long-standing affiliations amongst a
culturally heterogeneous urban labor population. Communists and other left organizations who
participated in what some termed a “second Independence movement” ceded important political
ground to nativists and nationalists.68 So too did the late fifties witness the growth of Dalit
political formations such as the Scheduled Caste Federation and the Republican Part of India.
Although the Republic Party of India failed to unite Dalit interests within this roiling coalition,
lower caste politics came to the fore around the formation of the state of Maharashtra.
In January 1955, just days before the scheduled maiden visit of Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev and Minister of Defense Nikolai Bulganin to the city, the Samyukta Maharashtra
Parishad called for a demonstration to illustrate its capacity to mobilize the popular classes, to
which six hundred thousand workers responded.69 Popular surges paved the way for violence and
riots. So too did the Samyukta Maharashtra movement organized satyagrahas (truth processions)
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As the Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad (SMP) would later inspire far-reaching ethnochauvinist political
formations such as the Shiv Sena, the fateful involvement of Communists and other left organizations in the
coalition would have grave consequences for working class solidarities, as discussed in the next chapter.
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The Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru revealed how significant this historic visit of Soviet leadership to nonaligned India was for Jawaharlal Nehru and his framing of the “Communist problem” inside the country. It was
Nehru’s interpretation that the Communist Party of India (then-undivided) was eager to receive instruction from the
USSR on the correct “line” to take in domestic and international affairs. According to Nehru, “early in 1951–1952,
some principal leaders of the Communist Party [India] went to Moscow secretly, that is without passports. They
came back and said that they had got directions from Mr. Stalin. At least this is what they said. The line then laid
down was one of full opposition (to the Government) and, where possible, petty insurrections." Moreover, there was
the divisive question within the Indian Communist Part on whether to follow the “China path,” replacing the earlier
Russian one, or to follow the “Indian path” toward communism. Quoted in The Hindu, September 7, 2003 (“A peep
into the Past”), https://www.thehindu.com/lr/2003/09/07/stories/2003090700170300.htm
68
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for nine months. As before, the police fired on crowds, killing ten and injuring hundreds. Protests
(morcha) by the movement resulted in a total of 105 people killed by police firing during the
period of agitation. While Bombay was mobilized by a “democratic nationalism” of the
“working class, the peasantry, and the toiling middle-classes. . . . the Nehru government was
unbending. On January 16, 1956, it announced the decision to form three states—Maharashtra,
Gujarat, and the city of Bombay, which would be administered from New Delhi” (Prakash 2010:
224). Left leaders were arrested, and workers resumed strikes that again crippled the city. Several
more police shootings in workers districts attempted to stem the growing tensions, claiming
between seventy-five and one hundred lives depending on which estimates are considered (Ibid.)
Nonetheless, the newly organized Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (United Maharashtra
Committee), an alliance of opposition parties comprised of Marathi nationalists, Communists,
Socialists, and Dalits formed in February 1956, used an electoral strategy as effectively as they
did with street pressure to fight for the linguistic state of Maharashtra. In the second general
elections of Bombay state, “they were rewarded with resounding success in” receiving a large
majority of seats in Maharashtra (Prakash 2013).
It was not by a diverse proletarian class-lower caste alliance but a multi-class
Maharashtran community of citizens that Bombay’s contested popular power was consolidated.
Maharashtra was born on the first of May 1960 with Bombay as its capital.70 The rearrangement
of states required new administrative centers and capitals and reoriented the direction of
urbanization at the time. Industrialization during the 1950s–1960s led to the development of
many new towns apart from the state capital that were linked to the location of heavy industries
and development projects. By the mid-sixties, capitalist expansion was slowing and the Congress
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P arty was losing its grip on workers who faced in their own daily lives incontrovertible evidence
of the bourgeois control of Independence which would favor the nation’s political classes over its
working masses. A period of contraction in the textile industry accompanied wider economic and
spatial policy changes in the city. Older sections of workers were getting restless and other
sections of the working class, such as service workers as well as a more educated and skilled
engineering, chemical, and petroleum workers, were getting newly organized in an era in of
capitalist expansion. However, workers faced informalization in which mill owners took
advantage of lax labor laws and of state support to the non-mill sector, subcontracted part of their
production to power looms (where workers were paid far less and were far more insecure) in
quasi-legal arrangements (Patel 2010: 75). There were signs that an economic transition was on
the brink: “the differentiation of the textile industry into a backward non-viable sector kept in
existence by state policy; a modern profitable sector with expanding investment and production;
and a growing small-scale sector, often producing under subcontract to larger units, became
characteristic of the entire spectrum of Mumbai industry” (ibid.).
The Shiv Sena, the right-wing nativist party and neighborhood-based organization was
founded in 1966. Its rise since the 1960s has had a major role in the ideological shift in mood
amongst the popular classes and the claim that workers had to better lives in the city. Hitherto,
“workers, intellectuals, and political activists saw radical urban dreams expressed in the color
red” (Prakash 2010: 205). The Shiv Sena, in turn, was used to break the last unities among
working class organizations in the city, mobilizing “Marathi-speaking upper caste Brahmins,
Sawaswat, Kayastha, and the OBC [Other Backwards Caste] caste groups”—at the behest of the
employing classes (Rodrigues and Gavaskar 2003: 146). Vehemently anticommunist, the Shiv
Sena penetrated the popular culture of the streets with a nativist and identitarian logic of
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mobilization. Gujarati and Marwaris (Rajastani) communities were perceived as owning the
majority of the industry and trade enterprises in the city (from grain, textile, paper and metal
trade, to diamonds, bullion, to stock trading), while white-collar jobs were mainly sought by the
South Indian migrants to the city. The Shiv Sena stoked resentment amongst Marathi people
about their relative marginalization in their state Maharashtra through a nativist narrative of
historical conquer and subordination by waves of outsiders. Urban desire and political will would
fuse into a governing redemptive power of mythic past glories for the Marathas.
Although they were not wholly allied or subordinate to business interests in the city, the
Shiva Sena accomplished far more in terms of workers’ repression than mill owners and the
police could. In this regard, the Shiv Sena has been described as an “emanation of the ‘crisis of
crisis management’,” a party that grew “between two spaces of wealth and poverty in Bombay
appealing to ‘a class squeezed in between which has neither benefited from close contact with
the power structure nor as a recipient of the welfare dole.” (Prakash 1993: 2120)
The Shiv Sena fomented a communal riot in the northern suburbs of Mumbai against
Muslims from Northern India. Meanwhile, they trained their suspicions on South Indians, who
were in addition to Communists, the other “aliens” to be purged from the native lands of
Maharashtra. In the 1960s and 1970s, Shiv Sena cadres became involved in various attacks
against the South Indian communities, vandalizing South Indian restaurants and pressuring
employers to hire Marathas. In 1969, the Sena (army) also instigated an “angry rampage” of
supporters retaliating against the police arrest of Bal Thackery and other leaders after they
enlisted a crowd to stop the motorcade of a deputy Prime Minister visiting the city on official
business from Delhi. Sena activists burned shops and buses, attacked police stations, and could
only be put down by police and army intervention.
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Worker agitations in the mills under the leadership of the trade unions (led by historic
organizers such as Datta Samant) continued in the sixties. This wave was characterized by
“militancy, direct mass action, disregard for legal proprieties and challenge to an established
union.” One confrontation between workers and Shiv Sena in a Godrej factory resulted in the
death of a police officer. Dalit youth and workers were increasingly frustrated in the early 1960s
that their everyday experiences of post-Independence Bombay were not being represented and
mobilized along the cultural identity of Dalits by the neo-Buddhist Dalit leadership and
organizations of the day.
Yet the Dalit movements gained political momentum in the late sixties and early
seventies, redefining the political of emancipation for lower caste Hindus in the city and beyond.
The Dalit Panthers were inspired by the Black Panther Party in the United States and the
dramatic Naxalite uprising to the east in 1967, as well as the student movements at home and
abroad. The Dalit Panthers were determined to unseat the hierarchical order of the caste system
in Bombay and in the nation, but they also claimed Dalit identity for all “oppressed” classes and
therefore included members of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, neo-Buddhists, workers,
women, the landless and farmers. While this militant anti-caste movement arose in the city in the
sixties and seventies, it was rooted in a decades-long protest movement against caste repression
and terror in the countryside. Thus they claimed the city as an urban continuum that included the
countryside in a connected terrain of struggle, more so than the Communists and trade unionists,
ethnic chauvinists, neighborhood dadas and mafias, and ruling party politicians ever did. They
organized for empowerment and against caste-imposed scarcity across the Dalit urban world, in
Bombay, Poona, Nasik, and Aurangabad as well as into rural Maharashtra. Yet the municipality
was not merely a backdrop or place of politics. It was also their politics of place, their right to
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reside and cultivate an emancipated future. The situation remained one of abject misery with
rural Dalits fleeing rural distress only adding to the slums in central Bombay and eastern
suburbs. Unemployment and economic insecurity amongst Dalit youth and the incidences of
atrocities committed against Dalits in both urban and rural settings set the stage for a
radicalization of Dalit consciousness based in fact-finding missions in the countryside as well as
urban youth centers (chavanis) that illuminated the conditions of Dalit life.
A communalization of worker politics was emerging in which workers saw themselves
more reflected in their ethnic as opposed to class background. This had already been set in
motion with the “dislocations in the labor force in conjunction with the slowing down and
constriction of industrial growth” (Rodrigues and Gavaskar 2003: 147). As the economy showed
signs of slowing, new social identities were being mobilized beyond the workers movements.
Divisive ethnic politics ruled the day as Dalits and Senaiks (Shiv Sena rank and file) alike made
subaltern claims on the city. Containing the growing political crisis of the city was the state’s
utmost concern, and as it had done before in moments of crisis, it resorted to municipal reform
and planning, factional deals, repression and recuperation to stem conflict. While Bombay was
well represented in the all-India railway strike in 1974, as well as in the cooperation of Dalits in
workers struggles in the textile mills, everyday violence erupted along the fault lines of new
ethnic identities. A BDD chawl riot erupted after Dalits were attacked by Senaiks (and supported
by police) during a public meeting called by the Panthers in Ambedkar Ground in Worli in 1974.

Planning in Post-Independence Bombay
With its political crises and simmering rebellions, post-Independence Bombay did not look as it
was to be expected. Indeed, an era of peace and prosperity was imagined to be as much a part of
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the city’s fate as the nation.71 The first Five Year Plans included considerable state involvement
in urban policy and planning. During the 1960s, several states enacted such legislation and
created town planning departments which, with the help of central grants, prepared over five
hundred master plans for individual cities. These could not cope with the rate of urbanization that
was already occurring and the plans remained mostly on paper. The building of new towns was
meant to meet several needs: provide jobs and homes for refugees displaced by the population
transfers (or movements) that accompanied the Partition; absorb excess population from the
older urban areas; generate economic development in the local region; and serve as symbols of
new, modern India.
An aspirational postcolonial vision optimistically glossed over the brimming struggles
and antagonisms seeded by colonial urban development. Post-Independence urban planning in
Bombay was imagined, if only briefly, as a field elevated from class politics and exempt from the
relations and contests of power. There was nowhere, therefore, to channel the myriad frustrated
desires and deferred dreams except in harsher and more exacting ethnic tensions. Such was the
vision to be found in an outline of a master plan for Greater Bombay drafted in 1948 following
Independence. It was already recognized in the forties and fifties that planning would be
necessary in order to control commercially-driven growth in the city by strict land-use
regulations and the regulation of industries on the island city. Yet little of this wisdom translated
into action. In April 1950, the merger of Bombay suburbs and Bombay city created the Greater
Bombay District, spanning an area of 235.1 km2 (90.77 sq mi) and inhabited by 2.3 million
71. During the first two Plans (1951–1956; 1956–1961), for instance, several important institutions for urban
administration and the training of skilled professionals were created by the central government. These include a
Ministry of Urban Affairs, the National Buildings Organization, the School of Planning and Architecture in New
Delhi, a Regional and Town Planning Department in the IIT Kharagpur, and the Town and Country Planning
Organization, the technical unit of the Ministry of Urban Affairs, which prepared the Master Plan for Delhi in 1957
and also model legislation for town planning to be enacted by state governments. Chandigarh is exemplary in the
modernist aspirations and visions of these plans.
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people. The Municipal Corporation limits were extended up to Jogeshwari along the Western
Railway and Bhandup along the Central Railway. This limit was further extended in February
1957 up to Dahisar along the Western Railway and Mulund on the Central Railway.

Figure 7: Railway Map of Greater Mumbai. Image credit: mapsofindia.com.

The Maharashtra state-legislated Bombay Town Planning Act of 1954 (which updated
and replaced the 1915 Act) mandated the city’s municipal corporation preparation of a
Development Plan for twenty years for the Greater Mumbai Metropolitan Region, which was to
include zoning for residential, commercial, industrial and non-development zones as well as
public provisions for amenities and utilities, including road networks. The vision for a
comprehensive Development Plan for the city was also based on the Maharashtra Regional and
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Town Planning Act, 1966 (revised in 1994 to appoint the Bombay Metropolitan Regional
Development Authority for planning), which aimed to take a regional planning approach to the
Maharashtra state, regulate development in both urban and urbanizing areas with regard to land
use reservations, utilities and amenities, preservation and conservation, and distribution of
population.72
In 1964, the city’s very first Development Plan was proposed. It primarily concentrated
on: providing various amenities in line with a land use plan, shifting development to the near
suburbs; and restricting the operations of industries, trade and population concentration on the
island city (Hamara Shehar Mumbai 2014). The plan detailed a large-scale restructuring of the
city through zoning, dispersal of the pressures of urban growth and governing a vast population
to suburbs and town satellites, decentralization of industries, and a massive housing campaign
which included improved water supplies, power, sewage, social services such as education and
medical care, and an attention to traffic flow. Intended to be financed mainly through loans and
subsidies from the Maharashtran state and the central government, its call for a development tax
alongside its proposal for zoning regulations was nevertheless perceived as conflicting with
business interests that enjoyed relative autonomy in their use of urban space. Assessing these
disadvantages, the business community first sought to delay the implementation of Bombay’s
first Development Plan, and then to present the municipal government with an alternative to the
plan. This plan met with some inevitable failures: failure to comply with timelines, failure to
expand and improve existing infrastructure, and failure to develop amenities proposed in the plan
(Hamara Shehar Mumbai 2014). The 1964 Development Plan was not approved until 1967.

72

From 1960 to 1970, sixty percent of all factory workers in Maharashtra were located in Bombay as were 88
percent of all joint-stock companies (Shaw 1999). In the late 1960s, Nariman Point and Cuffe Parade were reclaimed
and developed, largely for elite consumption.
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By then, a much grander vision was gaining force. At the same time that the city began to
be imagined as a zone of crisis, it also became imagined anew as a region. Navi Bombay (now
known as Navi Mumbai), one of the world’s largest planned cities, was conceived by several
prominent architects and implemented by the government-owned City and Industrial
Development Corporation (CIDCO) as a rebirth of the city across the bay to the east.

Figure 8: The Modern Architectural Research Group (MARG). Image of Volume 1 Number 1, October 1946. Image
Credit: https://www.marg-art.org/magazine/volume-1/volume-1-number-1.html.
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The Modern Architectural Research Group (MARG), whose vision of urban development
in its 1965 journal issue first presented the idea of a “twin city,” argued that nothing good would
come of developing Bombay piece-meal. A bold and sweeping planning imagination was
conjured with a new town built from the ground up as its focus. The New Bombay was to act as
a countermagnet to a “decaying city” faced with impending “strangulation” lest population
growth be directed elsewhere (Times of India 1969, 6:2, 6:7–8 as quoted in Shaw 1999).73 The
hope of comprehensive planning for Bombay was deferred to the “dream across the water”
(Ibid.)
More importantly, the “twin city” concept functioned as a counterplan that enabled the
business community to deviate from the original Development Plan’s proposal for spatial
regulation and zoning. This would recreate spatial patterns in a new, planned direction, stemming
the rapid rate of “haphazard” urban growth and accomplish the important task of spatially
“deconcentrating” Bombay. This would formally plan the already ongoing process of
urbanization of the countryside around Bombay city and its suburbs.

Figure 9: Page 112. Urban expansion into the Mumbai
Metropolitan Region. Image Source:
http://gsalgeog.blogspot.com.
73. Times of India, Bombay, Editorial, ‘Decaying City,’ 21 April 1969, 6: 2; also, Times of India, Bombay, ‘Saving
Bombay City: Strangulation Threat,’ 15 Oct. 1969, 6: 7-8. Quoted in Shaw 1999: 965.
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In 1970, the entire area east of the harbor—55,000 acres of land, from hills to water—
was notified for acquisition. In 1971, planning of the new township began with a focus on a
better living environment for an urban majority provided through basic, accessible, and amenityoriented housing for those who could not afford to live in Bombay. This mainly benefited middle
class professionals, service sector workers and workers in organized industries who had already
migrated from Bombay; the poorer classes of Greater Bombay in unorganized sectors would not
benefit from the expansion of urban land and housing opportunities.
In 1975, Charles Correa’s film “City on the Water” states in exceptionally clear terms,
this is the city and it is dying. Yet it understood that it was congestion that would cause the city to
explode. The film opens, “Incredible, it’s it? Half a million people arriving each morning. No one
leaving.” While the poor are shown favorably by Correa, the camera typically direct its gaze
downward to render a view the poor in need of rescue by development. If not, the city would
crumble—through neglect, overuse, and sheer numbers. “Where would there be space
enough?”—it asked. Indeed, urban growth in India throughout the twentieth century was rapid
and didn’t show signs of slowing in the seventies. The faster growth of large towns and cities
than smaller cities and town in the last century led to an increasing concentration of the urban
population in these settlements. This is the associated phenomenon of metropolization, of the
large, swirling economic urban magnet of major cities such as Bombay.74 Slums only increased
in both cities, while rural-to-urban migration to Navi Mumbai from nearby small towns and
villages supplied laborers for domestic work.

74. While at the beginning of the last century, small towns with less than twenty thousand people were the
predominant kind of town and accounted for 47 per cent of the total urban population, since 1901, small towns have
lost population, and by 1991 this figure dropped to 11 per cent. At the same time, towns with a population over
100,000, called Class I towns, accounted for 65 per cent of the total urban population. Whereas in 1901, there was
only once such metropolis (over one million in population, in this case Calcutta), by 1951, there were four (Mumbai,
Delhi, Chennai, and Calcutta); by 1981 there were 12 and by 1991 there were 23.
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As increasing migration to the cities, and specifically to informal settlements, pushed
urbanization outward from the peripheries of established cities, the city was forced to expand
laterally in some ways that were planned (suburbs, satellite towns such as Navi Mumbai
developed in 1972). The urban conglomerate of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region, consisting of
Greater Mumbai, Navi Mumbai and many satellite towns, became formally administered by the
Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) that very year. MMRDA
served as an apex body for planning and coordination of development activities in the Bombay
metropolitan region, and set up a regional plan that included zones for industrial, agrarian,
protected and reserved forest, expansion areas, urbanizable areas and restricted areas. As such,
urban growth emerges across the transit corridors in the region. Coastal Regulation Zones were
established for the preservation of coastal and agricultural landscapes. Maharashtra Housing and
Development Authority, established in 1977, was and remains engaged primarily in constructing
and selling housing to low- and middle-income groups in urban and semi-urban areas.
In August 1979, the sister township of New Bombay was founded by City and Industrial
Development Corporation (CIDCO) across Thane and Raigad districts to help the dispersal and
control of Bombay’s population. Similarly, the Jawaharlal Nehru Port was commissioned on May
26, 1989 at Nhava Sheva with a view to decongest Bombay Harbour and to serve as a hub port
for the city. Bombay is was among the most populous metropolitan regions in the world, home to
numerous multinational corporations, includes special economic zones, and haphazard
development has facilitated some of the largest warehousing zones in India. The populist
imaginary of the city at a time of independence, one that could fulfill its destiny and expand the
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realm of freedom, was being replaced by a city elite concerned with maximizing market and
consumerist opportunities. 75

A Theater of Popular Struggles
In the period of 1974–1975, a wide field of anti-state struggles emerged, from independent trade
union agitations, to opposition and left parties, social and mass organizations. The 1973 oil shock
and ensuing global crisis was felt in India, whose crude oil and petroleum product imports more
than doubled year-over-year. The state was already fiscally under strain from war with Pakistan
(1965) and the war of supersession with Bangladesh (1971). Prices nearly doubled while wages
remained frozen or were cut; inflation soared and a black market expanded. Two anticorruption
popular rebellions emerged amongst students and professional workers and their trade unions, in
Gujarat and Bihar. In May 1974, an all-India railway strike mobilized 1.7 million workers for
greater wagers and shorter hours. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi invoked the colonial-era the
“Defense of India Rules” and “the Maintenance of Internal Security Act” to arrest over 50,000
workers and suppress the strike in a move that was mere prelude to the coming Emergency a year
later. These struggles, inspired as they were by the social and economic crises of 1973, were an
indication of India’s integration in the world system.
The twenty-one-month Emergency during 1975 to 1977 dramatically escalated a situation
of class conflict, further expanding from industrial and informal worker sectors into professional
classes. Bank employees, workers in state-owned insurance firms, university teachers, and others
participated in marches. Engineers and workers at Siemens protested against both the company
and Siemens Workers Union (SWU) leadership who took advantage of the Emergency to pass
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Shaw traces these shifts to the “changes taking place in the economy and polity of Indian society as a whole”
(1999: 985).
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unfair settlements. A strike emerged after the company declared a lockout, inspiring workers’
militancy and violence. Only the intervention of the Chief Minister of the State, the strike was
called off after ten months. Siemans restructured its manufacturing into small workshops and
relocated them in distant districts of Maharashtra such as Nashik, rather than confront labor’s
intransigence.
There was an effervescence of democratic and radical politics in Bombay that sought to
experiment with the idioms of everyday life and the culture of work. Several study groups
emerged all across the city which were led by young intellectuals.76 Student groups actively
resisted the autocratic and capitalist tendencies in the education system as well as in society.
Vidyarthi Pragati Sanghatana was one such group that comprised students of the more elite
colleges of Mumbai such as St. Xavier’s, St. Wilson and Elphinstone. A few of the other student
groups active in this period were Progressive Students movement (PROYOM), which later
transformed for a time into the Pragatisheel Vidyarthi Sanghatana, All India Students Federation
(AISF), and Law Spectrum (a collective of law students which brought out a magazine for a time
of that same name). One of the more militant initiatives by the student groups was to oppose the
fee hike in universities in the late 1970s. The student movement against this fee hike, which was
led by a coalition of groups called SAFAC (Student Anti-Fee Rise Action Committee),
culminated in the occupation of university buildings on the Fort campus which eventually
compelled the state government to scrap the fee hike (ibid.)
Several politically oriented magazines were also brought out during this period, such as
Scan (by radical students in Elphinstone College), Kalam (published first in English and Marathi,
it would later become the mouthpiece of the All India Revolutionary Students Federation), and
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Blast (by a trade union). Several street theatre groups emerged in the city, one of which was
Avahan (आवाहन, a call or challenge). In its early phase, Avahan was influenced by Badal Sircar’s
Third Theatre which encouraged direct communication between the performers and the
spectators and removal of all elaborate props. Such theatre was more portable, radical, accessible
and intimate. For the activists associated with the group, it was a medium through which political
ideas could be disseminated at the grassroots in a more effective manner. Even the process of
writing scripts and directing plays was democratic, with no one person calling the shots and all
bearing responsibility for the play.
Avahan was formed by students and youth from largely affluent backgrounds and, in the
initial period, it bore the imprint of bourgeois theatre. While its members were left- oriented,
they lacked an idiom to reach out to the working people and oppressed social groups. Two
factors played an important role in the transformation of the group’s political character and
outreach. Firstly, there was a change in its social composition. As they started performing in lowincome colleges and bastis (slum settlements), several students from working-class and Dalit
families joined the group (some of them went on to become well-known balladeers and activists
such as Vilas Ghogre and Sambhaji Bhagat). The diversification in the membership led to
changes in its forms of doing theatre. Since the oral tradition was very strong among Dalits,
songs became an integral means of expression and communication in Avahan’s performances.
The second factor had to do with the fact that Avahan’s work among the oppressed and
the exploited at the grassroots shaped the way its members performed and interacted with these
classes. As they entered into a sustained and meaningful dialogue with the people, the latter’s
stories, folk traditions, language, forms of expression influenced Avahan’s theatre and songs.
Their politics acquired a working class and anti-caste character. It moved away from the usual
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forms and substance of bourgeois theatre and acquired a revolutionary character. It had found its
idiom.
Avahan was more an activist theatre engaged in contemporary political and social
struggles than it was an artists’ group. In the 1980s, it actively participated in the civil liberties
and democratic rights movement, struggles against forced evictions of slum dwellers and the
long militant strike of the mill workers. Its plays would adapt to the changes within the
movement. For instance, in case of the mill workers’ movement, as the strike and the ensuing
repression unleashed by the state entered different stages, Avahan’s plays were reconstructed
several times, sometimes overnight, in order to reflect the sentiments and demands of the
protesting masses. The reason behind this flexibility and relevance of Avahan’s cultural politics
was the dialectical link between their theatre and the consciousness and action of the working
classes. The group was more than simply a tool to mobilize public opinion. Avahan was about
inspiring people to act. It was more of an agitprop (agitation and propaganda) theatre. On the
other hand, people’s responses towards its performances also influenced the group’s theatre. It
learnt from people’s feedback, their ideas, stories and styles. Such an agitprop theatre strives to
push people’s struggles in a certain direction and in doing so, also undergoes metamorphoses on
account of the struggle. Though Avahan was active in the city of Mumbai, it also developed its
network with other regional and local cultural troupes and was part of the All India League for
Revolutionary Culture (Bhattacharya 2013). Its activists translated the works of regional artists
and activists such as Gaddar, Cherabandaraju, Ram Bali Yadav in local languages and used them
in their theatre, thus widening the audience for revolutionary poetry and songs. Avahan’s unique
style of weaving dialogues with songs in its plays also influenced radical traditions elsewhere.
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Sanober Keshwaar, a participant in Avahan at the time, noted that “since the Communist
Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People’s War was perhaps the first communist revolutionary
party that looked at the question of annihilation of caste seriously and that also had Dalit activists
among its leadership, it was no surprise that the leading lokshahirs (political poets and
performers) of the day were generated from its ranks.” She continued, “or that the glorious
tradition of communist oriented peoples’ songs and poetry of lokshahirs like Annabhau Sathe and
Amar Sheikh continued and was advanced by lokshahirs like Vilas Ghogre and Sambhaji Bhagat.
The songs penned by these lokshahirs of Avahan—a potent combination of the folk music form
and revolutionary content will be found on the lips of every left-of-centre group of activists in
Maharashtra. Such was their reach and contribution.”77

“The Last Great Strike”
It was only after the Emergency ended that Bombay’s second Development Plan, initially
prepared for the period of 1981–2001, was drafted. This Development Plan once again was
impeded by inordinate delays. By far the most deleterious delays were in financing and the
smooth procedural functioning of the bureaucratic machinery of the city. Yet nothing would seem
to stand in the way so significantly than the city’s last great strike. Indeed, though workers were
temporarily quiescent under the Emergency conditions of martial law and extreme repression, a
wave of rebellion once again burst forth as soon as the Emergency was lifted and showed signs
of bubbling into a city-wide revolt (Tarlo 2003).
There was a total of 140 strikes in the Bombay-Thane-Belapur belt between March 25
and December 31, 1977 (Pendse 1981). From April 1977 to June 1980, a cycle of direct action in

77. Adapted from the oral history by Sanober Keshwaar (fieldnotes, April 18, 2015). Keshwaar also notes that today
the same militant tradition is being advanced by the performance troupe of the Republican Panthers.
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newer struggles and newer demands cascaded directly from militant workers who were at this
point far in advance of the unions and political parties. At the end of 1981, workers gathered in
the tens of thousands at Nare Park and in the hundreds of thousands in Jamboree Maidan. “The
post-1977 period was one of challenging and overthrowing the state and management-imposed
codes of conduct. It was a period of the working class shaking up their own organizations and
casting them aside” (Pendse 1981: 747). Few exceptional leaders, such as the spectacular
personality cult of Datta Samant, who lead the historic strike of 1982–1983, knew that workers
were militantly organized on their own and could only be mobilized by those who “effectively
articulated the general distrust of capitalists which the workers were feeling. [Those who] echoed
the disgust which the worker was feeling towards the legal system [and the] time-consuming,
murderously slow and essentially biased labour law machinery” (Pendse 1981: 747).
On January 18, 1982, nearly 250,000 permanent and insecure workers across fifty mills
went on strike. The majority of workers remained on strike for eighteen months and successfully
closed most factories for over a year. Along with the increase of wages, a major demand of the
strike was the abolition of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, which sought to quell
unionization by recognizing a single state-sanctioned union that made strikes illegal. The
autonomous Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union, that would lead the strike under the prominent
direction of Datta Samant, was barely one year old. On August 1, 1983, some 250,000 workers
marched in the pouring rain, joined in a new “political alliance of industrial workers, the rural
poor, Dalits and women” (Omvedt 1983: 1509). The industrial actions of this period differed
from previous ones in this crucial regard. “Workers of Sangli district, for instance, have begun to
formulate strategies for leading struggles of rural labourers and poor- middle peasants against the
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kulak elite entrenched in the villages and sugar factories of the central irrigated areas of the
district.” (Ibid).
Others marched for Employment Guarantee Schemes, while on July 15, 1983, women
rallied against price rises and targeted the center of merchant power in the wholesale markets. A
range of actions “included huge rallies, marches and jail bharo [filling the jails] campaigns in
Bombay as well as in rural areas, and, in February-March 1983 district-level ‘long marches’ in
which 5,000 to 12,000 workers walked 3–4 days from their villages to district headquarters in
four districts” (Ibid.). The connections between industrial workers and rural struggles, such as
mine workers joining and supporting Adivasi peasant struggles in the Jharkhand-Chattisgarh
movements were parallel developments in the broad-based working-class movements in India at
the time. These illustrate the instances of solidarity between struggles and the degree of
coordination readily exercised and potentially available for sustaining a generalized rebellion.
This in part explains why the state and various bourgeois factions’ refusal to acquiesce to
the textile mill strike’s demands was so phenomenal. Both were clear about the national
significance of a potential working-class victory and therefore adamant about crushing the rising
tide of workers’ power in central Bombay, whatever the cost.78 As such the textile industry and
the city itself suffered major economic losses. “The strike began in what Indira Gandhi had
declared to be the ‘Year of Productivity—and by the time the year was over it had resulted in 50
million ‘man days’ lost,” most of it due to lockouts (Omvedt 1983: 1510). Constant police
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Javed Anand, a labor journalist who covered the strike as a correspondent for The Daily, a Bombay-based tabloid
newspaper, remarked, “prime minister Indira Gandhi was concerned that if Samant [the strike’s prominent leader]
had his way in the textile industry, port and dock workers from Bombay would come under his sway next and there
would be no stopping him thereafter. So, no concessions.” Source: “In the experience of blue-collared men, he
remained the only trade union leader who put workers before politics,” The Rediff Special. 1996,
https://m.rediff.com/news/jan/17javed.htm
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pressure, sporadic arrests of workers, who were sometimes dragged from their chawls, the
beatings and torture of workers who maintained rural connections during the strike were chased
down to the villages, where patils (village chiefs), police, local politicians all brought pressure
down on individuals. Worker militancy was also sustained with support of “tons of grain from
peasants, donations from workers and employees in other industries, as well as support strikes at
the state level” as well as by leftist student movements (Ibid.). But the leadership of the strike
movement was also prone to sectionalism, favoring certain more protected workers over a
broader coalition of the city’s workers (Sherlock 1996). This only played into the hands of the
Shiv Sena who were actively stoking regional-chauvinist identity nascent amongst Marathi
workers. While they largely failed to communalize the workplaces, “in sites where the Sena has
succeeded, the nexus between union boss, politician and criminal seems complete” (Sherlock
1996: L37). As such, a platform from which to mobilize the range of experiences as workers of
the city never congealed.
Eventually the longest and largest strike in the country collapsed, inaugurating an era of
retrenchment and precarity. Meanwhile, the city came to be home to myriad complex social
struggles in the post-Independence period. As these social struggles crisscrossed the city, a
central contradiction became apparent: on the one hand, the expansion of the field of social
struggle in the wake of repression broadened the meaning of class exploitation and oppression.
On the other hand, the transformation of identities beyond class resulted in the loss of immediate
solidarities as ethnic and communal affiliations replaced ready identification and social
connection with other popular and subaltern groups.
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CHAPTER 4
The Production of Urban Informality:
Industrial Decline and Urban Fragmentation
"Strikes . . . teach the workers to unite; they show them that they can struggle against the capitalists only when they
are united; strikes teach the workers to think of the struggle of the whole working class against the whole class of
factory owners and against the arbitrary police government. This is the reason that the socialists call strikes `a school
of war'. . . . A school of war is however not war itself."
—Lenin, On Strikes ([1899] 1970: 65, emphasis added)

Introduction
This chapter follows the preceding ones in offering a select political-economic history of
planning in Mumbai—both the articulations of developmentalism from above and popular urban
struggles from below—and how specific conflicts have produced the space and politics of the
city. The discussion covers the political and economic transformations in Bombay/Mumbai from
1982, during a crescendo of workers’ militancy, until the present day, tracing the city’s
devastating shift from an industrial-based economy to a largely informal economy propelled by
real estate and speculative land-based accumulation strategies. The major drivers of this
transformation were the fateful end of the 1982 strike, the 1991 liberalization of economic
policy, the sudden rise in land prices and speculation fervor, and the increasing international
consulting/NGO/governmental effort to turn Bombay/Mumbai into a “world-class city”
hospitable to ever new investment and business requirements of global elites. In particular,
chapter four analyzes the history and production of urban informality that has marked
Bombay/Mumbai over the last thirty years, and also chronicles the parallel rise of unorganized
labor and communal violence. The chapter’s central argument is that this informality,
unprecedented in the city’s history, was not due to a lack of sufficient planning or economic
development, but rather was a direct consequence of these decades’ class relations and urban
planning strategies.
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I argue that informality is the result of a hegemonic class strategy of materially and
categorically producing subjugated urban spaces across society through apparatuses of planning
and state processes. Recent critical planning scholarship has demonstrated the ways in which the
formal and informal are “interconnected” or constitute “hybrid arrangements” along a
“continuum” of urban processes (Daniels 2004, Roy and AlSayyad 2004). These approaches
offer insight into the ways which informality is embedded in a range of contradictory processes
that pass through experiences of work (and varied forms of labor valorization), housing
possibilities, as well as resource distribution structures and the organization of everyday
reproduction (water, electricity, transport, health, sanitation and waste). However, this chapter
brings attention to the class antagonisms that arise from informality as a central aspect of the
capitalist mode of urbanization in Mumbai. These antagonisms are rooted in both material and
symbolic productions of space. For instance, urban space is created in the unsanctioned forms of
housing among the poor, both in the manner in which land is reclaimed for informal settlements
as well as the manner in which state and municipal authorities sanction informal space by
notifying or de-notifying settlements. Moreover, parallel processes of unofficially sanctioning
non-legal housing projects for the rich create informal enclaves and housing projects out of urban
lands zoned for public housing or open space. So too are informalities embedded in speculative
real estate transactions of significant note, where they are found in both official “discrepancies”
and unscripted planning exceptions, uneven policy applications, arbitrary juridical enactments,
and as well as judgments that favor the bias of elite aesthetics.
While informality has long been a reality of Bombay’s urban history and, as such, a
recurring terrain of antagonism and struggle, its spread was curtailed by an industrial economy
that made vital use of labor power and was repeatedly forced to capitulate to various popular
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movements that organized against workers’ informalization at home and on the job. This
dynamic fundamentally shifted after the historic defeat of the workers movement in 1982—
inaugurating a new period in which informality has become both the predominant planning
paradigm and lived experience of the city.
How did the collapse of the mill workers’ strike break workers’ capacities to make wider
claims on the city and precipitate the ensuing era of intensified informality? I show how a new
land-based strategy rendered the mill economy superfluous, significantly reducing the power of
workers’ positions and demands—both in the workplace and in the city at large. Meanwhile, a
rise in communal divisions and violence, particularly at the street level, hampered city residents’
ability to make wholesale planning demands.
In this context, I lay out the political, cultural, and economic domains of informality that
arose in the city through the lens of the unstable force of Mumbai’s urban development regimes,
critically defining urban informality as a basic feature of contemporary development and urban
developmentalism in Mumbai. I show that informality in housing, sanitation, services, labor,
land use, and urban planning across Mumbai constitutes a complex of governing and governed
relations that is central to the spatial antagonisms of planning in the city.79 Drawing on what
H.L.T. Quan (2012) has called “savage developmentalism,” this chapter interrogates informality
through the relations of control and consent, consolidation and diffusion, concentration and
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These antagonisms constitute both the production of state-space and development politics as well as an unraveling
of those politics, in both molar and minor expressions. This is a particularly important dynamic to investigated as
“popular” politics have become the domain of the state as well as various classes in the city, and as these politics
become entangled in both everyday life and government planning policy. Gayatri Spivak suggests, “If democracy is
a major, molar, political system par excellence, with its firmly established equivalent identities, sanctioned by the
law, political anthropology today, with its ethnographies of contemporary society might methodologically and
theoretically be well suited to study the condition of a proliferation of minor identities and various contingent
actions and articulations that eschew the abstract pre-given notions of ‘People’ and ‘nation’.” (Gayatri Spivak,
“Ethnographies of Democracy and Minor Politics: In Conversation with Gayatri Spivak,” American Anthropological
Association Annual Meeting session, November 17, 2011).
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differentiation that cut across society’s norms and regulations, as well as the institutions of
political power.
The Informal Trinity: Capital, Land, and Labor
The astonishing decline of textile manufacturing in the 1980s was a watershed moment in the
generalized urbanization of informality in Bombay. The eclipse of industrial production also
ended the ability of Mumbai’s broad working classes to act as central determinations of
development, in which their struggles in part shaped the pathways and possibilities of planning.
A consummate form of underdevelopment rooted in permanent informality and instability
emerged in the wake of this defeat. Three essential relationships mediated by the state—between
workers, capital, and land—were central to this transition.

Capital
Millowners fought against the strike at every turn. They appealed to the state to deploy police
forces to beat and arrest workers. In concert with the press, they waged a detailed propaganda
campaign aimed at the middle and upper classes to discredit the workers movement as
unreasonable, ineffective against the power of the mill owners, and unwinnable. Newspapers
supported the propaganda effort by reporting little about the workers’ actions or points of view.
Owners paid huge sums of money to scabs and clerical staff while fabric produced elsewhere
was stamped as Bombay manufactured, all in an effort to make it appear that production was
uninterrupted. In all, “the propaganda blitz did have an effect in creating a puzzled and defeatist
mood about the strike among the urban middle classes” (Omvedt 1983: 1510).
Puzzling as the atmosphere was, sharp class tensions permeated the city. In the midst of
the strike, a short-lived police rebellion took city stage as sections of the police defected and
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demanded higher pay. The National Guard was airlifted into the city and violence resulting in a
few deaths erupted between intransigent police, who were occasionally joined by supportive mill
workers, on the one hand; and national guard and loyal police on the other. “There were
indications that officials feared that the unrest might spread among other police forces [and so
the] Maharashtra state government suspended the police union and all police associations in
Pune, sixty miles southeast of Bombay, and ordered border security force personnel into the
city.”80
The sharp class antagonisms, which climaxed in the 1980s, had been building for
decades. Worker power, uneven as it was, increased for a considerable portion of the laboring
populations in both the city’s main industries and across a wide range of manufacturing jobs in
the years after Independence. While the mill industry was already on decline by the sixties,
legislative and political constraints sustained the industry and its workers for decades. The
restructuring wasn’t simply a result of the competitive compulsions of a technological fix to class
struggle, for “it needed a violent blow to silence the workers unrest after the blanket of the
Emergency had not been able to suffocate it.”81 It took the violent repression of the seventies for
the economic restructuring of the eighties to have a key impact on the textile industry. Just as the
Emergency provided factory owners the opportunity to lockout workers as well as restructure
and intensify their work and still gain in productivity, during the Bombay’s millowners were
quick to shut down their factories and relocate them to the outskirts of the city where workers
were more disintegrated and thus paid far less.
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“Four are Killed in Bombay Riots Set off by Rebellion of Policemen.” New York Times August 19, 1982, A4.
“The cycle of struggle 1973 to 1979 in India.” Gurgaon Workers News, no.60 – November 2013 (October 31,
2013).
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While the popular perception of the strike is that it directly contributed to the decline in
the textile industry, the roots of the industry’s collapse and restructuring are to be found in capital
abandonment. As the overall textile industry declined, the growing incidence of underperforming
and less competitive “sick” mills was used as justification for the harsher retrenchment of
workers and greater automation. But “sickness” was also the result of transfer of capital—both
through the nationalization of certain mills in the seventies (which were later resold to private
owners during the Emergency) and through investments in more profitable enterprises, such as
real estate. Amid declining profits, mill owners increasingly began selling their lands in the
industrial heart of Bombay. Thus did the textile industry lend support to the rise of speculation
and real estate-driven capitalization, and eventually, deindustrialization, of urban lands.
Fatefully, the momentous “indefinite” strike of 1982–1983 gave employers the tools they
sought to wholesale restructure the mill industry and to break their labor dependency once and
for all. Run-down mills were “temporarily” closed and never reopened, starving workers out.
The majority of the eighty or so mills in central Bombay closed during or immediately after the
strike, no longer choosing to endure rising costs and the plague of decades-long worker
militancy. Some owners relocated surplus stock to new small-scale manufacturing centers, where
more vulnerable workers could be exploited. Others went bankrupt, while still more owners
chose to employ modernizing technology to make workers redundant.
Some 150,000 workers were left unemployed in the wake of the strike, and this number
only continued to increase. The backbone of Bombay’s industrial economy was broken. Over
eighteen months, the city sustained the world’s longest textile strike, formally involving a quarter
of a million workers. The defeat would not only have a lasting impact on workers movements in
the city, but its consequences would also be written in the coming decades into the very fabric of
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the city’s economy, built environment, and the cultural identities of various strata of its laboring
populations. The city has since witnessed increased and entrenched inequalities across the social
body of the city—between an old land-owning and industrial elite; an emerging middle class
comprising those with a firm base in the government sector and the security of public sector
housing as well as expanded earning opportunities in new industries; small business owners and
traders; declining formal working class with jobs in organized manufacturing sector; and
increasing number of poor, many of whom are former mill workers, eking out a living in the
informal service sectors.

Land
Labor and housing activists have long argued that mill owners, the state government, and the
Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh (RMSS) conspired to dismantle the mill factories and redevelop
the land for speculative real estate ventures. No sooner did the historic 1982–1983 mill workers
strike collapse did owners begin shifting from manufacturing to redevelopment of former mill
lands. One of the goals, according to housing activists, was “linking the central business districts
in Fort and Nariman point with the northern suburbs” (Whitehead 2008: 272). The
informalization of industrial labor coincided with a boom in land prices in the early eighties and
through the post-1991 liberalization that enabled the rapid conversion of public and private mill
lands. This transformation was facilitated by the removal of land use controls and a more flexible
use of land toward market diktats of “highest and best” use (Smith 1996:68).82
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Crucially, low rents in workers’ chawls and the Bombay Rent Act of 1948, which more or less froze rents at a
1940 baseline and created a hereditary line of sub-tenancy, were impediments to higher rents. These rent regulations
are still intact and have facilitated the rise of a renting “aristocracy” in Mumbai, who cling to their deteriorating
apartments decades later.
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Propelled by new institutional policies and informal state and market mechanisms, the
post-1991 liberalization ushered in multinational investments in real estate speculation and
commercial opportunities that quickly reshaped the city’s land markets. It also consolidated and
deepened a state-real estate nexus influenced by the commercial interests of developers and
financiers. Much of the industrial core of the city—previously home to a distinctive working
class culture around the factories and chawls—was supplanted by new commercial, financial,
and service centers. The remaining manufacturing industry was displaced to special areas north
and east beyond the boundaries of the city to suburbs and satellite cities such as Pune and
Nashik, as well in special economic zones in the hinterland. (Nijman 2011)83 By the early
nineties, subcontracted labor was also part of the new management of public infrastructure such
as Nhava Sheva and Kandla port facilities. (Sherlock 1996) By extending the economic limits of
the city and expanding the labor market to reserves of exploitable labor, capital also enjoyed a
downward pressure on wages.
As office jobs grew faster than factory jobs, prospects for redevelopment of commercial
lands shifted from south Bombay to the northern industrial districts (Adarkar and Phatak 2005).
Mill lands between Fort and a newly designated financial hub at Bandra-Kurla Complex now
acquired new and soaring land values, making the industrial area ripe for lucrative commercial
and residential real estate take over.84 Land that was once neglected as the reviled domain of
workers now became iconic of Bombay’s potential transition to world status.
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Some firms shifted their low-value and low-skill manufacture to outside the city and also to subcontractors, while
higher-skilled production remained in the city. Jan Nijman. 2011. “Mumbai as a global city: a theoretical essay.”
International handbook of globalization and world cities.
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Moody describes a similar expansion of New York’s financial center through a tidal of office building
construction from 1967 to 1973. “There was here a chain of dependency and vulnerability. Finance at the center,
vulnerable to the changing world system, and business services largely dependent on finance, on the one hand, and
its own exports on the other. These, in turn, affected the city’s important real estate market.” (Moody 2007: 13)
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One of the city’s most significant spatial planning decisions was the policy of “recycling”
mill lands in an effort to rezone and integrate the formerly industrial land into the world market.
The use and planning of mill lands were administered by the Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning Act (MRTP Act) of 1966. The 1967 Development Plan designated these areas for the
purpose of textile manufacturing. Yet, these land use controls were removed under revisions to
the plan—first prepared in 1977 and then implemented in 1985—ushering in a new flexible use
of land previously occupied by public and private mills.
Secretary of the Urban Development Department of the Government of Maharashtra DT
Joseph would oversee a “a rational formula…by which it was decided that the development of
land and built-up property of the cotton mills would be governed by the consideration of
environment, housing and the need to generate resources for modernisation or diversification”
(Adarkar and Phatak 2005: 5366). The formula, known as Development Control Regulation (or
DCR 58), was incorporated into the new development regulations in 1991, which allowed for
lands to be redeveloped according to a one-third stipulation for public housing, one-third
designated for public open space, and one-third for unregulated commercial use.85 For the twothirds of the lands to be surrendered for public use, the owner would be compensated with
transferable development rights (TDRs). The presentation of the scheme as balanced and fair did
much to stymie true dissent arising from public debate and media accounts. None of these
schemes, however, would offer jobs to those rendered jobless in these land conversions, and
indeed, a protest was launched under the banner of GKSS Mill Workers Action Committee
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Development Control Rules (DCR) permitted the sick or closed cotton textile mills, subject to a layout approved
by the municipal commissioner, to use the existing or newly built up areas for the same cotton textile mills and
related uses, for diversified industrial uses or for commercial purposes. However, if open land—whether already
existing or resulting from the demolition of the existing structure—was to be developed, total open land had to be
divided into roughly three equal parts. Part one for public housing, part two for local government to develop public
open spaces and part three for the mill to exploit commercially (Adarkar and Phatak 2005: 5366).
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(Girni Kamgar Sangarsh Samiti), which united workers, artists, and area residents against the
imposition of the development rules. Others in the workers movement articulated modest
responses to the deal between the state, private land market, including the workers at the All
India Textile Workers Conference in 1990, who demanded “surplus land in proper proportion for
construction of houses for low income groups and for industries” (Bagaram Tulpule, paper
presented at Poddar College, Bombay, April 1990).
Improvements to existing chawls and the promise of new housing to be given to former
mill workers, however, proved to illusory. Contrary to stipulations and public perception, many
loopholes, irregularities, and informalities meant that less than 8 percent of the land was
ultimately made available for Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA)
and Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) respectively.
The years 1991–1995 saw a 700 percent increase in land prices and put private pressures
on the government to revise the regulations for public and open spaces, reducing them to less
than 5 percent. A public interest litigation in 2004 resulted in a Mumbai High Court decision on
October 17, 2005, which “restored the original formula of sharing land, granting higher priority
to the environment and public good than private financial gains” (Adarkar and Phatak 2005:
5367). Despite the ruling, the skyrocketing land prices inaugurated an era of “land scams,” in
which developers and their allies in official state positions operated with near complete impunity.
Indeed, the smashing of the trade unionists and other independent forces in Bombay’s working
classes, whose struggles had traditionally functioned as far better enforcers of regulatory
standards than the legal system, contributed to the consolidation of class power in the builderstate nexus. Moreover, redevelopment regulations did not require any integrative planning of

132

roads or additional infrastructures. The open spaces that did emerge were fragmented and
unplanned, pushing the developmental trajectory toward increasingly splintered use of land.
Doshi (2013) has argued that contemporary governance in Mumbai works over highly
uneven governable spaces that extend market-based neoliberal solutions to the informal masses
of the city for their rehabilitation and redevelopment. These are routinely managed through two
circuits of power: on the one hand, the violent eviction of slum communities through police
injunctions and bulldozers, a mobilization of the coercive machinery of the state often spurred on
by builders’ interests. On the other, informal residents are managed by a nexus of state and nonstate actors, through partnerships between local state agencies, builders and developers, foreign
and often transnational financial institutions, and non-governmental organizations who often
have a history of advocacy and sometimes grassroots activism within the communities.
Central to the process by which the decreasing collective power of workers and their
communities in Bombay has resulted in their informalization is the political mediation of
dispossession and distribution.86 Individuals, families, and communities who are dispossessed of
their land, for instance, are still incorporated into the overall thrust of the city’s Development
Plans through various rehabilitative schemes. Thus, development of urban lands proceed while
the dispossessed urban populations are increasingly fragmented and marginalized, and at the
same time made dependent on various circuits of capital and the “redistributive” governance
schemes that sustain them. The structural coherence of developmentalism relies on an essential
form of mediation through the promise (often deferred and betrayed) of rehabilitation. This
86

Urban theorists focusing on informality have outlined multiple pathways and degrees of disenfranchisement or
dispossession, the diverse types of ‘sub-economies’ that undergird a wide range of developing cities, as well as
multiple strategies of the “dispossessed” that evolve from these conditions (Banerjee-Guha 2010a; Doshi 2012a;
Harvey 2003, 2005). The rise in urban inequality that is a consequence of the restructuring of Mumbai’s global
economy linked to international finance and real estate accumulation also reveals how urban informality is produced
and articulated across local, global and translocal scales (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Marcuse 2000; Smith 2002;
Roy and Ong 2011).
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political management has an integrative function in an otherwise extremely fragmented and
differentiated economy.
Many of those dispossessed by development schemes are not directly drawn into circuits
of capital as sources of labor but rather are “an unwanted possessor or occupier of economic
resources”—most notably land—from which they must be separated “to free those resources for
use in the circuit of capital” (Sanyal and Bhattacharyya 2009:35). Thus, they are the continued
targets of urban redevelopment schemes that perpetuate cycles of dispossession and displacement
on an expanding urban and periurban scale. It is in this manner that informal growth continues to
outpace urban development in cities such as Mumbai (Nijman 2009).
A market-led approach is increasingly common and extended to those who suffered
brutal, sometimes illegal, evictions to begin with. So too market-led redevelopment schemes,
even if they successfully rehouse the dispossessed, often end in further evictions and
displacements due to rising costs, exploitative service arrangements, and the loss of livelihood to
even begin paying for homes that were previously affordable because they were incrementally
“self-made.”
Planning institutions are central in both causing and managing the outcomes of
differential dispossession in the city by setting zoning and development regulations. These forces
together are themselves cultural constructions that have arisen within a distinct social and
historical context. They are deeply layered with traces of colonial procedure and jurisprudence,
imaginaries of development, the global co-constitution of imperial and accumulative ambition,
moral sentiments about deserving communities, the remainders of past workers’ defeats, and the
present incitements of violence of centuries-old legacies of caste and religious hierarchies.
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Both the skylines and foot paths of the central district’s former mill lands were
redeveloped dramatically as residential high-rises, private clubs, office and shopping complexes,
and other luxury commercial and entertainment establishments transformed the built
environment, all but erasing the historic imprint of the vibrant urban workers cultures whose
labors built the city itself. At the same time, the symbolic environment of the popular “city of
dreams” would be transformed as workers’ identities and political allegiances began to shift to
narrower ethnic notions of place.

Labor
The expulsion of hundreds of thousands of workers amidst lockouts and mill closures pushed a
significant portion of Bombay’s working class into crisis. Some, unable to provide for their
families, committed suicide. Others returned to their villages in the Konkan region, relied on
food grains from landholdings, or resumed agricultural labor before returning to the city to
resume a cycle of rural-to-urban migration. Still others stayed in the city and took on petty jobs
where they could find them in the informal sectors as hawkers, coolies, or watchmen, earning
half or a quarter of the wages they received in the mills (Bhowmik and More 2002:4825).
Women worked menial jobs or as domestic servants, and children were removed from school so
they could contribute earnings wherever possible. The self-employed mainly reestablished the
roads, alleys, corners and intersections of the city as their workplaces: as street hawkers, vendors,
service providers, craft makers, or other home-based workers. Those engaged in contract work
would now do so for longer hours for lower wages, and without any housing or health benefits.
A new era of labor fragmentation and differentiation emerged, deepening the historic
imposition of labor informality layered in the legacies of the colonial and industrial economy,
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with a remarkable and steadily growing population dependent on informal livelihoods and
informal housing, mainly in slums and squatter settlements in the last three decades (Cross 2010,
Harriss-White and Gooptu, 2001, Harriss-White 2012, Breman 2003, de Neve 2005). Plunged
into the ranks of the informal urban poor, a “drastic reduction of their income, further pushed
them into informal housing” (Adarkar and Phatak 2005: 5368). The “informal” strata of the city
were now represented by a growing multitude of unemployed, underemployed, casual labor,
subsistence workers, and members of the urban “underworld.” As the urban economy
reorganized industry and land in the era of liberalization, the urban poor also experienced greater
intolerance and criminalization of their poverty.
The 1961 census indicates that 65 percent of the workforce was in the “organized sector”
(the manufacturing sector that is formally recognized and registered by the government), while
only 35 percent was in the “unorganized sector.”87 By 1991, this proportion was reversed: 65
percent of the urban workforce was now in the “unorganized sectors,” mainly working as
contract or casual labor with no protections.88 With retrenchment, layoffs and dismissal of labor,
capital withdrawal, and austerity measures, only 35 percent remained in registered industries that
offered steady income, modest social security, regulation and legal protection. Bombay/Mumbai
also saw an explosion in slums, while worker provided housing became increasingly scarce.
As late as 1989, chawls—worker housing provided by either the state or mill owners—accounted
for as much as 75 percent of formal housing in Greater Mumbai. But only two years later, in
1991, 43 percent of Mumbai’s city dwellers were living in slums—twice the national average.
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The situation declined rapidly in the seventies and the 1982 strike only dramatized a consolidating larger trend
that in thirty years.
88
Today informal sector figures remain around 68 percent of the total employment in the city.
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By 2001, 60 percent of Mumbai’s population lived in informal, self-made houses (UN-Habitat,
2002; India Exclusion Report 2013–14).
The restructuring of land and labor policies through economic liberalization catalyzed the
rise of informal urban relations (Harvey 2005, Smith 2011). This entailed the “systematic nonimplementation and circumvention, rather than formally abolishing the legal frameworks” of
established social policies (Ahuja 2013: x). Thus the political machinery of economic and social
regulation was repurposed toward a deliberate failure to address and deliver the promises of
social and urban development effectively. While this failure has fundamentally disrupted
centralized and state-modernist institutions as drivers of development, the politics of
development nonetheless remained heavily state-mediated processes.
A celebratory account of the effects of state regulatory failure on development can be
found in the subaltern urbanist literature, for instance in Abdoumaliq Simone’s commentaries on
postcolonial institutional settings of cities such as “Mumbai and Jakarta, as in many other
locations,” as Simone describes, where in
“institutionally thick cities, the simultaneous enactment of differentiated forms of
expressions and constituencies render ambiguous the concretized summations and fixities
that large-scale development seems to guarantee. There are too many neighborhoods and
old housing conglomerations to clear, too many vested interests to wade through, too
many failed projects to cover up, too many commercial activities immune to
corporatization, and too many lives indifferent to their own apparent capture to take their
purported summations seriously.” (Simone 2016).
As Ahuja states, on the other hand, “both articulations of liberalization—labor relations and town
planning—worked in tandem to do away altogether with those cores of labor militancy that old
regime had failed to reign in” to the degree that ‘labor’ and ‘town planning’ have become almost
unusable categories of Indian political thought” (2013: x). This non-implementation and
circumvention in the realm of urban development fundamentally transformed Mumbai’s urban
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governance over the last three decades. At the core of this transformation was the strategy to
reorganize labor and land into a “property-based regime of accumulation.”89
As policies assisting in the new regime of accumulation were put in place, large sections
of the city’s labor force were forced into a “need economy.” The late Indian economist Kalyan
Sanyal (2007) defines the “need economy,” as a set of activities which exist largely outside the
circuits of capital accumulation whose orientation is subsistence transacted through a range of
markets.90 Sanyal insists that there is an important dynamic wrought by the structural necessity
of ongoing primitive accumulation that must continually, whether legally or through force,
dispossess those in the need economy. While the accumulation economy directly destroys the
livelihoods that individuals and communities make of their “need economies,” it also instigates
new, more fractured need economies for those churned up by cycles of dispossession and left
otherwise to organize the conditions of life again. The dispossession and distributive processes at
the base of the urban economy are fundamental to the political economic and spatial categories
of informality. Sanyal states
the social outcome of the exclusionary expansion of capital that relegates the victims of
its expansion—dispossessed informal producers, the detritus of modern capitalism—to a
non-capitalist outside reproduces a basic fault line running through the economy’ (Sanyal
and Bhattacharya 2009: 38).91
He and other commentators have argued that unlike the original accumulation of capital that
Marx describes, the nature of this dispossession is not the introduction of the dispossessed into
the capitalist wage economy. While processes of proletarianization accelerated during India’s
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“This has involved changes from a predominantly Fordist city dominated by large-scale manufacturing towards a
property-based regime of accumulation. Manufacturing has been relocated to the hinterlands, based on small-scale
units with flexible and cheaper labor force employed on temporary contracts” (Whitehead 2008: 270)
90
Sanyal, Kalyan. 2007. Rethinking Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation, Governmentality and Postcolonial Capitalism. London; New York: Routledge. This formulation departs from the familiar formal-informal
dichotomy emerging from the informal sector debates since the 1970s.
91
Sanyal, Kalyan and R. Bhattacharyya. 2009. “Beyond the factory: globalisation, informalisation of production and
the new locations of labour.” Economic and Political Weekly, 35–44.
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post-Independence era of Nehruvian state-centered growth, it remained uneven and some fifty
years later, was interrupted by a new orientation toward a global economy that required far fewer
laborers in the higher levels of the accumulation economy than ever before, and far more
contingent, casual, irregular, and involuntary workers at the lowest levels of the accumulation
economy. Rather, and most significantly, it is the release of land that is in question. Their
dispossession from the land coupled with their exclusion from the wage system is what
subordinates workers to more tenuous and fragmented informal economies.
The Savage Trinity: Chauvinism, Revanchism, Developmentalism
The reorganization of the relations of capital, land, and labor under a new property-based regime
of accumulation and informality led to the increased cultural fragmentation of the city’s workers
and the land use regime. An unstable urban developmental regime would emerge characterized
by communal mistrust and resentment among workers, upper class revanchism against the
informal classes, and an informalization of the municipal state in selectively withdrawing
provision for housing, sanitation, services, labor, land use. The city’s developmental trajectory
has been based increasingly on a property-based regime of accumulation that produces urban
informality would come to define the urban terrain of “savage developmentalism.”

Chauvinism
In 1996, the newly elected Shiv Sena-led government renamed the city of Bombay to the native
Marathi name Mumbai, and soon colonial British-era street and building names were shed to
assert or reassert local names in homage to mythic Marathi warriors and Indian freedom fighters.
The ethnic nationalist movement mobilized language and identitarian power—to the violent
exclusion of many other cultures and communities in the metropolis—to make citywide planning
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decisions. The renaming of the city was more than a culturalist expression of consolidation of
elite and popular status in the city. It was a profound planning event in the history of the city,
signally the symbolic and intentional ways in which the city was being imagined and planned by
a section of the ruling class in the name of a certain “popular” Marathi history. Yet this was by
no means a popular expression of the imagined and desired city. It was only possible after
decades of stoked communal tensions. The result was a consolidation of identities in a largely
cosmopolitan working-class Bombay that gave way to a saffron pall of nativism cloaking the city
in a growing parochialism and ethnic chauvinism.
The fundamental restructuring of the urban economy and spatial environment into
financial, real estate, and newer service and producer sectors accentuated the crisis of this
cosmopolitan vision and the abrupt imposition of a new vision of the city as a financial center.
Bombay/Mumbai increasingly wavered under the weight of a central paradox: “being the
preeminent symbol of India’s secular, industrial modernity” following Independence, the city
also became “a powerful symbol of the very crisis of this vision” (Hansen 2004:8). The rise of a
new planning paradigm around the financialization of land was concomitant with a re-socialized
and re-spatialized labor force with a dwindling base for the common experience of work.92 In the
absence of broad-based organizations capable of responding to the challenges of social
fragmentation and informality, a wave of ethnic chauvinism swept the city in the early days of
liberalization. The new vernacular struggles amongst residents over the identity and the
imagination of the city was a major expression of both a crisis in the everyday experiences of
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Veteran labor organizers such as Vasudevan Naimtah, President of New Trade Union Initiative felt that the
commonalities found in work ceased to provide a basis for workers to formulate a wider consciousness and political
formation based on their everyday experiences. (Fieldnotes, December 8, 2014).
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work and urban space as well as the image of the city as a beacon of modernization and
industrial development.
A chasm has developed between the organised workers and the others. . . Self-identification as members,
however removed, of the working class begins to recede. . .[The working class’s] social and ideological
weight exhibited a proportional decline. Informalisation and expansion of self-employment also saps the
basis of any occupational or class identity. It leads to a greater atomisation and competition. The
exploitative and oppressive nature of the system becomes increasingly invisible. Anger becomes ever more
vague and unfocused. Dreams tend to be acquisitive and consumerist (Pendse 1995: 25).

Workers’ movements could no longer organize widely, as they once did, across the city on the
shared experience of an “autarkic political economy, a conducive ideological environment and a
manufacturing sector dominated by a single large-scale industry” (Sherlock 1996: L38). The
everyday and ideological conditions of a shared urban consciousness declined with a
communalization of politics.93
The city was the site of episodes of communal violence between Hindus and Muslims
corresponding with the breaking of the historic strike of 1982. Two years later, on 17 May 1984,
riots broke out in Bombay, Thane, and Bhiwandi after a saffron flag was placed at the top of a
mosque. Nearly three hundred people were killed and a thousand were wounded. The
liberalization period following 1991 only accelerated communal tensions. In December 1992–
January 1993, over one thousand people were killed and the city was paralyzed by communal
riots between the Hindus and the Muslims caused by the destruction of the Babri Mosque in
Ayodhya. A series of thirteen coordinated bomb explosions took place in Bombay on 12 March
1993, which resulted in more than two hundred and fifty deaths and seven hundred injuries.94
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“In concrete terms, there is no alternative to the slow, often unrewarding work of organizing in the small-scale
sector where the working class is actually growing” (Sherlock 1996: L38).
94
It is widely believed that the attacks were orchestrated by mafia don Dawood Ibrahim in retaliation for the Babri
Mosque demolition. In the current century, there have been at least eight additional episodes of terrorism associated
with communal violence. On December 6, 2002, a bomb placed under a seat of an empty BEST (Brihanmumbai
Electric Supply and Transport) bus exploded near Ghatkopar station in Mumbai. Two people were killed and
twenty-eight were injured. The bombing occurred on the tenth anniversary of the demolition of the Babri Mosque in
Ayodhya. On 27 January 2003, a bomb placed on a bicycle exploded near the Vile Parle station in Mumbai. The
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The “saffron wave” also divided the anticaste movement and generally made it
vulnerable to the wholesale attempt to tame and “Hinduize” Dalit politics (Hansen 1999).
Through renaming certain ex-untouchable castes (and indeed the entire city), mobility and
recognition within political circles would be a sancritized affair too. Dalit communities were
increasingly fractured on the basis of their caste identities: while some were directly antagonized
by Shiv Sena-Bharatiya Janata Party (SS-BJP) governments coming to state power in 1995,
others were induced or intimidated into the coalition’s base of support. By 1997, signals of the
end of the anticaste movement, passing from impasse to terminal crisis, were sounding across the
city.
Communalism would effectively extinguish both working class and lower caste
movements in the city. The Shiv Sena have thus been a significant cultural force for
strikebreaking and breaking solidarities embedded in the city for generations. Insofar as those
solidarities and workers culture were replaced by a Marathi identity as the cultural identity of the
city, the Shiv Sena have been an undeniable force of change in the recent history of Mumbai.
Moreover, their cultural reorganization of the city has been effected by their organization of
urban space rooted both in the orchestrated exercise of municipal power as well as in the
improvised politics of the lanes and bi-lanes (Hansen 2004).

bomb killed one and injured twenty-five. The blast occurred a day ahead of the visit of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, then
Prime Minister of India, to the city. On 13 March 2003, a bomb exploded in a train compartment, as the train was
entering the Mulund station in Mumbai. Ten people were killed and seventy were injured. The blast occurred a day
after the tenth anniversary of the 1993 Bombay bombings. On July 28, 2003, a bomb placed under a seat of a BEST
bus exploded in Ghatkopar. The bomb killed four people and injured thirty-two. On August 25, 2003, two blasts in
South Mumbai—one near the Gateway of India and the other at Zaveri Bazaar in Kalbadevi occurred. At least 44
people were killed and 150 injured. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but it had been hinted that the
Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba was behind the attacks. In 2008, the city experienced xenophobic attacks by the
activists of the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS) under Raj Thackeray on the North Indian migrants in Mumbai.
Attacks included assault on North Indian taxi drivers and damage of their vehicle. There were a series of ten
coordinated terrorist attacks by ten armed Pakistani men using automatic weapons and grenades over three days on
November 26–29, 2008. The city again saw a series of three coordinated bomb explosions at different locations on
July 13, 2011. The blasts occurred at the Opera House, Zaveri Bazaar, and Dadar, which left twenty-six killed, and
130 injured.
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Revanchism
In 2003, an elite consultation group published a report on the failures of existing planning
approaches to the city. The “Vision Mumbai” Report would serve as a magna carta of the
“developer-state nexus” for the next ten years.95 A new vision of urban growth was promoted by
the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and the Asian Development Bank, which came together to
form a new a kind of urban think tank of the city’s industrialists (more than eighty private and
public trading companies were part of its roster) called Mumbai First to represent real estate and
multinational corporate interests in the city. The report was commissioned by Mumbai First and
McKinsey Global Institute, a global management consultancy.96 “The inclusion of private sector
actors in Mumbai First and private and civil society actors in Open Mumbai has allowed for the
inclusion of valuable tacit knowledge in the Mumbai Development Plan—knowledge that the
MCGM would otherwise not have obtained” (van der Heijden 2016: 18). One estimate for
needed investments for the realization of its vision to redevelop the city through, and most
crucially for, a lively international investment culture was 200,000 crores rupees ($40 billion).97
The Credit Rating Service Institute (CRSL), which provided ratings to different cities as to its
investment opportunities, would provide the rational basis from which to diagnose the problems
ailing the city, evaluate the infrastructural weaknesses of the city, assess the investments
necessary to become competitive with other Asian cities, and formulate a plan to reform the
economy and its spatial structure. In time, and with the right investments and improvements,
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Bombay First and The McKinsey Report (2003), See van der Heijden (2016) for a detailed sketch of Mumbai
First.
96
McKinsey was previously invited a decade earlier for the task of “Positioning Maharashtra for leadership in the
economic liberalisation era,” with far less success. Their suggestions for structural reorganization did not find a
hospitable government climate of the Sharad Pawar-led Congress government or next ruling coalition, the Shiv Sena
and Bharatiya Janata Party.
97
See Marie-Helene Zerah in Accumulation by Dispossession: Transformative Cities in the New Global Order,
edited by Swapna Banerjee-Guha.
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Mumbai would become a “global city” competitively attracting a flow of international
investments.
The new planning paradigm that emerged from this vision of the city aggressively fused
financial deregulation and land market reform. Through the real estate market, land values would
dominate concerns over use. The financial and spatial medicine would come with the
subordination of labor relations to finance; the vigorous courting of private and foreign
investment; the development of a new face for the city through new business districts connected
to transport nodes, communication, etc. An aggressive approach that equated urban development
with capitalist development could only plan for the “poor” when viewed as an underdeveloped
form of human capital. The roots of the problems of the city were perceived to be in the
“backwardness” of the majority populations, and that their problems, as well as the city’s
problems, lie in the lack of development. (This mirrors the colonial-era Victorian perception that
hygiene, for example, was an issue of lack of education rather than lack of infrastructure.)
The report became the new “common sense” of urban development in Mumbai,
articulating and legitimating neoliberal cultural values while establishing a spectrum of consent
for largely antidemocratic policy initiatives. It focused on “growth” through investment as an
entrepreneurial, technocratic, and urban-centered national development strategy. Economic
development, privatization of urban services, and competition were to become the hallmarks of
municipal government. Moving from an “adopted report” to a state government “Task Force
report,” its wisdom has been incorporated into the draft Development Plan 2014–2034 for the
city.
A new planning policy environment to transform Mumbai into a world class city was also
introduced in the Mumbai Transformation Programme (2005), a formal policy comprising more
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than forty projects to improve economic growth in Mumbai, reduce poverty, and improve the
quality of the built environment (Cities Alliance, 2013). These goals would be accomplished by
the creation of “a multi-stakeholder, public-private planning process” and a private-state think
tank mainly set up to address the city’s housing informality. While claiming to be a citizen’s
group, it was a partnership between the Cities Alliance (whose tagline is “A city without
Slums”), the World Bank, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the municipal
government. The Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) was created in 2005, “to serve
as an interface between the government and all other stakeholders involved in this ambitious
long-term programme. Its duties also include providing administrative and technical support, and
documenting the process.”98
As real estate and financial powers commanded urban development, therefore, they
promoted revanchist urban policies that relied heavily on legal and extralegal dispossessions,
evictions, displacements, and other forms of class and caste “cleansing.”99 A wave of such
demolitions and evictions of informal settlements occurred in Mumbai in late 2004 and early
2005, as the Indian National Congress-led Maharasthra state government, elected on a platform
of redeveloping slums, began clearing them through brutal demolitions with the purpose of
making Mumbai, in the words of the McKinsey Report, “a world class city.”100
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The Cities Alliance states its rationale for urban redevelopment: “The strain on infrastructure and services has
already lowered the quality of life and slowed down economic growth. Seeking to reverse this decline, in 2003 a
group of citizens began pressing for drastic infrastructure improvements and better planning and governance.”
(Website, http://www.citiesalliance.org/node/4395).
99
See these accounts that highlight forms of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ driven by gentrification, real estate
speculation, and financialization (Smith 2002, Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 2003, 2005; Peck and Tickell
2002, Banerjee 2010b; Doshi 2012b).
100
Between December 2004 and February 2005, 50,000 to 70,000 hutments were demolished in Maharashtra (whose
capital is Mumbai), in violation of poll promises and of international covenants to which India is a signatory (Burra,
2005).
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The first popular response to these evictions and the McKinsey Report was a grassroots
direct action anti-eviction campaign called Ghar Bachao Ghar Banao (GBGB, Defend Homes
Build Homes). As the urban offshoot of the popular network of rural social movement National
Alliance of Peoples Movements and the Narmada Bachao Andolan, GBGB was endowed with
decades of experience fighting big development politics in the region.101 Its foray into urban
politics, which included occupations of various spaces in the city and protests at municipal
offices, was strategically focused on, and tactically bold in confronting, what it called the
“builder-state nexus.”
Neighborhood demolition and redevelopment has been a recurring feature of the
postcolonial governance of Indian cities since Independence (Weinstein 2013, Appadurai 2000;
Roy 2003; Tarlo 2003; Hansen 2004; Benjamin 2008). In this regard, housing is the “spectral”
issue haunting postcolonial urbanization (Appadurai 2000, Anand and Rademacher 2011),
revealing the complex and shifting negotiations of the poor with spatial authority and
sovereignty. Mass demolitions exist side-by-side, and routinely interrupt, enduring campaigns at
the national, state, and municipal level for slum upgrading and improvement, most often with
support and legitimacy provided by international development financiers such as the World Bank
and the city’s local business communities. The “power to demolish” and the “will to improve”
through upgrading and rehabilitations, exercised by different members of the developer-state
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In the year following the publication of the McKinsey report, Mumbai hosted the World Social Forum.
Thousands of individuals, local and international activists, community groups, and NGOs gathered at Azad Maidan
to celebrate “another world” of popular power. Many regarded the inauguration of the antiglobalization movement
as occurring in southern and western India in 1982, with dramatic burning of Monsanto crops by the Karnataka State
Farmers Association (KKSS) in Kerala and the anti-dam protest movement organized by the National Association of
Peoples Movements (NAPM) which lead the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada Campaign) in Gujarat
and Madya Pradesh. Both movements would have enormous peasant and rural roots, but were also sustained by
urban activists and intellectuals.

146

nexus, reveal the contradictory nature of urban governance in Mumbai (Li 2007, Weinstein
2013).
The spatial organization and structural adjustment of industry, the removal of workingclass labor and housing from industrial centers in the city, and the redevelopment of Mumbai’s
economy and built environment, are not only factors in an economic explanation of
gentrification. Patel (2003) argues that Bombay did not deindustrialize so much as its industries
spatially reorganized and its city boundaries expanded, as manufacturing was relocated to the
suburbs and satellite centers. Meanwhile, the industrial center of the city was transformed for
new economic activities based in finance, real estate, and services. While spatial changes in the
city “have clearly followed the rising curve of rent gaps,” the political orchestration of these
changes indicates how capital flows and extra-economic violence have combined with
government policies (Whitehead 2008: 72).
Housing activists using the Right to Information Act (2005) have exposed several “land
scams” in Mumbai’s development in the last decade: building and planning codes pertaining to
former mill lands flouted, lands reserved for municipal schools or protected by environmental
zoning regulations misappropriated, regulations governing the encroachment of roads secretly
ignored, and the illegal granting of additional FSI building rights—all in order to illegally
acquire land for luxury developments such as condos and malls.
These scams have shown the collusion between developers, high court judges, state
bureaucrats in municipal offices, and builders’ associations. They point to the informality of the
state as real estate developers have increasingly relied on illicit deals to appropriate lands marked
for the city’s development. Housing activist Simpreet Singh, a dedicated organizer with GBGB,
stated, “when the Maharashtra government said they will convert Mumbai into Shanghai and
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began doling out land reserved for the poor and homeless to developers, we began looking into
this issue. It began as a social movement, but we could not get enough information….We used
the RTI Act to expose several housing frauds’”102 Singh stated, “I remember that whenever I
went to the collector’s office in Mumbai, the concerned person used to disappear. But you had to
get know the low-level employees who would let some information slip,” he said. “It took
months, years, to get a clear picture. But as it became clearer that things were fishy, our resolve
got stronger.” The RTI Act allowed people to do the careful work of exposing misappropriation
of land and other resources in the unseen channels of influence between powerful landowners
and the state. Singh states, “it just takes 10 rupees to right a wrong. The biggest achievement of
RTI is that it tells the most powerful people that they are not beyond the reach of a common
man.” According to the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, over sixty RTI activists have
been attacked, harassed or killed in Maharashtra in the last ten years, greater than any other state
in India.103
The 2008 crash of the global economy pushed the question of corruption onto the center
stage of politics, which had long been a specter haunting post-Independence political life.
Mumbai—as well as Dehli and other cities and rural towns in India—has witnessed a recent
wave of anti-corruption insurgency. Beginning in 2011, the protest movements sustained an
electoral mobilization of a new national political energy behind the social reformer and activist
Anna Hazare and the popular Aam Aadmi Party (Common Man Party).104 Interestingly, at a
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Based on interview with Simpreet Singh, April 20, 2014. Quote from Singh in Times of India. February 25, 2011,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-page/We-used-the-RTI-Act-to-expose-several-housingfrauds/articleshow/7564335.cms.
103
Quoted in Betwa Sharma. 2015. “5 Scams the RTI Act Helped Bust In Its First 10 Years.” Huffington Post.
December 10, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2015/10/12/5-most-critical-scams-exp_n_8263302.html; “The
Right to Information Act Is a Powerful Tool. Here’s How You Can Use It to Your Benefit,” The Better India,
August 1, 2017, https://www.thebetterindia.com/110189/how-to-effectively-use-right-to-information-act/.
104
In the same time period, there were variants of anti-corruption movements that emerged in the explosive 2010–
2011 cycle of struggles in Tunisia and Egypt, in Spain and Greek, and in the United States.
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moment of crisis of neoliberalism—a significant driver of the conditions of spatiopolitical and
economic subordination of informal life to market developmentalism—the popular masses
identified “corruption” as the culprit. The state and corporate “scams” that became the routine in
the preceding years had primed the masses to consider the deficiencies of democracy over the
deficiencies of neoliberal capital.105
An “underground” real estate development sector intent on breaking Mumbai’s relative
land immobility through both economic and extra-economic interventions in the land markets
has been “crucial in lubricating the transition from manufacturing to finance-dominated
economy” (Whitehead 2008: 271).106 Thus the emergence of a municipal government whose
informalized exercise of state powers are articulated through the role of non-state interventions
for disciplining workers’ resistance to displacement, “mediating” conflicts between landowners
and tenants organizing police support through bribes, facilitating “consensus” on redevelopment
projects that require 70 percent assent of inhabitants, and extortions, intimidations, and other
persuasions to remove barriers to those higher and better uses of land.
In such conditions of state and non-state informality, urban violence has been both
episodic and routinized. The growth of real estate ventures and its links to “black money” and
organized crime, the use of force and intimidation at the local and state level to displace
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The Adarsh Housing Society scam, the 2010 housing loan scam, the Niira Radia tapes controversy, and the 2Gspectrum case were incidents of national interest. For more, see “The Radia Tapes,” The Outlook, 18 November
2010, https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/the-radia-tapes/268214; “Adarsh scam: The story of a posh highrise with not-so-posh occupants,” The Hindu, April 16 2016, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/adarsh-scambackgrounder/article14264528.ece; and “The 2G Spectrum Case,” Times of India, Jul y 3, 2018,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/2G-spectrum-scam.
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Land supply has always been geographically limited by the peninsular contours of the narrow strip of coastal land
that juts out from mainland Maharashtra; it has equally been shaped by historic land grants given under conditions
of colonial loyalty and complicity. The biggest landlords and owners are public agencies, such as the Bombay Port
Trust, the BMC, MHADA as well as those owned by major private land trust. “While the property details of some of
the large public sector bodies are well known, not much information about the private sector landholding pattern is
available” (Singh 2003). Today, approximately nine developers and trusts form much of the land oligopoly and
control all available private land on Mumbai island (Bharucha 2015).
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inhabitants from their lands, as well as an intensifying right-wing communalization of politics
have made for a more violent daily existence in the city’s distinctly anti-poor and anti-worker
urban environment. Both factors of the aggressive capitalization of land markets as well as
changing patterns of individual and collective identity in the city amid aggressive
communalization of urban culture have constituted a wide scale attack on workers’ broad and
heterogeneous power that so influenced Mumbai’s urban culture and determined its political
possibilities in both industrial policy and urban development. Thus both revanchism and
chauvinism have cleared the way for a generalization of informality in the city that has come to
define the liberalization period in Mumbai in the pervasive social conditions of marginality,
exclusion, and sociospatial fragmentation.107
Developmentalism
H.L.T. Quan (2012) describes “savage developmentalism” as a metalogic of antidemocratic
development. It involves, centrally and tangibly, the “undevelopment” of life through neglect,
repression, violence, and improvement schemes, which are all part of the “telos” of development.
Social disruption as opposed to planned stability, everyday as well as episodic forms of violence,
and cynicism, cruelty and neglect form the juggernaut of this form of development. Its savagery
is premised on the “terms of order” (Robinson [1980] 2016) of what is possible and what is not,
but so too in an implicit lack of choice and a betrayal of promises by the ongoing functioning of
development.108 What are the categories and practices of political life and the “future in
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There has been much attention to conditions of informality amongst urban poor as accelerated through urban
development schemes (Banerjee-Guha 2010a, Rao 2007).
108
In Spivak’s terms, the politics of this situation is best addressed by deconstruction, wherein “one cannot not
desire development.” As I trace in the emergence of the contemporary planning culture in Mumbai as a terrain of
mobilization and demand, other politics are possible. Spivak defines deconstruction in these terms, as “a persistent
critique of what one cannot not want.” See her introduction to Of Grammatology (1976), “Deconstruction does not
say there is no subject, there is no truth, there is no history. It simply questions the privileging of identity so that
someone is believed to have the truth. It is not the exposure of error. It is constantly and persistently looking into
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question” endowed and contested in the present forms of developmentalism (Coronil 2011)?109
Addressing this is necessary if we are to understand how urban mobilizations for claims to the
city take shape under conditions of such informality. Only then can we understand how different
strata of a fragmented urban working class make claims on the city.110
The savage work of development through violence, repression, and anti-democratic
identitarian politics was further enabled by forces of nativist and defensive ethnic chauvinism
that dislodged broad if unstable class solidarities that emerged through the rise of Bombay’s
industrial and informal working classes.111 Both secular and communal forces were entangled in
the savage development of Bombay during the city’s industrial, post-Independence, and
liberalization periods. What defined Bombay’s experience of modernity and democracy, and the
possibilities of a different and far more cosmopolitan development history, was largely rooted in
its plural proletarian classes, who created an urban culture that was differently mobilized through
a mixing of regional, caste, and religious traditions. It was the myriad forces arrayed against this
plural and popular urban culture where one finds the sources of rupture of these democratic
possibilities.

how truths are produced. That’s why deconstruction doesn’t say logocentrism is a pathology, or metaphysical
enclosures are something you can escape. Deconstruction, if one wants a formula, is among other things, a persistent
critique of what one cannot not want.” (28)
109
Coronil describes the contested imaginaries of the future in the present: “This future imaginary can be glimpsed
in everyday political actions and discourses as well as through concrete cultural artifacts such as plans, projects, and
constitutions. Yet, since fundamental conceptions of history—not their specific content but their
framing temporal structure—are often implicit or taken for granted, I focus on how ineffable imaginaries of the
future inhabit the present, how the ‘what is to be’ saturates the ‘what is’ or, in Reinhardt Koselleck’s terms, how the
‘horizon of expectation’ relates to the ‘space of experience’. . . .” (2011: 232)
110
Claims for inclusion, in housing schemes, water and other essential life infrastructures, in the entitlements of
urban citizenship and belonging and participation in the urbanization process constitute the arena in which
contestations over displacement are a part (Bhan 2009, Von Schnitzler 2008, Graham and Simon 2001, Desai and
Loftus 2012, McFarlane 2008).
111
Hansen suggests that the disintegration into unstable naming practices (vernacular politics that culminated in the
historical renaming of Bombay to Mumbai in 1995) and exclusionary and fragmentary micro-communities should
not be understood as anomalous, but rather the immanent “possibilities always folded into India’s unique experience
of modernity and democracy.” (2004: 9)
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The development histories of Bombay can be seen as the informal production of space as
it has relied upon and also in turn shaped the production of difference. Wherein early colonial
urbanization divided and differently developed laborers and elites, Indians and British, the city’s
economy relied upon a precarious political integration of these differences as well as the
governance, most often characterized through neglect, of a surplus population remaindered
outside the spatioeconomic requirements of colonial development. As Doshi (2012b) shows, the
development politics of the contemporary neoliberal state continue to drive a differential
production of space and subjectivity among the urban poor. The syncretic nature of urban
administration and governance has consolidated this history as it has cohered into a complex
system of governing informality. Market and state informality in terms of spatial planning, extraeconomic and extra-state violence, as well as uneven governance that has striated urban
citizenship, has now largely come to define the experience of a poor urban class and how they
are managed politically. As Doshi (2012b) has shown, displacement and redevelopment in
Mumbai is experienced in highly gendered and caste-differentiated ways that have also affected
how the urban poor mobilize against displacement. This “differentiated displacement” hinges on
the role of marginalized subjectivity in representations and consensus among diverse poor
communities whose forms of resistances result in what Doshi refers to as “graduated slum
citizenship.” Such anti-displacement politics are entangled in urban governmentality and
governance schemes, yet nonetheless constitute an arena in which alternative or possible futures
and urban aspirations are staged. These include documenting schemes in which slum dwellers
themselves are induced into financial speculation schemes or asked to self-manage their own
dispossession through slum redevelopment schemes (Mukhija 2003, Blomley 2004, Echanove
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and Srivastrava 2011, McAuslan 2002, Weinstein 2008), as well as investigations of cultural
attachments to property and sensibilities of propriety (Murphy 2015).
Decades of development that differently exclude and marginalize the majority of the
city’s populations have led, according to architect-activist PK Das, to “critical levels of social
alienation and apathy.” “Policy after policy continues to doll out concessions to regulate people’s
demands in measured doses, without altering the fundamental premise of permitting land grabs
for real estate business interests by private agencies.” He emphasizes the need to situate planning
and design questions at the heart of urban movements for social justice, such as the NGO he is
centrally involved in called Nivara Hakk Suraksha Samiti (Right to Shelter Welfare Committee),
a prominent NGO fighting against slum dwellers’ displacement, to formulate planning and
design as part of the right to the city: “citizen’s movements in many Indian towns and cities are
actively engaged, not just in questioning the government’s plans, but also evolving people’s
vision and alternatives for democratization (2015: 92, 94).”
Urban informality can be understood as the spatial expression of savage
developmentalism. Informality also constitutes a mode of urban governance, through unstable
and improvised relations of control and consent, consolidation and subversion of official norms
and regulations, as well as a dispersion of political power across a number of authoritarian
networks and actors. Urban development has evolved over the course of Mumbai’s history on an
asymmetrical terrain of urban politics based on various cultural logics of exclusion that is
mediated through a range of property and labor relations that, in the contemporary period,
enables only the most striated senses of urban citizenship with respect to allocation of resources
and claims to space.112 As the production of informality has been so embedded in mode of urban
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Much recent scholarship on informality draws inspiration from philosophies that posit exclusion and
dispossession as primarily political processes (Li 2009, Agamben 2002, Bauman 2003).
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governance that governs selectively and differently, it also therefore opens up the city to a terrain
of differentiated struggle.113
Complimenting an urban governance framework is one that critically analyses the
planning culture of the city. Mumbai’s planning culture is shaped largely by a mix of top-down
technocratic, officially democratic, and postcolonial liberal traditions that mix both the postIndependence ideologies of state planning and the British colonial legacies with neoliberal
market-orientations for resource deliveries. These cultures of planning are important to address
for it is in culture that “the future-oriented logic of planning and development finds a natural
ally” (Pal 2008: 11). As Pal shows, “in recent years, there has been a growing interest among
scholars in various disciplines to include both political and planning culture (Cullingworth, 1993;
Friedmann, 2005b; Bishwapriya Sanyal, 2005a) and culture in general (Appadurai, 2004; Rao
and Walton, 2004; Sen, 2004) in the debate over development and public action. [Moreover] it is
in culture that ideas of the future, as much as those about the past, are embedded and nurtured
(Appadurai, 2004).” (ibid.)
Conclusion
The historic production of informality in Mumbai has deep class origins. As the discussion of the
historical development of Bombay has shown, informality represents the transmutation of
previous modes of production and processes of governing (Chakrabarty 2008; Chatterjee 2011),
instead of spaces of ‘exceptionality’ to the logic of neoliberalism as some have argued (Ong
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In this regard, the politics of urban informality can be understood as unfolding as a “milieu” comprised by
“qualities, substances, powers, and events” that combine in ways that are unplanned but that create the context for
what is next possible. Deleuze suggests that “a milieu is made up of qualities, substances, powers, and events: the
street, for example, with its materials […], its noises […], its animals […] or its dramas […]” And he adds, further,
“the trajectory merges not only with the subjectivity of those who travel through a milieu, but also with the
subjectivity of the milieu itself, insofar as it is reflected by those who travel through it.” (Deleuze 1997, Essays
Critical and Clinical) [Quoted by Vyjayanthi Rao, “Proximate Distances: Paradoxes of Conviviality in Urban India”
In What Makes India Urban (Berlin: Aedes 2009: 54)]
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2006, Cross 2010.) The working together of the informal trinity of capital, land, and labor
alongside the reorganization of the popular and working classes of the city through the savage
trinity of chauvinism, revanchism, and developmentalism have consolidated class power in space
and economy and rendered informal a significant spatial and political terrain of struggle. While
informality is, as this chapter has shown, intentionally created and perpetuated by planning
institutions, capital flows, and class rule, there are also unpredicted and unplanned powers at
work in these informal spaces and economies. The conditions of informality create a terrain of
contestation among the informalized, the dispossessed, and the subaltern. From their struggles,
we can best discern the class dynamics of informality and the fault lines that cut across urban
society.
This approach critically departs from prevailing anthropological theories of popular
politics among subaltern groups. Holston’s (2008) notion of “insurgent citizenship” partially
reconstructs this question in the limited framework of citizenship. He describes the strategies of
the urban poor to gain access to land tenure, infrastructure, and recognition for inclusion, and in
the process challenges and expands existing property and citizenship regimes mediated by the
state. Here “insurgence” is predicated on land tenure and the ability to negotiate within existing
property regimes as the pathway to citizenship. These insurgencies consequently shape
entanglements with governmental schemes that aim to potentially displace residents in the name
of redevelopment. Chatterjee’s (2004) conception of “popular politics” illuminates how the urban
poor negotiate with the state despite lacking recognition as proper citizens by mobilizing a
selective governmental agency fashioned out of associations of moral community. These are
fraught and temporary spaces of popular politics in the sphere of “political society,” in which the
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poor identify as a population to be governed as an exception to the rule of law, what Li has
described as “government through community” (2007: 232, Chatterjee 2011).
Our understanding of these democratic urban aspirations have been complicated by more
recent theorizations that attest to the flexible and fragmentary nature of contemporary regimes of
citizenship enacted by diverse governmental arrangements. Roy (2009b, 2011) has called for
research into this question through the development of the concept of “subaltern urbanism” as a
contradictory set of policies, practices, and relations amongst “governed” populations. Bayat
(2000), relying on Scott’s notion of everyday resistance, suggests that an enlarged political frame
is required to interrogate practices of informality that constitute “a quiet encroachment on the
ordinary.” This approach renders an image of a dynamic urban world of informality that is in
various ways affected by the governed relations of the city, but except in extraordinary moments
of transcended, do not challenge urban relations of power but exist in the space between
representation and transformation.
While the focus of such studies aims to counter narratives of incapacity,
underdevelopment, and dispossession in urban slums, and rather to redeploy these spaces as a
“terrain of habitation, livelihood, self-organization, and politics,” (Roy 2011:224), they render
the politics of informality as incredibly dynamic yet ineffective. As I argue in greater detail in the
following chapters, what is missing is attention to the class antagonisms that are the base of
urban society, and their role within accumulation strategies that produce both urban and state
spaces of informality. How do the “governed” see themselves as governing—not only their
neighborhoods, but the entire city? What happens when fragmented urban communities
differently affected by the legacies of informality and developmentalism seek to collectively
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govern their own spaces, and plan beyond ruling spatial ideologies is the purview of the
following chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
“When We Demand Our Share of this World”:
Hamara Shehar Mumbai and New Municipalist Politics
“The writing of new spatial relations (territorialization) was, ultimately, tantamount to the production of boundaries
and hierarchies, zones and enclaves; the subversion of existing property arrangements; the classification of people
according to different categories; resource extraction; and, finally, the manufacturing of a large reservoir of cultural
imaginaries. These imaginaries gave meaning to the enactment of differential rights to differing categories of people
for different purposes within the same space; in brief, the exercise of sovereignty. Space was therefore the raw
material of sovereignty and the violence it carried with it.” —Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, emphasis added.
“The remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is contained in the faculty to make and
keep promises. Both faculties depend upon plurality, on the presence and acting of others, for no man can forgive
himself and no one can be bound by a promise made only to himself.” —Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition

Introduction
This chapter examines the emergence of an array of populist urban agendas responsive to the
opportunities and perils involved in Mumbai’s development planning. It draws on ethnographic
research within the recent citywide campaign Hamara Shehar Mumbai (HSM, Mumbai – Our
City), a grassroots urban movement that contested municipal planning paradigms at the heart of
the city’s implementation of its recent twenty-year Development Plan 2014–2034. The chapter
traces the five-year arc of Hamara Shehar, beginning with its early efforts to transform planning
rubrics such as community consultation and participation process into a terrain of democratic
contestation. From there, the campaign sought to intervene in, and occasionally interrupt, state
planning through a democratic municipalist movement. Finally, the campaign formulated a
populist planning vision that endeavored to shape the future-oriented development of the city
through a nexus of popular decision and distribution. This chapter discusses the strategies of this
cycle of citywide grassroots coordination and mobilization to shape planning “from below,”
which has included processes of diverse community consultations, community mapping of land
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use, the valorization of local knowledges of land use and place, and public protests against layers
of enclosures articulated through technical planning regimes and developmental governance.
I develop an anthropological critique of planning to understand the condition of urban
development in Mumbai. I show how collective sociospatial practices that produce alternative
knowledge of municipal forms of life—what I refer to as new popular “counter-municipal
cartographies”—emerged among disparate sectors of the city mobilized to intervene in the
shaping of the city’s twenty-year Development Plan. In the process, the chapter details how
planning operates as both an apparatus of control as well as a horizon of democratic populist
realization. At the center of these counter-municipal cartographies, as I discuss below and in the
following chapter, are numerous questions of enclosures and commons, livelihood, land use,
social difference, and spatial organization not typically addressed by established planning
paradigms.
Given the specific history preceding these mobilizations—a period during which
collective demands on the city’s resources and specific appeals to its overall planning cultures
were scattered—this cycle of mobilization was both unlikely and unprecedented. Its existence in
and of itself represents a new vision of the city. Not only did the campaign arise as a series of
mobilizations to push a new planning agenda on the municipal corporation, but it also
demonstrated a different vision of the city: one that is plural (opposed to communal and
chauvinistic), populist, participatory, accessible, multilingual, ecological, working class, oriented
around the common, rooted in various Indigenous histories of the region, and above all, based on
an accurate lived experience of the city itself.
The campaign, as I discuss below, was fiercely pitched on the terrain of juggernaut
developmentalism. Given its entanglements with the state and the limits of working within the
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confines of developmentalism, the campaign was not fully able to realize its own vision.
Nevertheless, both the campaign and wider popular mobilizations it participated in reveal that
established understandings of planning in Mumbai have to be reframed.
Anthropology has much to offer established ways of thinking about planning and urban
development. The anthropology of planning, as Abram and Weszkalnys suggest, approaches the
city from the perspective of “what people think is possible and desirable, and what the future
promises” (2011:4). The question of the future of Mumbai for its residents is a spatiotemporal
one, but most crucially one expressed in the present through shared and divergent senses of
possibility. The desired future came to be a central focus for many of Mumbai’s residents as the
municipal and state government, planning consultants, and a range of developers’ interests
conspired to draft a twenty-year Development Plan 2014–2034 for the city. Despite Mumbai
being a city with a deep history of conflict and transformation, the historic character of these
urban antagonisms seem dormant. Absent wide and popular mobilizations of collective urban
struggles, the city’s developmental regime has grown increasingly anti-democratic and
depoliticizing. The nature of planning has suspended the time of historical transformation.
Possibilities inherent in planning, where the realms of everyday sensory experience mix with the
ether of dreams and desire are compressed, contained.114
Revenge (revanchism) and deceit (promises made in bad faith, obligations indefinitely
deferred) are defining qualities of Mumbai’s history of developmentalism. The history and
politics of the city determine the horizons of development, but how that horizon is traced,
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“Today historic time seems to be compressed and the future temporality of desires deleted: the present is eternal,
unchangeable, and necessary. All this is registered and overdetermined by the sovereign ruling powers. Therefore
the modern history that had previously been depicted as the continuous emergence of social conflicts and the
repeated modification of constitutional structures must be paralyzed around a political center celebrated as the Eden
of Equilibrium.” (Hardt and Negri 2017: 247)
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through what intersections and geometries of power, what emergent conflicts and antagonisms,
has a great deal to do with how the city is planned and unplanned. The planning of urban worlds
takes shape through myriad relations of debt, obligation, and commitment. Realizing an
alternative planning process, therefore, also requires extracting “planning” from the world of
betrayals, coercions, and domination that it is currently mired in and instead renewing the
intentions and promises people can make to each other.
I reflect on what these mobilizations reveal about the ways people claim, hold, and use
space, and on the challenges the campaign faced in a planning culture shaped by pervasive
informality that produce uneven and unequal access to land and services, structured around
salient social experiences of difference such as caste, class, religion, and gender. I also explore
Mumbai’s contested geographies and layers of diverse relationships to land and place, especially
those often neglected by planning. How do developmental imaginaries and practices contribute
to these novel inscriptions of social and spatial boundaries as well as generate enclosures across
multiple social and environmental terrains? Finally, this chapter addresses the political cultures
and imaginary these mobilizations give expression to, and how we might understand their
beginnings, affects, and unlikely combinations and durations. It concludes with a reflection on
the new orientations to time and space articulated in the city’s layered history of enclosure and
commons in the mobilizations that come together and come apart, but nevertheless reconstitute
the city as a terrain of struggle.

The Failed Histories of Development Plans
The conceptual and practical failures of development planning in Bombay stretch back more
than a century. The Bombay Act of 1915 called for the preparation of town planning schemes for
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Bombay State, though planning remained for the next several decades piecemeal and without a
conception of adjoining areas. In hindsight, the MCGM claims the first Development Plan of
Mumbai, for the period of 1964–1981, was “not effective as it did not involve any public
participation and relied entirely upon the Municipal Corporation to generate resources to meet
the cost of acquisition of land, removal of encumbrances, and development of the amenities.”
Furthermore, “it is felt that the citizens should be made aware of the broad outlines of the
Development Plan and the Development Control Regulations 1991, so that they would be able to
understand and participate more effectively in the implementation of the said Development
Plan.”
The second Development Plan, prepared for the period of 1981–2001, was only
sanctioned in parts between 1991 and 1993, due to “several procedural difficulties” (M-Ward
publication). This second Development Plan once again experienced inordinate delays in the
making of plan proposals and getting approvals. Since the municipal corporation could not
“provide adequate financial resources” to bear the costs of rehabilitation and development in its
second Development Plan, “the amenities could not be developed to the desired extent.”
(MCGM M-Ward publication, 2014) The plan made provisions for residential land use and
housing for a population projected to be 9.87 million by 2001, whereas the city’s actual
population topped 11.9 million by that year, leaving an unaccounted-for population of 2 million
to be accommodated.
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Figure 10: Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Sanctioned Development Plan for 1981–2001. City DP
Sheets. Image source: The Indian Institute of Architects, http://iiamumbai.com/dcr1991.php?name=eastern_areas.

According to Hamara Shehar, both the plans “acted against the spirit of urban planning.”
Because of inadequacies in the plan design, making and implementation, only 5 percent to 7
percent of the plan actually got implemented.115 The Hamara Shehar Mumbai campaign sought
to break Bombay/Mumbai’s long history of failing to meaningfully implement its own
development plans—a century-long failure that allowed the “builder-state nexus” to instead fuel
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According to early analyses of Hamara Shahar, the preceding Development Plans failed to meet the expectations
of the citizens as well as the decision makers for several reasons: design and approach were far too simplistic in
anticipating citizens’ needs and aspirations; very long tenure was a major hindrance to anticipating socioeconomic
changes over time; a restrictive approach taken to implementation without adequate flexibility to meet the changing
needs of the city. Hamara Shehar Mumbai. 2014. “The People’s Development Plan.” Circulated as an email and
later published online at https://hamarasheharmumbai.org/the-peoples-development-plan/. See also Aravind Unni
and Dhanraj Khare. Mumbai Development Plan Implementation and its Biases: From the Perspective of the Urban
Poor. Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action: Mumbai: 2013.
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uneven, market-driven development that drove informality, as discussed in the previous chapter.
At its most fundamental level, therefore, the campaign wanted to facilitate popular engagement
with a development plan that would actually be fulfilled.

A Web of Development Actors
Mumbai’s 2014-2034 Development Plan was developed by an array of state and non-state
actors.116 While the public authority responsible for implementing the Development Plan is the
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM), important revisions were the responsibility
of outside consultants, a consortium of Indian and French urban planning companies that were
hired through a tendering process. Indeed, the domain of planning in Mumbai had long been the
domain of a piecemeal collection of overlapping political institutions and private interests. An
urban governance framework (Cf Pierre 2005:16, Sellers, 2002a: 6) allows us to “disentangle the
complex web of actors in the planning process of a large metropolis in the context of limited
resources.” (Pal 2008: 21) These include the formal political institutions charged with urban
governance: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM117), the primary agency
responsible for urban governance in the city; the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development
Authority (MMRDA), a body of the Maharashtra Government that is responsible for
infrastructure development in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region, chaired by the Minister for
Urban Development in Maharashtra Devendra Fadnavis (who is also the current Chief Minister
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A revised Development Plan for Mumbai, its third in fifty years, was a requirement of the central government’s
Ministry of Urban Development. The Government of India’s 2005 urban modernization policy, known as Jawaharlal
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, promoted equity and sustainability alongside infrastructure development as
the desired features of the urbanization process to come.
117
Established under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888, it is responsible for the civic infrastructure and
administration of the city and some suburbs of Mumbai. The Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation is India’s first
municipal corporation (founded in 1882) and is one of the largest local governments in the Asian continent. The
BMC is the civic body that governs the city of Mumbai, Maharashtra and is India’s richest municipal organization.
The BMC’s annual budget is more than that of some states of India.

164

of Maharashtra)118; the Government of Maharashtra, and the Government of India through
support from programs such as Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission.119
The web of planning agents and authorities also extends to a range of international nonstate actors: management consulting firms such as McKinsey, special interest groups such as
Mumbai First, aid agencies such as the World Bank, USAID, and Cities Alliance. Adding to this
are actors and institutions such as private sector businesses, both corporate and informal;
professional such as including expert planners, civil society, including community-based
organizations, NGOs, local political parties, religious groups, trade unions and trade association,
and marginalized communities whose interests are often represented by professional
organizations.
On January 1, 2011, Group SCE India, a consultation group that previously prepared
Bangalore’s Development Plan, began work on Mumbai’s new Development Plan. This work
involved thematic mapping, tracking growth scenarios, and the aim to finish a comprehensive
land-use plan in the next eleven months. The government’s own preparatory studies revealed the
dismal state of planning in the preceding years that resulted in inadequate public utilities and
amenities, low per capita open space ratio, failing record of housing provision, and unregulated
vertical growth. Many urban planners consider the municipal corporation’s inability to
implement the previous Development Plan dating back to 1991 to be the central cause of this
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See for example the First report of the Chief Minister's Task Force, “Transforming Mumbai Into a World-Class
City” (Government of Maharashtra, 2004)
119
“Apart from municipal institutions, the Indian urban scene is cluttered with a host of parastatals, and
departmental agencies dealing with urban services, in addition to the general regulatory activities through the police
and district administration, so much so that the substance of urban governance really lies with the state government,
rather than in the municipal institutions.” (Pal 2008: 76)

165

state of planning.120 Others have identified the lack of public participation and the inability to
anticipate citizen’s needs.
Public participation has become increasingly important to the privatization agendas that
are central to the city making projects of urban neoliberalism. Both are crucial to the urban
management strategies of city governments and private entities representing developer’s
interests, to implement globalizing development agendas that enable cities like Mumbai to be
competitive landing strips for territorializing capital. Yet the discourse of participation has
contributed to a range of populist imaginations and urban agendas that competed for inclusion in
the Development Plan process in Mumbai. The concern with equity, like participation, have been
central demands of these populist expressions, and have extended the project of consent-based
hegemony, wherein increased inequalities are part of a calculated risk of governability. In
addition to infrastructural developments, which have also been tied to both security and
development concerns and investment opportunities alike, ideals of participatory and equitable
cities have increasingly been a central strategic concern for neoliberal urban agendas (Smith
2002). This points to a central paradox in the planning of Indian cities: inclusive and equitable
planning is widely heralded by the state and municipal agents as the favored means of achieving
an “urban awakening,” in which “housing for all” is the guarantee of a “slum free India”
(McKinsey Global Institute 2010). Yet the majority of urban Development Plans have remained
fiercely exclusionary, entrenching and indeed relying upon salient social differences such as
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“This, most urban planners conclude, has a lot to do with the MCGM’s [Municipal Corporation of Greater
Mumbai, also known as Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation, BMC] failure in implementing the 1991 DP.” Kunal
Purohit. 2015. “MCGM will share city’s blueprint with you,” Hindustan Times, February 16, 2015.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/mumbai/MCGM-will-share-city-s-blueprint-with-you/storyKIx7ob8YUHMWCU3JEPpQYO.html
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caste, class, religion, and gender to produce an uneven and unequal landscape of access to land
and services (Government of India 2014, Centre for Equity Studies 2014), and thus less equity.

In the Name of the People
“Cities are lived through the diverse ways in which they are conceptualized. Not only do imaginaries shape how
people understand their own city, but they also shape how cities are actually made. How people work, live, and play
in a city, as well as how a city should look, how local government should function and what kinds of developments
should be prioritized are all shaped by urban imaginaries.” (Jonathan Shapiro Anjaria and Colin McFarlane, Urban
Navigations: Politics, Space, and the City in South Asia, 2011:4)

One of the first populist impulses to arise from citizen groups came from Urban Design Research
Institute (UDRI), a trust of planners, urban designers, architects, and other urban affairs
professionals focused since the early eighties on progressive interventions in the built
environment. UDRI was early in bringing attention to the 2014–2034 Development Plan and
identifying the opportunity to shape the proposal process by advocating for participation and
started raising awareness shortly after the decision to revise the current Development Plan was
taken in 2009. Beginning in September 2009, UDRI organized a few workshops, foremost
amongst urban planners and architects, to contribute, in their own words, to the “formulation of a
public participation process for the revision of the Development Plan for Mumbai 2014–
2034.”121 Their audience was limited to an existing circle of urban professionals with influence
in the political apparatuses of the city but who nevertheless self-consciously considered
themselves insufficiently represented in official planning discussions.
As part of “a public participation planning process” UDRI conducted surveys of about
two thousand people on a variety of issues. It formed “ten different stakeholder groups on
education, health, livelihoods, energy, environment, water, housing, transport, urban form, and
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See http://www.mumbaidp24seven.in/index.php/about-us
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governance [which] met regularly to formulate the principles that should guide the Development
Planning process of the city.”122 UDRI’s surveys and meetings were largely discussions between
professionals and experts, consciously identifying the emerging consensus as representative of a
number of public stakeholder’s interests. In order to enter into dialogue with the city
government, members of UDRI thus sought to mobilize influence based on their own planning
expertise and demand inclusion based on their professional credentials. Citizen involvement
remained limited to discussions, workshops, and exhibitions, all designed and managed by the
organization itself. Nonetheless, UDRI produced what it referred to as “A People’s Brief”
consisting of thirty-five “stakeholder principles” derived through its consultation process that it
presented to the city government and to the planning consultant Group SCE in December 2011.
Meanwhile, beginning in June 2011, the group YUVA Urban (Youth for Unity and
Voluntary Action) initiated a separate “peoples’ process” aimed at influencing the development
plan. YUVA is a left-leaning national NGO founded in 1984 with paid staff of directors,
researchers, and community organizers concerned with urban indices of development. Its work
on issues of urban poverty and marginalization has been in a critical human rights framework but
its analysis and reputation as an important NGO in the country stems largely from its community
organizing campaign and base building efforts among the urban poor. Alarmed by the
exclusionary histories of the city’s development plans, YUVA committed its field office in
Mumbai to investigating the likely consequences of the forthcoming development plan on the
lowest strata of the city. The goal was to assess the official development itineraries of the city
from the perspective of the communities least benefited by the city’s uneven histories of urban
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The surveys queried a range of topics, from governance, urban life (housing, environment, water and sanitation,
health, education, energy, livelihood) and urban form. These groups held an extensive series of consultation
workshops scheduled with stakeholders, including key municipal departments, NGOs and concerned citizens (42 in
total), “to understand the needs and solutions for sector wise planning issues.”
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development schemes. YUVA’s office in Mumbai initiated what it referred to as “awareness
building workshops” and “network building” as well as large-scale training meetings. The group
also used its constituents and connections across the city from past campaigns against the
privatization of water rights and the demolition of informal housing to host several rallies, the
first of which were held in the P/North Ward six months later, in January 2012.

Figure 11: Map of P/N Ward. Image source: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai. R/S – Ward Existing Lan
Use 2012.

This municipal ward was already a significant territory for the non-governmental community
organization, which had been organizing in the area slums and had developed significant ties to
the community. Following the rallies, the group hosted a three-month “ground truthing” study
from March 2012 to June 2012. Through direct observation and verification of lived experience,
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mobilized communities situated the place and politics of urban land in their own actual, concrete
relations as an incitement against the municipality’s rendering of localities into plannable
abstract space. While ground truthing has its own technical geospatial-planning connotation
(with geographic information systems), in its community form, it also conveyed the moral force
of satya, of insisting on the truth. The point was to understand the land use pattern in the district
in order to assess how poor communities in the locality had fared under the previous and current
twenty-year development plans. A set of concrete demands emerged from residents at the
settlement and P/North ward level. This was later published as Mumbai Development Plan
Implementation and Bias: From the Perspective of the Urban Poor (2013) and has been widely
circulated and subsequently accepted by professional planning groups and the municipality as
one of the most detailed primary studies of the implementations of the 1991 Development Plan
in Mumbai. It recognizes that the housing situation has been in crisis since the seventies and
draws immediate connections between the rise in informality and precarity in housing and other
provisions on the one hand, and the liberalization of the land markets in the city on the other.
Moreover, the report identifies the limitations of existing planning at the scale of the informal
settlement and argues that the Development Plan 2014–2034 process is a politically important
opportunity to reverse a longstanding anti-poor urban agenda and so that the many issues
plaguing the development of the city may be “planned and participated at the level of the city.”
The demands that YUVA’s researchers and community organizers list in this document include
planning with the recognition that the majority of the city’s population is not “illegal” though
they reside in slums (estimated 70 percent) unassisted by the state; allocating specific planning
resources for the urban poor, including coastal communities and others excluded by the
municipality; using the development plan process to build equity in the city; and reducing the
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duration of the plan from twenty to five years with a robust process for monitoring and
modifying plans in regular intervals; among other specific ward-level demands such as improved
housing, health care provisions, schools, playgrounds, and “real open spaces” accessible to all.
Mapping the City: Residents’ First Encounter with the Development Plan
In September 2012, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai released Existing Land Use
(ELU) maps of the city, marking residents’ first encounter with the development plan. This was
one of the most crucial stages of the multi-year development plan process. It would set the tone
for the planning process to come by either acknowledging or refuting an understanding of how
land across the city was currently being used, and by whom. It also demonstrated how prepared
planning authorities would be to deal with the complex spatial realties of how people use urban
land, and how likely city officials would be to impose their development vision on top of it.
Finally, the moment clearly crystallized relations of consent among the state and the governed in
how city agencies and consultants would mold a vision for the city’s future land use with—or
against—those who are most vulnerable and those who are most interested in profiting from a
development agenda. The release of the Existing Land Use maps also offered a crucial moment
for the city to respond to the government’s development interests and visions, and attempt to
shape the plans with their own vision.
Led by prominent architect and urban designer Pankaj Joshi, the Urban Design Research
Institute continued to organize, host, or facilitate Stakeholder Meetings and Workshops
throughout 2012 and periodically until 2014. UDRI also launched a web platform imbued with a
quasi-populist spirit to facilitate citizen involvement in the development plan process under the
name “DP24Seven Project.” The website featured a mapping resource guide for citizens to check

171

the MCGM’s Existing Land Use maps for errors and inconsistencies. 123 Published in both Hindi
and English, UDRI’s guide to citizen existing land use verification was the first online tool made
available to Mumbai’s residents. The DP24Seven Project encouraged people to directly send
comments to the MCGM’s email account dedicated to land use questions. UDRI also published
three “inception reports.” In its language and appeal to “citizens” to take notice and contribute to
the visioning of their city, UDRI seemed mostly to address the city’s university students,
professionals, and middle classes. Whether the group’s vision and expertise could adequately
engage other strata of the city and accommodate their strategic leadership for a more popular
development plan would remain an unaddressed question in its campaign to bring popular
attention to the planning process. This question of audience and engagement remained a
distinguishing difference between UDRI and YUVA in their shared use of broadly populist
rhetoric and technical planning consultation language.
From October 2012 to February 2013, multiple groups engaged in a large-scale effort to
verify—and correct—existing land use maps released by the MCGM. YUVA sponsored a
community-level verification process in several in the city’s twenty-four wards, as a diverse
“peoples movement” was slowly emerging from poorer districts in the city. YUVA’s aim was to
involve as many communities of slum dwellers, coastal communities, urban villagers, and
informal laborers in the process, identifying a range of community “stakeholders” who would
ensure that ELU maps were marked correctly.
Members of the “people’s process” were concerned with how well the existing land use
maps could reflect both the physical geographic and lived spatial reality of Mumbai, which in
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The MCGM had uploaded the Existing Land Use (ELU) maps and report on the MCGM website and invited
comments on the ELU maps and report. The deadline for submission of comments on the Existing Land Use Maps
and Reports (ELU) published by the MCGM, was extended to March 28, 2013.
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many instances is defined by the coarticulation of informality, various laboring and ecological
commons, and dispossessions and enclosures. Yet there are also economic and spatial commons
that transverse this categorization and mapping process, whose historical patterns predate
capitalist urbanization in Mumbai and have long been entangled with its formations. Fisher
communities (kolis)124 along the western coast and Indigenous tribes (adivasis) in Sanjay
National Park and Aarey Colony are two such communities. In these important instances, the
commons maintain their livelihoods, and contribute to their reproduction as a community.125
There are indeed a variety of commoners—most notably hunters, gatherers, foragers, and
fishers—in the metropolitan space of Mumbai, some of whom partially enter into commodity
relations within the capitalist economy but whose existence in the city raises important and
largely unanswered questions of how multiple and different commons connect to the urban
economy, its governance, and larger issues of livelihood, land use, and resistance
(Parthasarathy 2011). The vision of the city as a global metropolis does very little to recognize
these communities’ original claims on space, their laboring traditions, their ongoing and dynamic
spatial needs, and their hopes for the city. Moreover, the global metropolis vision willfully erases
“the economic and cultural contributions of ‘commoners’ whose everyday labours make possible
the city as we know it” (Gidwani and Baviskar 2011: 43).
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“Koli is an umbrella term to refer to a number of castes and tribal groups in coastal Maharashtra, Gujarat and
Goa, and who profess different religious faiths. A majority of the Koli fisher people in Mumbai are either Son-Kolis
or Mahadev Kolis.” (Parthasarathy 2011: 62 fn20)
125
Parthasarathy suggests that “users of these resources tend to differentiate between rights over property and rights
over embedded resources in a property available for access to external actors who own no property (the second
being regarded as the commons). ‘Commonising’ or ‘commoning’ is perhaps a better description of the processes
and actions described here rather than the term “commons.” There is no public notion of the commons, but the idea
is seen in more immanent terms. The idea of accessing resources that are not commodities and are not strictly
classified as property is different from the concept of poaching. In many ways, especially in a sociological and also
political sense, Mumbai itself constitutes a commons for the people of the south Asian subcontinent.” (Parthasarathy
2011)
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The commons are routinely misrecognized as “informal” economies and spaces, both in
planning regimes and spatial mapping exercises that mark the urban commons of fishing
communities or urban villages as slums, or as laboring Adivasi communities as engaged in
informal sector transactions. Correctly mapping these common spaces would also bring into
focus a view of Mumbai as an urban society organized through many types of subsistence
laboring. Recognizing the existence of these communities of commons is an important way to
situate a diverse urban poor as active interpreters and collaborators in contested urban political
and ecological fabrics, and not merely as victims of restructuring and redevelopment processes.
Moreover, the urban commons serve both as a political lens for approaching the city as well as a
means for recognizing and recovering the history of diverse values and experiences of laboring
communities in Mumbai.126
Hussain Indorewala and Shweta Wagh, participants in the early “peoples” campaign and
activist-researchers teaching at the well-known Kamla Raheja Vidyanidhi Institute for
Architecture and Environmental Studies, recall “the result [of the community mapping] was
dramatic: over the next six months, institutions and individuals pointed out 5,134 errors in the
maps.” Land that was marked as “slums” on municipal maps were indeed fisher villages
(koliwadas) and urban villages (goathans). Land marked as green and open spaces actually
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“Research on the urban commons in India is scarce, though there are signs of increasing interest. The focus,
however, is on issues that reflect the core concerns of urban sociology and critical urban studies; streets, maidans,
lakes, parks, and garbage disposal sites are usually identified as the commons. The identification of the commons by
researchers does recognise issues of class, gender, inequality and the concerns of the urban poor, but on the whole
seems to be more of a reaction to exclusionary tendencies and the takeover of common facilities and sites by the
middle classes and the elite. Questions are rarely raised beyond the routine ones of struggles over access and
exclusion with reference to common civic natural resources such as lakes and parks, common facilities
(playgrounds), or the use of streets and foot- paths for vending, hawking, housing, and so on. How and from where
do the urban poor meet their fuelwood needs? What are the sources of food and fodder for urban livestock holders?
How do the urban poor and lower middle classes meet their food requirements? What kind of resource dependencies
are exhibited in the livelihood strategies of street vendors and hawkers, and of sundry artisanal groups working in
the city? Are urban and peri- urban natural resource pools and commons (for instance, fish from lakes, rivulets,
creeks, ponds and other water bodies) integrated into the supply chains of small retailers, wholesalers and
supermarkets, as well as of eateries and restaurants?” (Parthasarathy 2011: 55)
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included inaccessible parts of the rock coast. Housing settlements were designated as
commercially zoned and vice versa. The development plan was mired at the start in controversy
as a number of community groups alleged innumerable inconsistencies and errors in the ELU
maps.
In response, the Standing Committee Chairperson of the Development Plan, bowing to
the increasing pressure over the inconsistencies in the ELU, agreed to meet with communitybased organizations and NGOs. This was the first meeting regarding the Development Plan
where officials met with the public and made certain assurances. Coming out of this meeting,
according to the MCGM, the “civic body promises to make all reports, maps on Development
Plan process accessible to the public.” The public and participatory nature, however limited, of
the development process was briefly guaranteed. Yet in a meeting in May 2013 with stakeholder
groups, the MCGM rejected all of the communities’ corrections to the maps except “250
discrepancies,” claiming the other corrections were mere “comments” or “suggestions”
(Indorewala and Wagh 2013). Public pressure nonetheless forced the MCGM to review all
recorded errors and present them in an “Action Report.” The people’s campaign that YUVA
initiated among the poorest sections of city had compelled its first response from the city
government and seemed to have won its first victory in what would be a long battle. Yet even
consequential errors that were admitted—such as the lack of mapping of existing slums, urban
villages, hawkers, the homeless and other vulnerable groups—were dismissively filed away for
the proposal stage, a flouting of the planning regulations about how existing use is to be notated
at the time of map preparation.
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Real and Imaginary Populism
Mumbai is often represented as a “popular” city famous for its public cultures and celebrated for
the marvels of the spectacularly ordinary routines that its masses engage in across the city. In
their imaginaries if not their direct experiences or everyday expectations, so too do ordinary
citizens, politicians, as well as experts such as planners, routinely invoke a long tradition of
popular engagement in the city’s development. The “popular” is a powerful but a contradictory
construct available for use by diverse interests to draw from, reinterpret, and mobilize for their
own purposes. What I refer to as “imaginary populism” is an essential construct that allows
various visions of the city to find justification, to represent certain mass and elite agendas as
immanent urban imaginaries that are already in the pulse and air of the city.127 Imaginary
populism enables a simultaneously shared and different city that links the “popular” with forms
of accessibility and acceptability. The “people” and the “popular” also mask the enclosures and
appropriations in the process of Mumbai’s urban development. This is what makes it possible for
the city government to claim it ensures the “public participatory nature of the Development Plan”
while dismissing people’s submissions. Citizen outrage at the very process can even be contorted
into an example of people’s participation, as it was in the press and by MCGM officials.128
“Imaginary populism” is also what allows officials to generate consent to development and
manage implementation of its schemes; it also allows experts such as the members of the UDRI

127

In proposing the term “imaginary populism,” I draw on Ernesto Laclau’s discussion of populism as an inherent
dimension of a democratic politics and interpret Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined community” as part of a
larger process of how imagination contributes to political community building. Laclau, E., 2005. On Populist
Reason. New York and London: Verso; Anderson, B. 1993. Imagined Communities. New York and London: Verso.
128
Hussain Indorewala and Shweta Wagh. 2013. “People’s Participation in Planning Mumbai?” Kafila. December
17, 2013. See also Kunal Purohit, “MCGM Agrees to Review ELU Map Errors Found by Mumbaiites,” Hindustan
Times, January 18, 2013. http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/mumbai/MCGM-agrees-to-review-elu-maperrors-found-by-mumbaiites/article1-992622.aspx.
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to lament previous failures of participation but not interrogate what popular participation should
or could have looked like, or to articulate their proposed notion of public participation.
In April 2013, as a consequence to the error-riddled process and lack of incorporation of
popular sentiments in the development plan process, YUVA began organizing meetings and
discussions between more than a hundred community groups and other grassroots organizations,
activists, researchers and experts. The result was a polyvocal formulation called The People’s
Vision for Mumbai’s Development Plan. The process of drafting the document began some
eighteen months earlier and brought together hundreds of different organizations and individuals
in the city to contribute their lived understanding of the city’s existing land use against official
estimates. YUVA and other community groups initiated assemblies for debate and inquiry in
various geographic wards and social sectors (for instance, labor and housing communities) of the
city, where different groups came together around specified issues and themes, such as housing,
informal livelihoods, education, health, and gender. These discussions and the resulting
publication took about three months and involved a lot of debate before demands were finalized.
A remarkable statement that draws on diverse experiences of exclusion in the city and YUVA’s
earlier work among the urban poor of P/N Ward, The People’s Vision imagines a popular
citywide twenty-year development plan that supplants the one that the municipal state was
concurrently drafting. Here, a range of diverse everyday experiences of the city clashed with
state assessments routinely obscuring slum settlements, urban villages, homeless persons, and
land used by street hawkers and “casualized” workers.
The process that YUVA initiated with community meetings, rallies, mapping exercises
was now taking shape as a larger more autonomous movement that prioritizes the abilities of
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“people to articulate their own needs and priorities.”129 In May 2013, the Hamara Shehar
Mumbai campaign was inaugurated, an important organizational moment for formulating
popular demands on the city.130 On October 22, 2013, more than 1,500 people, including a loose
formation of eighty organizations, gathered at Azad Maidan, a historic open space in the city of
public demonstration and protest, to formally present their collectively-authored vision of
development based on the diverse experiences of exclusion in the city to the MCGM. The
People’s Vision interestingly juxtaposed with the MCGM’s own Vision Document of the
Development Plan 2014–2034 published in 2013. While the People’s Vision demanded that
future planning recognize and account for the myriad ways laboring communities already make
Mumbai the city it is, the city’s official document calls for Mumbai to be transformed according
to three distinct but related visions—of a competitive city, an inclusive city, and a sustainable
city.” Its vision makes spatial arguments for the intensive redevelopment of certain areas rather
than approaching a plan for the city according to existing issues (Rangwala 2013).131
The aims of the nascent campaign at this moment were revealingly complex and
contradictory. On the one hand, by addressing the municipal corporation as the main agent of
development, the campaign largely accommodates the current distribution of power, and seeks
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Moreover, the campaign is “self-financed, with its own name, and a convener group comprising of individuals
from various community groups and organizations.” Hussain Indorewala and Shweta Wagh. 2013. “People’s
Participation in Planning Mumbai?” Kafila. December 17, 2013
130
Officially titled Hamara Shehar Mumbai Vikas Niyojan Abhiyaan (Mumbai People’s City Development Plan
Campaign, hereafter shortened to Hamara Shehar Mumbai). The campaign announced its founding with the
following note: “The people’s Mumbai Development Plan (DP) campaign (unanimously named by its members as
Hamara Shahar, Hamara Vikas, Hamara Niyojan Abhiyan, Mumbai, Our City, Our Development, Our Planning
campaign).”
131
“These visions however benevolent do not seem to carry forward to the level strategies and projections. The
document thus reads as argument towards intensification of built-up area to meet various demands, rather than a
careful approach towards mapping identified issues comprehensively and thus developing frameworks that are bold,
and inclusive in the real sense. Organizations representing marginalized communities have therefore been working
arduously right from the initial stages of plan preparation to ensure adequate representation.” Lubaina Rangwala,
“The Mumbai Development Plan: A Politics of Representation” December 11, 2013,
https://favelissues.com/2013/12/11/the-mumbai-development-plan-a-politics-of-representation/
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only to negotiate with power holders for increased participation in the planning of the city. On
the other hand, the popular energies mobilized in the campaign envision a wholly different
approach to development that would require a significantly new balance of powers in city
planning.
The campaign was galvanized by some of the most marginalized communities in the city.
Working class and poor Muslims, Dalits (untouchables), and Kolis (traditional communities),
though very often more men than women, constituted the majority of those who participated in
ongoing monthly meetings and day-to-day operations of Hamara Shehar (Field notes, December
8, 2014).132 Among those who joined the campaign were members of the 128 gaothans (urban
villages). These are home to Mumbai’s East Indians, Marathi-speaking “original inhabitants”
who lived on the islands of Bombay, the island of Salsette, Chaul and Thana and who converted
to Christianity (Roman Catholic) during the sixth century. They’ve been living on their land
since centuries before Portuguese arrived in 1498, and their housing and village formations have
existed long before the city’s modern development control rules were established. These East
Indian communities became involved in the people’s campaign because their gaothans were
marked incorrectly on the land use maps as slum clusters. The goathans are quite differentiated
by class, with some suffering crumbling infrastructure, illegal displacement, and poorly planned
Slum Rehabilitation Schemes that are destroying the fabric of the village. Others are susceptible
to buy outs and redevelopment amidst the difficulty of house repairs and as compensatory
amounts are often too high to resist. Even relatively well-off villages suffer dwindling numbers
of households often triggered by water and sewage problems. The Development Plan 2014–2034
would also later threaten gaothans with road-widening projects that would disrupt these urban
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Agarwal (2001:1623) has referred to these gendered tendencies within popular organizations as “participatory
exclusions”—“exclusions within seemingly participatory institutions.”
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villages permanently, ripping the fabric of century-old processes of community urban
development. Their settlements have narrow alleys latticed through century old bungalows
(trellised balconies, open porches, curling staircases, and sloping tiled roofs are all regular
architectural features) and are sometimes regarded as an aspect of Mumbai’s living heritage to be
preserved, though the sentiment rarely impedes “higher and best uses” practice by developers.
Like koliwada and adivasipada settlements, many East Indian gaothans are organized
through association and maintenance of village affairs to defend their right to live on their own
land, as well as to follow the customs and traditions they have been following for generations.
These self-organization and resistance histories galvanized the nascent people’s campaign and, at
crucial moments, helped mobilize thousands of community members to demonstrate the broad
and popular backing of the campaign’s demands.
A City Entangled by the State
The campaign was self-conscious in its “attempt to overcome various obstacles to [its] own
development in partnership with the powerholders,” as it stated in a campaign communiqué to its
members in 2013 (Hamara Shehar email, 2013). While it described the development plan process
as a “top down, secretive process,” Hamara Shehar also believed its struggles could push the
government toward a more democratic process of planning. The campaign even lauded the
MCGM’s openness to participation when the municipal government recognized the campaign’s
early demands for community consultation workshops.133
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The campaign wrote in September that “the Development Plan process – till now – has not been participatory; it
has been a perfect example of a top down, secretive process.” Hamara Shehar in its continuing struggle for a more
participatory and inclusive planning process appreciates the most recent undertaking by the Brihanmumbai
Municipal Corporation (MCGM) as a definite step in the right direction. In a first of its kind endeavor in the country
where urban planning is still primarily “expert”- driven and considered too technical an exercise to be opened up to
the public, the MCGM has organized several thematic consultations to gather public opinion directly pertaining to
the Development Plan under varied pertinent categories affecting the city. (Hamara Shehar campaign communiqué)
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The campaign had to grapple with the tendency for planning officials and other stateoriented experts to appropriate the citywide attempt at shaping the process of consultations and
informing the development process. Yet it proceeded with the assumption that only by allowing
itself to be entangled with the state would the process open up to more than experts. The
municipal commissioner, however, showed repeated disinterest in distinguishing elite and
ordinary “stakeholders.”134 The pressure that the individuals and groups comprising Hamara
Shehar placed on the state were instrumental in the formation of the process involving these
consultations in order to solicit “feedback from various stakeholders” as the Development Plan’s
Existing Land Use, Proposed Land Use, and Development Control Regulations were being
drafted, anchored by various NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) having a record
of working for ordinary citizen’s concerns. It was Hamara Shehar that pushed the consultative
process to be carried to each of the twenty-four administrative wards in the city where “people’s
representatives and common citizens” could understand the challenges at the ward level and
express their concerns.
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According to the MCGM, initial consultation meetings in June 2013 were “followed by thematic workshops
organized by the NGOs and professionals [starting in December 2013]. They also claimed that MCGM “meetings
with experts and all the wards” from late 2013 to early 2014 which were a result of its own mandate.” Municipal
Corporation of Greater Mumbai, “Greater Mumbai Draft Development Plan 2034: Executive Summary” released on
February 16 2015.
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Figure 12: Ward Map of Mumbai. Image Source: BMC Elections: BMC New Ward Maps, Ward Boundaries, New
MCGM Wards.

The campaign argued that there is a long history in Bombay of the majority of its residents not
even becoming aware of, and thereby claiming no ownership over, the development plans
intended for them. In this light, it’s beginning—although rudimentary and contradictory—
augured a positive step toward recognition of the importance of a differently conceived
participatory process. The success of these consultations lay in the actual participation of people
in large numbers. The campaign therefore relied heavily on the media to disseminate the
information, far and wide. But it also pressured the MCGM to take responsibility for notifying
the public of meetings and listing the schedule on its website.
On November 29, 2013, the MCGM held its first open public meeting for community
members to present their aspirations and grievances with the Development Plan process thus far.
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The MCGM published its Preparatory Studies Report one week earlier, which included valuable
data about the proposed spatial vision of the forthcoming Development Plan that was hitherto
unavailable.135 On November 29th, various civil society organizations, NGOs, CBOs, officials
and individuals gathered to voice “their ideas, aspirations and most evidently their fears”
(Rangwala 2013). The meeting concluded with a clear mandate for the MCGM to organize and
anchor various thematic, sector-wise consultations supported by various NGOs working on
specific issues.
The first consultative meeting of the “MCGM Workshops with Stakeholders for the
Revision of Development Plan for Mumbai 2014–2034” was held on December 17, 2013 and
focused on the issue of transportation. The second MCGM consultative meeting on January 7,
2014, debated the spatial implications of Development Control Regulations (DCRs), which were
crucial to the framework and implementation of development rights for the city. A third thematic
consultation called “education” proposed a set of technical recommendations by the city’s
architects in anticipation of both the DCR and Proposed Land Use Plan. Subsequent meetings
dealt with the environment and sustainable city, slum housing, and the urban form by
professional groups involved in these matters. Various social welfare groups working with the
poor in slums drafted five-point plans for making Mumbai slum-free through an integrated work
and life concept relying on slum redevelopment and affordable housing, as well as proposals to
give those working in the informal economy legal entitlements and jobs. These initiatives came
in response to “the Development Plan consultative exercise initiated by municipal commissioner
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The report is supposed to be a well-researched document that informs the creation of the Development Plan (DP).
It is one of the most important steps towards creating a well-informed Development Plan through detailed
information on the existing situation, possible growth scenarios over the next three decades and suggestions on
amenity/land provisions based on these projections.
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Sitaram Kunte to ensure maximum participation and consultations before finalizing the city’s
fate for the next 20 years.”136
Community-based organizations also hosted a series of meetings with members of social
movements in the city. A meeting on water issues was hosted by Pani Haq Samiti, which has
been organizing for public rights to water provision and against privatization over the course of
the previous decade. Feminist organizations hosted a gender workshop on January 20, 2014 to
pose the question of women’s labor, safety, and autonomy in the city as central to a popular
definition of urban development. Sanitation and the informal sector, which included trade unions,
street vendor (or hawker) associations, waste pickers associations and taxi/auto workers’
associations both met on January 21. Formal housing and physical infrastructure, health, and
finally, digital inclusion rounded out the thirteen thematic meetings that occurred over six weeks
from December 2013 to February 2014. The various perspectives on city development and the
mix of expertise and direct experience presented in these meetings were unprecedented in the
history of Mumbai’s development plan process.
One of the campaign’s criticisms of the Development Plan preparatory studies report was
its definition of “open space” and “natural areas.” Open space—specifically designed,
designated, and provided public space by city planning for use and recreation—is an important
index for how planners and municipalities prioritize and act to make the city more livable. At its
foundation, the question of open space is a clear articulation of the dispute over land use for
profit and land use for social reproduction, whether public or through existing commons.
“Natural areas” is a demarcation that spatially maps the city’s embeddedness in natural and
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“A public workshop [was] conducted on January 11 at the F-South office between 2pm and 6pm. Groups such as
Nivara Hakk Suraksha Samiti, CRH, Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action (YUVA), Slum Rehabilitation Society,
along with Tata Institute of Social Sciences, want the MCGM to publish a map of all slum-occupied land with areas
and population.” Clara Lewis, 2014. “NGOs draw plans to free Mumbai of slums,” Times of India, January 5, 2014
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ecological systems, its regulatory relationship to the region’s biodiversity and its fragile
ecosystems, and its understanding of the economic and cultural ways communities relate to
natural resources, for instance primary activity, which in the case of urban village communities
constitute their “commons” in distinction from public spaces.137 The reports have attempted to
include a series of natural areas such as swampy mangroves, mudflats, saltpans, nallahs (creeks),
rocky coastlines, and dense forests that are either largely unavailable to the public or inaccessible
through various exclusions (time, fee-based, membership, fenced, policed, suitable for certain
classes or lifestyle activities) into its open space calculations. Meanwhile, areas marked by the
MCGM as open spaces are in fact garbage dumps or other socially engaged (“encroached” upon)
spaces. Boat storage on beaches, fish drying, and plantations of Adivasi communities are
examples. These productive spaces and activities are as threatened by privatization as they are by
disingenuous municipal mapping of primary spaces as “public” or “open.” The campaign has
been among the only groups in the city to argue that these distinctions are important to maintain,
and that all three (natural spaces, open spaces, and commons) should be prioritized in the city’s
own understanding of itself as reflected in its spatial use and Development Plan.
While core members of Hamara Shehar seized on the opportunity to present diverse
perspectives on the Development Plan to the city government, the organizers also prepared a
strategy to reach communities with participatory workshops and presentations on ward-wise
planning issues in order to prepare the ground for consultations and the forthcoming
development proposals (Field notes, December 8, 2014). The campaign worked with
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Open space is simply calculated as total available gardens, parks, recreation grounds, and playgrounds per
person, an estimated 14 square km of open spaces for 12.4 million people according to Open Mumbai, it is ranked
among the lowest of all the world’s major metropolitan areas (the existing per capita open space of 1.1–1.24 square
meters per 1000 persons indicates an alarming shortfall of the nine meters prescribed by the World Health
Organization, or the 25 square meters in New York) and verifies the ubiquitous image of a teeming city population
living and breathing on top of one another).
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communities on the technical aspects of the planning process—translating, for instance, official
municipal documents to draw out the significance of ELU (Existing Land Use), PLUs (Proposed
Land Use), DCRs (Development Control Regulations) in the statistics, graphs, and technocratic
language used in the Development Plan documentation. Meanwhile, in its meetings and
campaign communiqués Hamara Shehar routinely relied on the popular imaginary of a shared
city, as well as a shared collective consciousness of belonging, and a citywide entitlement to the
decision making processes that would steer its future.138 For instance, one evening on December
13, 2014, Hamara Shehar Mumbai convened a campaign meeting in an open space between a
maze of alleys deep inside a slum community in the P/N ward. Members hung a banner outside
of a shack on the side of atrium where people gathered to hear speakers. As the banner flapped in
the wind under darkening skies, its painted message—a poem by Urdu poet Sahir Ludhianavi—
was unwavering in its call for a collective world-making populist aspiration:
“When we labourers demand our share of this world,
not just an orchard,
not merely a field,
we will demand the entire world.”
Thus, while part of the campaign’s strategy focused on presenting a “people’s” perspective to the
state, the campaign also launched a parallel process of raising awareness and formulating
community-based perspectives on a collective vision of the city.139

The Port Evictions and the Fracturing of Solidarity
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For instance, Hamara Shehar’s rallying cries during those weeks of consultative meetings typically made the
following appeals: “As a campaign we must come together in the coming days to demand our share of the city over
the next twenty years!” (Field notes, February 19, 2015).
139
On March 25 and 26, 2014, YUVA hosted the National Symposium on Urban Planning and Governance (the
theme was ‘Towards Inclusive and Equitable Cities’, an urban forum to share both experiences and to facilitate more
debate. At the meeting, city officials, professionals, and certain mobilized communities encountered one another on
a highly uneven terrain of urban knowledge and urban experience.
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While the campaign was envisioning a more equitable future Mumbai, the city and state
governments, meanwhile, were not only deliberating on the changes to come; they were actively
clearing the way. From January 8 to 9, 2015, authorities demolished 150 homes and warehouses
on Mumbai Port land at Powder Bundar, where five thousand people worked in informal trades
and daily contract work of shipbreaking, warehousing and scrapping at Mazagaon docks. Though
the demolitions were an official action called for by Union Minister for Transport, Highways and
Shipping Nitin Gadkari, involving Maharashtra State Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis and
Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT) officials, only one Marathi newspaper covered it. One of the Hamara
Shehar campaign members (referred to as saathis, or comrades) who was working with the Port
laboring communities went with people from Powder Bunder to meet a lawyer to obtain a stay
order on the eviction. While Hamara Shehar had direct connections to individuals and groups
across the city, its core members could not mobilize them quickly in a direct demonstration of
solidarity for eviction defense. Rather, the campaign appealed to those who have been
participating in planning and development discussions in light of the Development Plan via
emails and phone calls to come forward merely to offer any support and advice. At the same
time, they called for an urgent in-person meeting the next day to discuss the future steps of the
campaign in the light of the demolitions at the Port land.
In Mumbai, the demolition of informal settlements is a frequent and strategic action on
the part of government authorities, and the Port Trust eviction was no exception. The Mumbai
Port Trust constitutes approximately one-eighth of the area of the city, including a 28-kilometer
coastline. It is government-held public land. Though formally outside of the city’s development
plan, a Mumbai Port Land Development Committee (MPLDC) has drawn plans for a “vision for
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the future development of the eastern water front.”140 These redevelopment plans were largely
revealed to the public in celebratory news clips, which presented the plans as in the larger public
interest. It includes a consolidated five hundred acres to the south of Mazagaon for port
activities, and a new transition corridor billed as “an international-class promenade, a marina, a
floating hotel and restaurant, water sports facilities, jetties and a Ferris Wheel along the lines of
the London Eye.” It was also designed to include a special trade zone, a world-class cruise
terminal, and three one-hundred story buildings (Field notes, February 18, 2015).141
According to authorities, a Special Planning Authority (SPA) with powers to appropriate
and develop the land would be established to oversee the work. Under the Maharashtra Regional
and Town Planning Act, an SPA replaces an elected local authority such as the MCGM as the
new development control authority, wresting control from democratic institutions and giving the
unelected bureaucrats the power to acquire land in a notified area for the purpose of
development, to formulate policies regarding land use and zoning, and to tax and levy charges,
among other powers. For residents, the problem of special planning authorities was not only an
issue at the port; nearly 10 percent of the total land area of Greater Mumbai was already under
SPAs and therefore beyond the reach of the MCGM’s planning jurisdiction.
Following the demolitions, Hamara Shehar organized meetings on December 30, 2014
“to get local residents to voice their concerns and speak about their aspirations as rightful
stakeholders in the development process” of the Port. They were clear that the redevelopment
proposals did not reflect the “real needs” of the people of Mumbai—neither the working-class
populations dependent on the port lands, nor the majority of the city’s existing inhabitants, who
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The Mumbai Port Land Development Committee (MPLDC) was established by Gadkari in June 2014 and led by
former MbPT chairman Rani Jadha.
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Manthan K Mehta, “Gadkari to seek state help to evict all encroachers from port land,” Times of India, January 7,
2015
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were demanding affordable housing. While several members of the campaign voiced concerns
that the “affordable housing” discourse obscured the right to housing as a political demand and
replaced it with one based on market delivery, Hamara Shehar nonetheless began working in this
period with other housing NGOs that used the affordable housing framework.
A January 2015 meeting brought the campaign together with unions and community
groups, composed of several slum dweller associations, social workers, and youth, such as the
Nivara Hakk Suraksha Samiti (Housing Rights Security Committee), and Dharavi Bachao
Andolan (Save Dharavi Movement). Veteran millworker trade unionists such as Datta Iswalka of
the Girni Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti (GKSS) union attended, suggesting that the issues of
housing and labor, long the “red threads” of class struggle in the city, might formally entwine in
contemporary ongoing citywide campaigns. But representatives of the port trust union were also
in attendance at the meeting, even though its workers had just recently presided over the
emergency evictions that befell port workers, dabawalla union members (food delivery), and
informal workers associations. The port union issued a statement that the port trust should only
deliberate over issues related to the port, not housing or informal work. Some of Hamara
Shehar’s core members were furious at the port union’s cooptation of solidarity between housing
and labor (Field notes, January 16, 2015). The implications of this statement for a small
campaign ambitiously trying to organize a mass-based city struggle were especially deflating in a
city where labor struggles had such an enormous historical claim, yet current workers’
organizations did not seem to have a view of the city beyond their workplaces. As one member
of Hamara Shehar put it, “unions hardly talk about the city; NGOs are quite clueless about cities
too.”
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Participatory Patience
What is the mood of planning? What do people feel or think about it? Why does the city feel this
way—both electric and alive, and also hardwired into demobilizing relations of control and
intolerance wrought by the existing power structures and institutions? What does it mean to
allow these lines to be drawn across the shared city? A Development Plan for the city is a
collective space of discussion in which a city’s inhabitants may ask, “what is going to happen
next?” What then does it mean when the process of negotiating the city’s future is simultaneously
participatory and dismissive of people’s knowledges, desires, and wills?142
The Hamara Shehar campaign mobilized communities tirelessly to demand that their
value to the planning process be recognized and their contributions incorporated. Their emphasis
on an equitable and community-based planning approach certainly draws on a varied tradition of
radical planning that emphasizes decentralization, popular control, and even decolonization
(Friedman 1987).143 In their interactions with officials and state agencies, the campaign seemed
to take a determined but conventional approach. By making demands at every stage of the
development planning process on the MCGM, the campaign was simply calling for a basic
principle of planning: begin from what exists.
“The campaign has continuously demanded for informal settlements and informal work spaces to be
included in the revised Development Plan. The MCGM had also promised to map koliwadas, gaothans and
adivasipadas. We continue to demand that the needs of the common man been taken into cognizance.
Demands have been put forth at the various stages of preparation - the people’s vision document, people’s
plans, collated demands of the thematic consultations held in January 2014 have all been submitted to
concerned officials. (Hamara Shehar Mumbai, February 15, 2015)
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Field notes, October 2014
As Friedmann lays out, the concept of radical planning is “performed largely at the political base of social
movements in local communities, involving relatively small numbers of participants but with a view beyond their
local sphere of action to the larger structural changes that must be accomplished on a wider scale.” (2011: 61)
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Both workers within the informal urban economy and the producers within the urban
commons—the koliwadas, gaothans and adivasipadas, among others—are often excluded from a
series of narratives of the global developing city; its spatial transformation at the hands of
capitalist development, its contested cosmopolitanism, the mutations of its urban modernity. This
erasure—enacted both on bureaucratic maps and through violent demolitions—is what the
campaign sought to redress. Through the campaign, these laboring perspectives of commoners
and informal workers formed a platform for rethinking planning, and challenging and
supplanting established neoliberal urban policy and governance frameworks. The campaign also
attempted to shift public discourse away from neoliberal logics and assumptions—which
promotes the perception of the inevitability of existing and ongoing social inequality and spatial
differentiation—in order to imagine, narrate, and enact a vision of the shared city and world
through the recognition of the urban commons and a true valuation of informal work.
After four years and three official extensions of deadlines, news of the late-breaking
proposed land use maps (PLU) finally came through the English-language media on February 16,
2015. The Hamara Shehar campaign spoke with Development Plan officials, who stated that
municipal commissioner Sitaram Kunte had already presented the PLU to Mayor Snehal
Ambekar and other Shiv Sena party leaders, and that the plans would be discussed with heads of
MCGM departments in the coming days. After that, the PLUs would be available in a month’s
time for public suggestions and objections. The campaign immediately demanded that the
MCGM “take into consideration the extensive participation process initiated at the city and ward
level.” If the MR&TP Act granted an extension by two years to the city officials to prepare the
Development Plan, they argued, then it should also extend the period of suggestion/objection
from the public.

191

Hamara Shehar called for a meeting a few days later at the YUVA Office at Tilak Nagar
to synthesize an understanding of recent events in the development plan process and, as the
invitation described “to prepare ourselves for constructive engagement to defend our right to the
city.”144 The campaign encouraged these technical documents to be read as widely as possible, to
“assess the plan, and what it means for us and our city.” Members of Hamara Shehar met with
the Commissioner Sitaram Kunte on February 25 to once again relay key demands regarding the
recent developments in the draft Development Plan. The meeting was attended by more than
forty individual members of the citywide campaign representing gaothans, koliwadas,
aadivasipadas, women’s groups, hawkers, slum residents, homeless and various citizens groups.
It was in this meeting that the commissioner agreed to additional community consultations on
certain themes as well as administrative ward-level consultations on the draft Development Plan.
The campaign also pressed for consultations on the Aarey land and Coastal Road in
addition to inclusion of slums, hawkers, urban villages, social amenities, Integrated Coastal Zone
Management Plan, homeless, Mumbai Port Trust land. These different areas concerning the
Development Plan had long been discrete terrains of struggle for the campaign. The campaign
seemed willing to pursue every single one on principle and conviction, despite the state’s dismal
record of accounting for them. In what could be seen as an invitation to the table, at that meeting,
municipal commissioner Kunte asked the dozens of Hamara Shehar members present to state the
kind of interaction they wanted on these issues and requested the campaign provide a list of
issues to be discussed at the forthcoming thematic consultations.
The campaign was successful in getting the thirty-day public comment period extended to
sixty days: the deadline for objections and suggestions was now April 24, 2015. The additional
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Campaign communiqué in advance of the meeting on February 19, 2015 stated, “We are right now in the process
of studying the document and by evening we shall share to everyone the major points in the summary.”
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time negotiated would allow Hamara Shehar to inform and mobilize the city about the
significance of the Development Plan and the popular demand to shape it. After this brief
feedback period, a nine-member official committee would be appointed to address the objectives
and comment on the basis of their decision with regard to objectives. With the changes proposed,
a new Development Plan would be presented to the Municipal House, where it would be debated
for fifteen working days.

Popular determination
On March 10, 2015, the Marathi language newspaper Lokmat reported the MCGM’s intention to
host workshops to “explain the Development Plan better”—one of the campaign’s core demands
at the meeting with the municipal commissioner (and replicated at the ward level). The campaign
met to discuss the way forward. They decided to host a series of “pre-consultation” workshops to
discuss the implications of the Development Plan. As a campaign announcement stated to its
members, “there is no mention of the concerns of the working class in the city in the draft DP.”145
For ten days in March, the campaign organized “preparatory” education workshops in the
spirit of pedagogy of the oppressed, to read the maps and discuss the issues arising from the
proposed land use from the city’s diverse popular and working-class perspectives. With
community representatives and groups deliberating on the city’s planning needs from the range
of perspectives, each of which was designated a separate workshop, the campaign collectively
formulated a comprehensive planning vision on the following points: slums and habitat; informal
livelihoods, adivasipadas, gaothans, koliwadas; the Bombay Port Trust; social and physical
infrastructure; environment and open spaces; affordable housing; and gender. These workshops
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Communiqué dated February 25, 2015.
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brought communities together to compile detailed suggestions and objections and to prepare for
MCGM Stakeholder consultations, “if and when they happen.” The workshops also provided a
recap of the process (which at times seemed technical, focused on objections and proposals as
opposed to visions and demands), and included campaign recommendations made at the thematic
workshops, an explanation of recommendations of the draft Development Plan relevant to the
sector and preliminary critique (PLU / DCRs), and explanation of the process of suggestions and
objections and time-frame. They also featured map reading with communities and discussion and
summarizing points to be raised.
Popular education and collective inquiry about the Development Plan continued to take
place over a series of lengthy public meetings that on occasion started with song. At times, less
than a dozen would huddle over desks in a cramped office at Tata Institute for Social Science,
other meetings filled the rooms of borrowed union halls, or in the shared village halls of
koliwadas, tenements, and other community spaces. During this time, the core campaign
members seemed limitless in their energies. It was a crucial time for the campaign, and members’
energies reflected neither optimism nor pessimism but pure determination. In addition to
community gatherings and the work it did to speak directly to the masses of the city to shape
public opinion, Hamara Shehar willingly participated and facilitated gatherings with planners
and other urban professionals about the Development Plan.
One such meeting was the “Preparatory Workshop on Adivasipadas / Gaothans /
Koliwadas,” held on March 15, 2015, in a small office in an NGO called Apnalaya in a
deteriorating SRA Housing building near Tardeo Police Station. Approximately twenty-five
people were in attendance, mostly men. More came in later, about three hours into the meeting,
perhaps totaling over thirty. The campaign has been meeting with these communities in their
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homes and in the few open spaces available in their villages for years. Since the end of 2013,
they have also been ensuring the Kolis participate in consultations with various groups that
would be affected by the proposed Development Plan. The campaign’s major work in identifying
the needs of commoners in Mumbai has been to facilitate meetings with members of various
Gaothan, Koliwada, and Adivasipada communities.146
After collectively reading through provisions for urban villages in the draft Development
Plan and DCRs, maps were explained. Hamara Shehar campaign members offered a summary
and explanation of how the Development Plan will affect coastal roads, no development zones,
etc. The campaign facilitated inquiry with communities, using their own experiences as
university researchers and teachers to do what NGO staff activists often do not: that is, move
beyond summary and slogan and, in small ways, change the relations of understanding within
communities through co-research. In these meetings, there were often bouts of many people
talking at once, asking questions, making clarifications or raising points. The format was not
always about listening to presenters and following along on the projected slides. Residents of
gaothans pulled out a large map and studied it. The attendees seem to have done a certain amount
of homework before the meeting. One had a letter of objection typed up on letterhead. They
arrived at a plan of action including ten core objections. A campaign member explained technical
points from the proposed Development Plan with respect to the reconstruction and
redevelopment of goathaon areas. It was a humble experiment in pedagogical democracy: lifting
the issues out from behind their technical veil and laying them before these marginalized
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E.g. January 18, 2014 at Kamla Raheja Vidyanidhi Institute of Architecture (KRVIA). HSVN organized a series
of nine Preparatory Workshops between March 12 to 26 2015 to explore a number of pressing themes and issues
surrounding the draft Development Plan with various communities who will be most affected by its implementation
as well as key resource persons and groups.
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communities for discussion and deliberation. A shared commitment to collective action, humble
and considerate, emerged (Field notes, March 15, 2015).
Another such meeting that brought together a number of professional planners critical of
the municipal government’s handling of the Development Plan took place at Studio-X, a cultural
venue concerned with architecture and urban design issues, on March 19, 2015. As the invitation
for this “informal gathering of experts” indicated, the meeting was intended to “provide
coordinated resistance among various groups in the city and a positive review and support for a
way forward in envisioning an equitable strategy for Mumbai’s urban development.” Participants
were invited as experts who were actively involved in some resistance to the Development Plan.
While there was much shared in terms of nuanced analysis, the strategic tenor of the moment
remained a point of debate. One participant, Sheela Patel said, “We’ve talked about several
powerful issues. But we haven’t given people any hope that they can do anything about this. We
need to demonstrate what can be done from below. If we stop this [the development plan], there
should be something from below that can push things forward. As intermediaries, we have to
take this up” (Field notes, March 19, 2015). Hamara Shehar core campaign member and veteran
community organizer Sitaram Shelar then pivoted the conversation and refocused on the
campaign’s concern for the masses: “many communities are ready to take this up, not just slum
communities, rickshaw drivers’ union, hawkers’ unions, and so on. But political parties, such as
Shiv Sena, will be getting interested in the Development Plan for their own purposes too. So we
may have strange fellows in the campaign. We have to be a bit careful, even as solutions coming
from above may be good.” This analysis reflects the campaign’s understanding of the
heterogeneity of official and elite planning interests, as well as its strategy of engaging with the
state while also attempting to working autonomously from within communities. The campaign,
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as it continuously articulated, was determined to create a mass-based movement for a popular
plan for the city “from below.” The need to be “careful” that Shelar refers to speaks to the
challenges of prioritizing the experiences and desires of the most marginalized communities in
the city despite the power and authority of experts, professionals, and city officials.
By the spring of 2015, controversy ballooned around the draft Development Plan. Various
populist responses to the plan had been going on for three years, punctuated by mass
demonstrations and public appeals. After such extensive expert and citizen’s feedback, and after
such delay, many in these meetings and in the city’s streets and neighborhoods wondered how
the planning process could be so error-ridden. One explanation came from a participant in the
March 19 meeting who stated, “The institution, on a day to day level, does not have the capacity.
So it has no business putting together such a plan. It is insulting to all of those who have been
working hard to understand these issues.” In campaign meetings and the daily newspaper
editorial pages, it appeared that sentiments were shifting from frustration toward apathy. What
would the point be of planning for the next twenty years if the plan itself so grossly misestimated
present realities—spatially, culturally, and economically?
The technocratic nature of the documents, the planning parlance employed, and the rule
of experts that made only slight gestures toward people’s input created an air of despondency in
the meeting halls of the campaign. “There are needs that continue to go unfulfilled. You don’t
need a Development Plan to tell you that things are not changing. The Development Plan is like a
Trojan horse. We do not know what they want from it. It may be used to occupy us while they
move ahead with their own plans. Nobody gives a damn about what 2034 looks like. The
document is a distraction.”147 The notion that the Development Plan was a distraction from the
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city’s “real” intentions that cannot yet be fathomed (except by following the chain of demolitions
and evictions) speaks to the exclusionary and alienating nature of governance and planning in
Mumbai. It also suggests how the concept of a shared future can be robbed of its power and
potential by the juggernaut of development. Exhaustion at the prospect of an alienated future is a
challenging condition from which to mobilize in a city known for its ceaseless energies. The
MCGM seemed to have made up its mind and it would not listen to citizen’s concerns. As one
member said, “Everyone seems to be frustrated with the pace of things, rather than the
direction.” (Field notes, January 16, 2015). A small but growing consensus held that nothing
more could be done at that point but start from scratch. Galvanized by these sentiments, the
UDRI built a website called “Dump the DP”—a far cry from UDRI’s early, enthusiastic efforts to
engage with the Development Plan process.
In this midst of this sense of despair, Sitaram Shelar reminded people how the “people’s
planning” process had arisen organically from the contributions of a multiplicity of experiences
in the early days of the unprecedented organizing around the Development Plan. “We need to go
back to 2010–2011 to understand what is happening now with the Development Plan. There were
109 organizations working on various issues (child-rights issues, women, youth, disability,
hawkers, naka workers, formal and formal housing, etc.). We thought, ‘the corporation is
building its own visions and objectives on the Plan for Mumbai, so why shouldn’t the people
also?’” (Field notes, April 2015). The MCGM made quite a show of its inclusion of consultation
workshops, but the corporation never actually answered the communities’ suggestions. “That is
because a certain mandate is locked in place,” another participant in that March 19 meeting
stated. “Their mandate must be changed; currently it is the mandate of the market.”

198

In fact, at the same time the Government of Maharashtra was ignoring residents’
comments, it was simultaneously holding consultations with the city’s developers and real estate
speculators—at least six by March 2015—where the profiteers squabbled over what the city’s
Development Plan would mean for their bottom line. One such meeting was organized by the
Practicing Engineers, Architects, and Urban Planners Association (PEATA) and entitled “Unlock
Draft Development Plan DC Regulation.” A packed auditorium of hundreds of builders and
developers turned up to see what the new DCR meant for their profit margins. The room’s aisled
periphery was bulging, and at the threshold of the side entrance people thronged, trying to get in
or just peak in. The agitated knot of people at the door—and this was the case at each of the
doors in the auditorium—seemed to adapt to the scene as they would a crowded commuter train,
perfectly happy to stand bunched together and listen to the proceedings inside, certain they
would arrive at their destination en masse. A builder’s dream of progress is certainly a moving
train. Though the Development Plan was already so builder friendly, the audience offered a
chorus of hoots and hisses each time presenters read from the new DCR and interpreted what it
might mean for their earnings, sometimes collectively raising or lowering their thumbs.148 Soon,
however, other demonstrations of discontent from the city’s margins would drown out the
builders’ chorus of whimpers.
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CHAPTER 6
Countermunicipal Cartographies:
Alternative Ecological, Indigenous and Commons Visions of the Collective City

On April 18, 2015, tens of thousands of people from across the city marched to Azad Maidan in
the scorching heat to register their anger at the city’s Development Plan. The mass yatra
(procession) of slum dwellers, fisherfolk, adivasis, hawkers and other workers gathered for
morcha (protest) in the open field across from the municipal headquarters, where people listed
core demands and issues in the draft Development Plan. The mass then proceeded to flood the
offices of Municipal Corporation headquarters to submit individual suggestion/objection letters.
Confronted by a never-ending queue of citizens outside the MCGM Head Office that reached
Cama Hospital, the MCGM was forced to set up additional “dispatch” desks (five of which were
set up outside the head office on the sidewalk). The campaign estimated that around fifty
thousand suggestion objection letters to the draft Development Plan from different wards and
different issues were submitted on this day alone.149 The outpouring of such public objection was
a municipal record in itself. More than ever, Hamara Shehar was seemed poised to, in its own
words, “stake a claim to our right to this city.”150
Mired in the thickest controversy it ever faced during the Suggestions and Objections
process, the MCGM appointed former bureaucrat Ramanath Jha as an Officer of Special
Deputation (OSD) to oversee the revision of the city’s new Development Plan (DP) on May 14,
2015. Jha was brought on specifically to help review the suggestions and objections and oversee
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Field notes, April 14, 19 2015.
“The campaign has been the collective effort of so many groups and individuals. We are all hoping tomorrows
event will be one that will stake a claim to our right to this city.” (Field notes, April 17, 2015).
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the revision process.151 After having sacked the two private consulting firms that played a critical
role in drafting Mumbai’s error-ridden Development Plan, the MCGM decided to form a panel of
experts to help revamp the project. Responding to the fact that there were, by official estimates,
over thirty thousand objections and suggestions submitted to the MCGM, Jha poured vitriol on
the idea that so many people would interject in the process. “People like Hamara Shehar got a
bunch of slum dwellers and they have done a Xerox copy of suggestion and objection letters—I
don’t believe it,” he reportedly commented during a meeting attended by some of Hamara
Shehar’s core organizers. Members relayed the affront to others in the core group as they
assessed the opportunity of working with the special officer appointed to “streamline” the
process. “Jha speaks like a Brahmin, he shows his caste in such comments,” said one member.152
Nonetheless, Hamara Shehar called for a meeting with Jha at the end of May in which
organizers attempted to delineate “what the review process should entail” and “a demand for a
monthly update on the process” during the four-month period for revision.153 Organizers held a
campaign meeting to discuss how to prepare for what seemed to be a coming showdown over the
next three months, during which negotiations with the city government were pitched more often
on the contested grounds of the city’s informal settlements than in the officials’ air-conditioned
municipal offices.154
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Ramanath Jha To Oversee Revision Of New Development Plan, Mumbai Mirror, Thursday, May 14 2015.
“Jha’s inputs will be of great value in revising within the four-month period that is given by the state government.
Jha can take the help of any experts and urban planners to help in the Development Plan revision too,” the official
added. Jha has a lot of experience and expertise in town planning and policy making,” said an official. Jha has been
heading the All India Institute of Local Self Governance. An IAS officer, Jha served as the Metropolitan
Commissioner in the MMRDA in 1998 and has also worked as the Municipal Commissioner in Pune in 1995.
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“Kardi jha ne Brahman wali baat. Dikha di apni jaat.” Fieldnotes, discussion in core group communications,
May 21, 2015.
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Field notes, May 31, 2015. Op cit. field notes, April 22, 2015
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The agenda for that meeting on May 6, 2015 included: the need to reach out to more people (some means
identified were media, meetings, etc.); to look out for new partners and friends, and yet to keep the existing network
strong; and to focus on new developments like CZMP, Maharashtra housing policy, etc.; to meet the Municipal
Commissioner and urgently convey demands from the four months of Development Plan revision; to strategize for
holding public awareness drives and to kick start a three-month campaign starting June 2015.
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Monsoon struggles
On June 4, 2015, forest officers, forest and local police, MCGM officials, and bulldozers arrived
at informal settlements in Malvani, in the northern suburb of Malad, and demolished an entire
settlement of more than 650 households. Most of those displaced had been living in the
settlement since before 1995, though they lacked the electricity bills or birth certifications that
would allow for recognized status and right of settlement. After twenty years of residency,
families were evicted in a single morning. Only a few were given the 24-hour notice mandated
by the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act (1971). The Forest Department claimed these homes were
encroaching on mangrove land under state ownership (though only some parts of the entire
settlement were on mangrove land), and said the demolitions were necessary for the
environmental protection of the mangroves. Not two days later, the Maharasthra government’s
proposal to build a coastal road, which would destroy enormous mangrove lands elsewhere in the
city, was approved by India’s central government.
Hamara Shehar, and other urban activists seasoned in the housing movement as well as
experienced in eviction defense, such as Ghar Banao Ghar Bachao (GBGB, Build Homes,
Defend Homes), knew all too well that municipal and state departments often hid behind
deceitful arguments, deliberately evaded responsibility, and made false promises. As Hamara
Shehar member Hussain Indorewala expressed unequivocally, the “protection of the environment
does not come in the way of large infrastructure projects like the coastal road, but seems to be a
hurdle whenever housing rights of the poor are involved.”155 The forms of neocolonial violence
of the Indian state here toward its own populations is a routine part of the juggernaut of savage
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Quoted in Amitra Bhattacharya, “In Housing rights struggle, monsoons are just a blip,” The Stateman, June 11,
2015.
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developmentalism. The implementation of authoritarianism, the bureaucratic dimensions and the
calculated callousness, along with the sudden and cyclical forms of violence, are also basic
features of this form of development. Yet in the face of it, communities most vulnerable to the
form of development that the state unfurls often remain entrapped, in their strategies and tactics,
by a desperate and ultimately liberal notion that all that they can demand of the state is that it
operates legally when all evidence and experience suggest the state is, in fact, designed to do
otherwise.
The juggernaut developmentalism of the state includes using existing regulations such as
the protection of mangroves against slum dwellers fighting for tenure and regularization. Two
other illegal evictions by the Forest Department displaced around seven hundred families after
April 23 in Cheeta Camp and eight hundred in Bheemchhaya, Vikroli, Kannamwar Nagar in the
first week of May 2016. In a statement by Ghar Bachao Ghar Banao on the demolitions, the
group refers to the duplicitous use of legal statues meant to protect both the lives of those who
have settled in forest areas and the ecological protections.156 These same regulations are not used
to protect mangroves in other instances nor are they the basis of a larger directive to protect
mangroves, for instance, on Carter Road, by implementing more capacious sanitation measures
across the city. Moreover, they communicate to slum dwellers, and the city at large, that these
regulations are not to be used for what they are intended, but rather for the maintenance of a
powerful legal and extralegal system of land and resource acquisition that stretches across the
city. Here, the state’s defense of “ecology” is a defense of its land sovereignty and the rule of
property, whose operations routinely render peoples’ housing and livelihoods criminal.
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“Ten years after passing the order [a Bombay High Court order regarding protection of mangroves in Mumbai
and Navi Mumbai in the year 2005], the forest department suddenly started evicting slums near the mangrove areas
in complete violation of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, which contains a full procedure of settlement of rights of the
people living in forest areas.” (GBGB statement, April 19, 2016)
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Elsewhere, in the case of the coastal road, private transportation seems to matter more than the
ecological integrity of the mangroves.
Moreover, the Indian Forest Act has been used to attack those who seek their living in the
forests of India, whether in major metropoles or in the countryside. While the significance of the
spatial politics of zoning and planning is evident in categorically determining the uses of space
(what “is” and what “is not” in order), the governance mechanisms of informality are often
obscured behind the idea of “rule of law.” This unequal application of the law has profound
consequences for how people mobilize land and other resources given their own informality (of
tenure, services, etc) and how the state acts formally and informally (selectively misapplying its
laws) to acquire land and resources. By appealing to regulations as stipulated, e.g. a full
procedure of settlement of rights of the people living in forest areas, communities in resistance
communicate a double articulation of the limitations of their politics; on the one hand, their
struggle is within the state, defined by moral claims for inclusion and representation. These
politics accept the state’s legal framework as a functional basis of justice despite all evidence to
the contrary. On the other hand, their struggle is against the existing state, which recognizes the
disjuncture between the state’s self-representation and its reality, challenging the state to uphold
its own stipulated frameworks for governing by obeying the communities’ directives and actions
that in fact rely on the liberal functions of the state.
Yet this framework does not account fully for the nature of revenge and deceit in
Mumbai’s development politics. Not incidentally, the residents of the Malvani settlements
devastated by demolitions had been participating in an alternative Development Plan process
facilitated by the Hamara Shehar campaign since December 2013. The campaign and area
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residents held numerous community meetings to discuss existing amenities and services in the
area, residents’ needs and expectations, and the community’s proposed land use.

Figure 13: Slum demolitions in Malvani. Photo by author.
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A campaign member and activist explained the model in Malvani, where a people’s
development process was part of the larger Hamara Shehar campaign:
For Malvani, we are proposing a ‘no-developer’ model—or a ‘cooperative self-build’
model, where residents come together and create a small co-op (at the most about 75
families) and pool in their own money to raise a loan to finance their development. The
guidelines for building heights will be low enough for homes to remain affordable, and
setbacks will ensure adequate open areas and amenities—some of which they run
themselves (like community halls, reading rooms, etc) or hand over the municipal
government (to run clinics, preschools, etc). Unlike other developments, if a community
does not want to develop, they are free to continue living in their present homes, or go for
minor improvement and upgradation measures. All of the land in Malvani will be
effectively an affordable housing zone—there is no question of inclusionary zoning, since
there is no exclusion. (Interview, June 19, 2014)
The result of these discussions was a document entitled the Malvani People’s Plan. The
municipal government was well aware that people in Malvani were asserting their right to
housing and proposing development of their areas. Their plans had been twice submitted to the
MCGM for approval as part of a wider city plan. During ward consultations in September 2014,
members of Hamara Shehar handed a printed and bound copy of the Malvani People’s Plan
directly to the corporation’s town planner, Dinesh Naik. In January 2015, the report was again
submitted to city officials by Hamara Shehar members, this time handed directly to municipal
commissioner Sitaran Kunte. During the subsequent evictions, some of those same Hamara
Shehar members were detained by the police, along with five women from the settlements who
were trying to save their homes from demolition.157 As such, the demolished settlements sent a
strong retaliatory message to informal communities across the city that they were neither to be
accounted for as part of the city’s official Development Plan, nor would they be allowed to create
their own alternative Development Plans.
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“Five women from the area who attempted to save their homes were arrested by the police and an FIR has been
lodged against them. This was the second demolition in the Malad suburb since last week” (Field notes, June 4,
2015).
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Juggernaut developmentalism is a war machine that traverses the terrain of community
life, rendering it informal through the state’s dispossessions and its own illegal operations. That
same week, on the eastern suburb of Mandala, landless families launched what they called Awas
Haq Satyagraha (People’s Voice Rights Truth Force) and occupied 55 hectares of land (135
acres) on the edge of the mangroves. Nearly 1,500 slum dwellers who had been evicted ten years
earlier during the massive citywide demolitions of 2004–2005 (the wave of demolitions
accompanied the inauguration of Mumbai’s Global City initiative) returned to the dusty and
barren lands they long ago settled. Some sat in the exact location where their homes once stood
ten years ago. Others began drawing chalk lines and planned to start building again. More than a
decade had passed in waiting, after court rulings favored their resettlement, after officials assured
the right to return of the three thousand families that lost their homes.
Activists from Ghar Banao Ghar Bachao (GBGB, Build Homes, Defend Homes)
including the prominent activist Medha Patkar, accompanied them. Their only demand was to be
recognized and allowed to build their own (kuchcha) home and be provided basic amenities
pending fuller incorporation into a housing plan. This cycle of informal land struggle suggests
the role of collective memory and place-making among the poor, who for ten years after the state
demolished their homes, have remained determined in their state of displacement and have
mobilized various instances of community self-organization in the face of state indifference.
Their memories trace many other cycles of land struggles in the city, but their cyclical nature
also point to the limits of engaging with the state for the right to basic housing and amenities on
the terrain of informal land tenure.
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Figure 14: Slum dwellers demonstrate at municipal offices. Photo by author.

The scholarly attention paid to land grabbing in the city in the contemporary period has
highlighted the economic and political process of dispossession and the accumulation of land and
other assets, yet has done little to understand the nature and the history of what kinds of relations
are being dispossessed. Mumbai’s landscape is indeed changing rapidly through special forms of
enclosure and thereby rapidly reorganizing the basis of resource dependency in the urban
economy. These have largely worked through legal and extralegal channels, and can be
described as a form of urban informality enacted through a form of exception. Yet the ways in
which scholars have understood the neoliberal moment in Mumbai through the lens of
“accumulation by dispossession” has partially obscured the political orientations and possibilities
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of various social strata who lie at the threshold of the state’s laws and regulations and whose
laboring practices do not fit in the “phantasmagoria of city-ness” ascribed to cosmopolitan cities
like Mumbai (Robinson 2004: 570, quoted in Parthasarathy 2011: 55). For the city’s commoners
this brings questions of organization and governance, rules of use and access (e.g. during
hunting, gathering, and foraging), to discourses about urban life that are otherwise limited to
public and private spatial concepts, while simultaneously opening to these questions larger
modes of economic production and spatial production.158
As Baviskar reminds us, “public” is a juridical category; and therefore also a terrain of
struggle that, while often construed on the subjective terrain of the citizen and the individual, is
ultimately about shared control of resources by communities. Most often, community land use
and the commons in Mumbai imply a conversion of physical geographies (forests, mangroves,
coastal zones, lakes, the sea), from private or government territories, into a manner of laboring
and living that enables individual and, in certain cases, community access, contribution, and
maintenance of a common resource.

“Firefighting informality”
The recent municipalist campaign Hamara Shehar and the decade older housing rights group
Ghar Banao Ghar Bachao, the two leading land-based social movements in the city, share a
terrain of struggle on the uneven landscapes produced by juggernaut developmentalism. Yet they
offer different lessons about the significance of building popular urban movements in the context
of pervasive informality. GBGB’s strategies involved building popular power through direct
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Awareness of the urban commons also “reflect ways in which middle-class and elite consumption, forms of urban
governance, modes of capital accumulation, infrastructure growth, regional capital and population flows, and
political conflicts and mobilisation facilitate or promote specific resource dependencies and their spatial outcomes
for the city.” (Parthasarathy 2011: 60)
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action, land-based actions of defense and reclamation while also exposing the informality of the
“state-developer nexus” by exposing land scams through the use of RTIs. The direct actions that
accompany the production of knowledge in its campaigns have delivered material gains to the
displaced and evicted of Mumbai. However, the cycle of redevelopment that is central to
juggernaut developmentalism has proved extremely difficult to break. As one of its veteran
organizers Simpreet Singh commented, “after ten years of participating in Ghar Banao Ghar
Bachao and trying to stop slum evictions, it feels like firefighting. You may put one out, but there
is always another” (Simpreet Singh, interview June 9, 2013). Hamara Shehar offer the valuable
lesson that there are myriad interconnections between experiences of informality, and building
popular power to confront informality requires establishing the connections between housing and
other aspects of informal life in the city, from infrastructural issues such as water, to
transportation; and to connect to communities differently affected by a general production of
informality, such as street vendors, fisherfolk, adivasis, gaothans, etc. Indeed, a municipalist
framework that can facilitate the mobilization of a shared spatial consciousness of
developmentalism proves essential to address the systemic nature of developmentalism.
In Chatterjee’s (2004) formulation of the politics of the governed, slum dwellers mobilize
with whatever tactics may enable them to secure land rights, amenities, etc. directly from the
Controller or municipal official. In struggles against informality, according to Chatterjee’s
analysis of the functioning of “political society,” demands are limited in their object and the
outcomes specific to the community that is mobilizing. If they are granted entitlements and
recognition, it will extend to the boundaries of how that community is recognized by the state
and also the power that the state potentially has over these communities. But importantly, rights
granted will not be the basis of a generalized realization of rights to housing or provisions. By
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this logic, struggles against informality by “the governed” only strengthen the state’s
governmental reach. In fact, in many cases, the expansion of specific communities’ recognition
and inclusion are only achieved by “governmental” self-identification of title recognition, which
recast community membership along cut-off dates or official documentation. Struggles within
and against informality, for housing or whatever right that may be demanded, are thus confined
within the state’s flexible capacity to govern. And concessions on this front are granted on an
exceptional case-by-case basis, the reasons having only in some instances to do with a successful
grassroots victory.159 It has been said time and again that the poor do not want free homes. In
fact, they hardly ask for anything exceptional in society. Yet the myth of the undeserving and
entitled poor is deep and damaging. What the evicted, the insecure, the brutalized and bulldozed
of these recent campaigns in Mumbai actually wanted is for the state to play by the rules it
claims to uphold. This is not a demand for exception but rather an abolition of exception. Even as
Hamara Shehar could not mobilize its large city network directly to stop the cycle of evictions
and demolitions, nor even prevent the state sanctioned dispossessions (for instance at the Port
Trust lands, in Malvani, in Mandala) from interfering with its own base-building popular
planning process, it did nonetheless assist the communities directly impacted in reframing the
entire regulatory framework and demand that its protections and guarantees apply for all.160 The
campaign’s approach to the Development Plan departs from this first realm of exception
altogether by seeking, with the communities in Mandala and Malvani, to challenge the state to
uphold laws and regulations, a demand that would fundamentally challenge the composition of
the state. On its surface, the Hamara Shehar campaign’s concern with the Development Plan
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Other reasons may include alignment of other interests by hired thugs (goondas) and big men who deliver based
on rent- and vote-seeking logics.
160
Drawn from field notes, June 10, 2015.
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seemed predicated on a faith in the functional operations of the democratic state, despite
evidence to the contrary. In this interpretation, the campaign seemingly upholds the functional
state and its role in democratic development abstracted from the antagonisms of the past and the
lines of conflict around developmentalism in the present. Yet, as I’ve shown, the operations of
the municipal state are embedded in Mumbai’s history of juggernaut developmentalism, defined
by arbitrary rule and selective governance on an uneven landscape that differentiates and
underdevelops certain social groups. This, the process of redressing informality amongst
marginalized communities necessitated simultaneously addressing the composition of the state’s
own informality.
The campaign also continued its grassroots work in various informal settlements across
the city through an ongoing engagement of collective inquiry toward self-development,
involving principles of autonomy and community self-representation and self-determination of
their own urban futures, for instance, in the slum community of Mankhurd Transit Camp in MWard. The ward has one of the lowest Human Development indices in the country. In January
2016, there was a community screening in Hindi of Dear Mandela, a documentary about the
South African shack dwellers movement. The public screening was meant to emphasize the
importance of issues close to home by showing their international dimensions.
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Figure 15: Chart on slum population of Mumbai’s M-East Ward. Image source: scroll.in.

State-space and state-time
Much of the sustained community engagement in the Development Plan process eventually did
win the campaign a place at the municipality’s table: the municipal commissioner asked Hamara
Shehar to work with the city to design a workshop for appointed ward level planners and “give
them a framework and concrete suggestions of how to include marginalized sections in the PLU
they are preparing right now.” (Field notes, September 24, 2015). From March to May 2016, the
MCGM began releasing parts of the revised DCRs, the legal specifications that guide the
implementation of the Development Plan over the next two decades. UDRI referred to the
“piecemeal publication” as an attempt to obscure the uncorrected errors and conceal the facts of
its wholesale disavowal of the objections and suggestions process.161
In all, the campaign organized a challenge to the state-space of the Development Plan, its
zones of inclusion and exclusion, its forms of knowledges and its spatial representations. But it
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One Hamara Shehar core member (saathi) referred to MCGM as “a special planning authority (SPA),” which
verifies the extent to which the core group, certainly others in the campaign and more widely in the city, see the
democratic municipal body dominated by private interests. At the same time, the members made biting reference to
UDRI as a “special authority on planning,” a critique of the elitist approach they take to planning. (Field notes, April
19, 2016).
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was unable to fundamentally interrupt the state-imposed temporality, of both the endless
deadlines and the schedule of meetings that delayed accountability and constantly deferred to
community work the required operations of the planning authorities of the city government. The
process was dominated by the state, which has repeatedly distracted the campaign and other
citizen groups with errors and false promises of recognition and rectification. Moreover, the
MCGM sought repeated extensions for its deadlines to publish the twenty-year Development
Plan, delays which routinely suspended the animated campaign by interrupting growing citywide
concern with a start-and-stop bureaucratic rhythm of consultations and schedules of information.
Always fixed in the immediate present, the campaign had no choice but to engage in the state’s
temporal restrictions. Hamara Shehar’s urgency of course had everything to do with the future in
question. As it self-consciously framed in its earliest documents, “the kind of accountability that
people have access to now won’t be available later. So these processes should be taken under the
scrutiny of the people now.” (Field notes, June 1, 2015)
The city government released its Revised Draft Development Plan (RDDP) on May 27,
2016. Entangled in the fate of the document, Hamara Shehar Mumbai once again organized over
sixty community meetings and seven thematic consultations across the city. These consultations
at “citizen’s facilitation centers” aimed to both increase popular understandings as well as bring
together experts to inform the impact of the Development Plan to develop well-informed
suggestions to be submitted to the Development Plan. Each community meeting had
explanations of area reservations/designations, and what the resultant DCR implications and
ward provisions indicated for the city and its implications for slums, housing, open spaces, urban
villages, informal livelihoods, hawkers, and social amenities. Glaring omissions as well as
suggestions and objections to the RDDP were noted through this process. These have
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importantly brought out numerous cases of exclusion within the Revised Draft Development
Plan and raised very serious concerns about the type of development that will unfold in Mumbai
if many of the current Development Plan provisions are sanctioned by the state.
With just over twenty days left for the suggestion and objection period, Hamara Shehar
invited all its members to a city level strategy meeting on July 11, 2016. This meeting
summarized and generated suggestions and objections to the Development Plan, planned for the
days ahead, and decided on key issues that would be taken forward in the campaign. The meeting
also included a sharing of issues in the Revised Draft Development Plan and its implications on
slums, housing, urban villages, informal livelihoods, hawkers, social amenities etc., by
representatives from various communities that have been excluded from the planning process.
The campaign decided to organize a public meeting at Azad Maidan on July 20, 2016—just ten
days prior to the end of the suggestion and objection period. There was, once again, a mass
submission of approximately 3,500 suggestions and objection letters by people from across
Mumbai to the MCGM office prior to the public meeting. Around 750–1000 people gathered at
the Azad Maidan to protest the exclusionary Development Plan prepared by the MCGM.
As many as fifty diverse groups, led by Hamara Shehar Mumbai, aimed at submitting
close to one hundred thousand (one lakh) objections to the plan over the remaining eight days of
the comment period. The groups stated unequivocally that the “regressive” Development Plan
favored developers and submitted eight non-negotiable demands to the MCGM. The “nonnegotiable demands” put forth by the Hamara Shehar Mumbai reiterated the transformative
urban democratic agenda it fostered from community meetings since the earliest days of its
campaign: legal recognition and upgradation of slums, adivasipadas, koliwadas, and gaothans;
livable housing for all; equitable amenity distribution; access to livelihoods and “economic
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opportunity”; protection of No Development Zones; and participation and local area planning. In
each of the demands, the campaign used the language of universalism to attempt to break the
exceptionalism of municipal governance.
A delegation met with MCGM officials. At the public meeting, Hamara Shehar Mumbai
released a detailed response to the Revised Draft Development Plan 2016, a populist analysis of
the city’s development documents in the form of the People’s Response to Revised Draft
Development Plan (RDDP) 2014–2034. The document chronicles the campaign’s good-faith
process of engagement with the Development Plan process as well as derides the problems and
limits it identified with the governmental approach and analysis.162 The campaign noted that
some of its demands were included in the government’s document, such as the addition of an
entire chapter devoted to gendered implications of planning, provisions for homeless. But
overall, the Revised Development Plan carried forward the errors and unpopular proposals, such
as the Coastal Road and the unmarked koliwada and goathan areas that plagued the development
plan process from its start. Moreover, some potentially useful and progressive elements found in
the original draft were excluded, such as calling for smaller planning units and local area plans.
The campaign also reiterated its own vision for “a close coordination between economy, equity
and environment which in turn are important for planning of a city.” Predictably, the MCGM
failed to comment.
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They hosted a campaign meeting and workshop on May 30 with the agenda of taking stock of the progress of the
DP; familiarizing themselves with the DCRs and critically assessing them; studying maps to figure if their demands
have been incorporated; and discuss the city-wide development projects such as BPT, metro car shed, coastal road
and arrive at Campaign position.
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Development Deferred
There was a lull in campaign activities—the first in nearly five years—for a few months before it
met again formally on November 2, 2016 to decide the next ground and strategies of the
campaign and to address the widespread disregard the MCGM had shown to the enormous
outpouring of objections and suggestions throughout the preceding five-year period. The work of
preparing and submitting the proposed plan should have been done in June 2011 and cost ₹ 5.48
crore ($800,000 USD), according to the original scheduled timeline. The MCGM sought a thirtymonth extension to prepare the Development Plan guidelines just two months shy of the
deadline, extending the timeline to December 2013. In December 2014, the state legislative
assembly approved an amendment to the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966
(MR&TP Act), granting another two-year extension to prepare, submit, and sanction the
Development Plan. Civic officials said the implementation of the final Development Plan would
take more time, owing to a number of factors: the national level Lok Sabha, and soon thereafter
the Maharashtran Legislative Assembly Vidhan Sabha elections in 2014 forced inactivity, but it
most directly cited the consultation process in order to explain the delays.
An ordinance was issued by the civic corporation in July 2016 to extend the deadline for
the implementation of the Development Plan to November 26, 2016, which was postponed again
over six weeks into the new year.163 This was the second extension sought by a committee
consisting of three municipal officials and three state-appointed experts. Yet again, after
postponing the formation of the committee for more than three months, hearings for twelve
thousand citizen-objections were held between October 16 and December 17, 2016. The delayed
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The new deadline was January 15, 2017.
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Development Plan has come at a cost of ₹ 12.83 crore (1.8 million USD).164 The city argued the
delays and the compounding costs had to do with procedural adjustments brought on by the
citywide consultation process.165 The campaign, meanwhile, argued the MCGM was holding the
“city at ransom” in these delays. Sitaram Shelar from Hamara Shehar Mumbai commented
bitterly, “The MCGM has betrayed citizens. They keep delaying their work, but when citizens
ask for an extension, they do not give us even one extra day.”
Despite the deep knowledge and insight into the city’s current spatial status offered by
Hamara Shehar through extensive popular engagement with the city corporation on errors and
suggestions, the plan submitted to the Government of Maharashtra was riddled with errors.
Nonetheless, the 2014–34 Development Plan along with the Development Control Regulations
(DCR) were passed by the MCGM on the evening of July 31, 2017. It came after a five-year
delay and marathon-session of debates running for ten hours in the Municipal Corporation
Building.166 In a city historically captured by competing landed interests, the development
“future” all came down to land use. A study of three distinct regions and laboring communities
affected by the Development Plan illustrate this point.
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“Civic officials said the cost of the Development Plan had escalated and the plan had been delayed because the
consultants had asked for more time to prepare it in a comprehensive manner and because the Lok Sabha and state
assembly elections took place last year [2014]. The firm also incorporated a few workshops at the ward and zone
levels, with the local MP, MLA, corporator and public.” Sujit Mahamulkar. 2015. “In a first, Development Plan
pitches for green city.” The Times of India. February 13, 2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Ina-first-development-plan-pitches-for-green-city/articleshow/46221723.cms
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“While this Development Plan aimed at being an all-inclusive one by having ward-level consultations. . . these
were not planned in advance. Besides, why the need of a Development Plan as the authorities tweak several
aspects. . . Development Plan1991 was revised 240 times,” said Milind Mhaske, project director, Praja Foundation.
Richa Pintol. 2015. “Uncertainty over when new Development Plan will get clearance,” Times of India, February 23,
2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Uncertainty-over-when-new-development-plan-will-getclearance/articleshow/46336630.cms
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There are to be three separate Development Plans in addition to the main one, indicating plans for three land
parcels—39.3 hectares in the Oshiwara District Centre, 47.37 hectares of the A block in the Bandra-Kurla Complex
(BKC) and 27.37 hectares between LBS Marg and Mithi river in Kurla. A similar process will unfold in which the
plans will be published, there will be a suggestions and objections process for sixty days, and a planning committee
will be constituted to hear objections.
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The Salt Pans
The Agari community of Maharashtra and Gujarat are largely salt workers who labor on half of
the city’s 5,500 acres of salt pans mostly on the eastern side of the city, nine times the size of the
defunct mill lands, and one of the largest surplus land parcels in Mumbai. 167 Although most of
these lands are privately owned, much of this land has historically been “encroached” upon by
salt working commoners and slum dwellers. The lands are in reality layered with multiple
disputes over the land (the Government of India has assumed ownership of the lands, yet the
state of Maharashtra and the BMC also claim it).168
The contested 2014–2034 Development Plan effectively ignored the spatial and labor
practices of salt-working communities in municipal guidelines that state the land should be
reserved for “socially relevant activities.” Maharashtra Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis has
approved a master plan for developing the central government-owned saltpan lands in Mumbai,
which would prime for development some of the last open spaces in the city. Ostensibly the state
policy would appropriate the land in order to house the poor. This plan would work in concert
with the commercial development interests reflected at the municipality level in its twenty-year
Development Plan as well as the Development Plans of the Mumbai Port Trust Land (the largest
landowner in the city). Once approved, the central government would likely transfer land rights
to the MCGM or other agencies, eventually also to private developers. Despite much of this land
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Freny Manecksha. 2010 “Saltpan city,” http://infochangeindia.org/agenda/coastal-communities/saltpan-city.html.
“The Konkan coast around present-day Mumbai was ideal for the manufacture of salt; indeed, salt works have been
in existence here for as long as people can remember. Since 1850, however, the saltpans began to be acquired for
various public purposes, and little by little, they ceased to be used to produce salt.”
168
“Since 1960 the Central Salt Department in Jaipur has taken the view that salt work lands belong to the central
government, and that the salt manufacturers only have right of use to the land to produce salt under the terms of the
license…the state government has been claiming that though owned by the central government, the salt work lands
were leased out to the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) in the late-19th and early-20th centuries.
Subsequently, the BMC sub-leased the land to various people on a 99-year lease, to manufacture salt. Though the
lease is over in most cases, the lessees have not given up possession of the land. . . [Private owners] claim that most
of the land is private land not government land as claimed by the state.
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previously being marked as either No Development Zone or Coastal Regulation Zone169 (CRZ,
which restricts development within five hundred meters of the coast),170 the state government’s
draft housing policy has proposed to “relax environment protection regulations governing coastal
land use,” essentially removing salt pan lands from CRZ. In addition to housing, the
government’s vision includes a network of roads through the salt lands, gardens, and
playgrounds—laying the groundwork for whole new townships.171 The government’s “From
Hutments to Tenements” policy envisions shifting slum dwellers through redevelopment
schemes away from other parts of the city to make room for development and infrastructure
projects in valuable areas. “The proposal to use saltpan lands first emerged in 2002 when the
Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) warned that it was running
out of land and asked the state to release land belonging to various departments” (Manecksha
2010).172
Salt lands not communized are leased by the Union Ministry of Commerce to business
communities involved in either construction or development for the real estate industry. “Owing
to increased slum inhabition [sic] on these lands, alongside other arguments for best use of the
land (ease demand for development, opportunity for infrastructure development),” both central
and state governments have agreed to initiate land transfers and end salt panning in Mumbai
(Ibid). The salt commons are refracted through emerging divisions within the traditional salt
working communities. There are those who have established some fortune based on claims to the
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Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZs) has been used as an important line of defense for the commons, but just as often
have been used by the municipality to evict commoners from the coastal lands.
170
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court instituted a series of injunctions protecting the shoreline and access to it for
fishermen. These injunctions, along with the creation of Coastal Regulatory Zones in the 1990s and growing
environmental concerns, have significantly decreased the number and scale of land reclamation projects pursued in
Mumbai. The Supreme Court has added more restriction in 1990s with the Coastal Regulatory Zones.
171
Current environmental regulations would prevent real estate growth on much of the saltpan lands.
172
Freny Manecksha. “Saltpan City.” Infochange, News & Features, April 2010, http://infochangeindia.org/agendaissues/coastal-communities/8243-saltpan-city
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land and who are eager for the land transfers to go through so that they may sell for handsome
profit.
But for the majority, the saltpans, mud flats, and mangroves are the ecological basis from
which specific laboring communities form contiguous commons vital to their reproduction, but
also to the reproduction of a city and region prone to floods, as evidenced by the July 26–27,
2005 floods and the 2017 monsoon, which devastated many parts of Mumbai, claimed over one
thousand lives, rendered many homeless, overwhelmed sewage lines and contaminated drinking
water for the entire city, and caused widespread economic loss of about ₹ 550 crores ($100
million). (Anjaria 2006b). This environmental disaster precipitated former Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh’s call for the expeditious transfer of saltpan lands to the state government.
While state reappropriation of lands proceed, mangroves and saltpans are also routinely usurped
by private owners, despite legal protections.173 Flouting legal decisions that certain salt lands and
adjacent mangroves be notified as “protected forests,” in some cases part of the land leased out
to salt pans in the eastern suburbs have already been converted for real estate development. The
overwhelming and contradictory claims by state and private entities are one reason why it is
rarely acknowledged, even by environmentalists or activists fighting land grabbing, how
communizing the salt lands and mangroves might actually help protect the city and its fragile
ecosystem in the future.
Similar to the salt workers are those who labor in the sand and feed the construction
industry. The riverbed commons have long been the site of extraction by the “sand mafia” in
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In Oshiwara, the mangrove lands are owned by a single businessman who is granted permission to develop it as
he wishes (more car parks and roads, most likely).
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Mumbai that directly feeds the construction industry and the “land mafia.”174 Dredging these
riverbeds was the historical work of certain “denotified” tribes such as Kaikadis, Katkaris,
Pardhis (no longer considered “criminal” by virtue of their commoning traditions), who have
been pushed out and have fallen back on foraging in the forests, manufacturing bamboo and leaf
products, as well as basket weaving, and whose occupations remain under state and police
scrutiny as to whether they are “conducive to settled way of life” although they are no longer
listed under the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871.175
Koliwadas, the Coastal Commons, and the Coastal Road
The MCGM has indicated in its preparations of the Development Plan that the problems of
mobility and choked traffic flows on the “inadequate road density and. . . several missing road
links in the overall road network infrastructure. . .particularly so in the Western Suburbs.” The
people’s campaign has identified the source of this policy wisdom in the municipality’s working
relationship with the World Bank-initiated Comprehensive Transport Study (CTS), which
“recommends expanding the existing road networks to accommodate increasing private vehicle
demand (and hence creating additional demand).” To this end, the BMC intends to spend ₹150
billion (US $2.3 billion) to construct a new 35-km long Coast Road on the western sea front
connecting Kandivali to Nariman Point, as opposed to investment in rail transport systems. This
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Badri Chatterjee. 2017. “Illegal sand miners in India make ₹1,611-cr profit every year: Australian film.”
Hindustan Times. April 17, 2017. http://www.hindustantimes.com/mumbai-news/illegal-sand-miners-in-india-make1-611-cr-profit-every-year-australian-film/story-o0wzzmQhL3ON42JlkeBM9H.html
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“The national commission and commissioners appointed by the Supreme Court in the Right to Food case have
highlighted the intense hunger and malnutrition that large sections of these communities are being subjected to as a
result of lack of access to small game and non-meat forest food like barks, roots, tubers, seeds, fruits, leaves, sap
honey etc, as also fish in ponds and streams, as development takes its toll by snatching their traditional means of
subsistence without compensating them. Many of these people were performers, artisans or craftsmen working the
streets for a living, but anti-beggary laws have now hindered them from earning from these activities as well.”
Neelabh Mishra “Little Caravanserai” The denotified tribes commission has restarted the quota debate.” Outlook.
October 6, 2008, https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/a-little-caravanserai/238563.
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plan is a direct refutation of conventional transport planning as well as public wisdom: new roads
do not alleviate traffic, but rather create more of it. The Coastal Road first appeared as a
“proposed road” in the city’s Development Plan preparatory report’s maps. The Municipal
Commissioner [claimed it] as one of his three major achievements, which he is “pushing for. . .in
the larger interest of the city.176
Hamara Shehar was one of the first groups to raise critical attention to the controversial
road. Meetings were held by the fishermen associations to lodge their protest against the project,
which would completely wipe out fishing activity and cut off the Koli community’s direct access
to the sea. The coastal road project, they argued, would change the face of Mumbai,
homogenizing the western coastline and destroying the diverse natural features such as beaches,
mangroves, creeks and existing Koli villages. The project will involve large-scale reclamation
and destruction of fragile ecosystems such as natural beaches, estuaries and mangroves. This
process will have an impact on natural drainage patterns, flooding and erosion and apart from
affecting the livelihoods of fishing communities dependent on coastal resources. The
construction of a massive sea wall with a eight-lane highway across large stretches of the
waterfront will cut off the city from the sea, destroying the beaches that act as important and rare
open public spaces, replace sea breezes with car exhaust, and transform Mumbai from a
waterfront city to a freeway city. Reclamation due to the coastal road will also cut off iconic
landmarks and heritage buildings such as Bandra fort and Mahalaxmi temple from the sea and
destroy the aesthetic beauty and diversity of the city’s waterfronts. Moreover, none of the real
traffic problems and commuter needs of the city would be addressed. The campaign expressed
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Response to the MCGM’s Preparatory Studies Report for the Development Plan 2014-34; Hamara Shehar,
Hamara Vikas, Hamara Niyojan, Abhiyan Mumbai. See also S Balakrishnan. 2013. “BMC Chief Aims for
Corruption-Free Civic Body, World-Class Mumbai.” DNA, August 13.
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surprise “that the environmental and social impacts of this controversial project which will
completely transform the geography of the city and is faced with massive opposition from
coastal communities and environmentalists alike have been completely ignored in the
[municipality’s] situation analysis report.”177
There is a long history of Koli communities, perhaps the group most affected by urban
development in the city, resisting big projects and land encroachments such the coastal road in
defense of their right to the coast and the livelihoods and housing it provides.178 Of the distinct
thirty-six Koli settlements that endure in the city today, there are at least eight communities that
will be affected by the coastal road.179 These communities are already affected by rapid
urbanization that puts pressure on their land. These changes can be traced in the Worli-Bandra
Sea Link bridge project in 2000. There was massive resistance to these by the Worli koliwada as
well as others some fifteen years ago, but to no avail.180 Since that time, poor planning of waste
infrastructures in the city has affected the mangrove ecosystem and fish catches have been
steadily declining.
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Response to the MCGM’s Preparatory Studies Report for the Development Plan 2014-34; Hamara Shehar,
Hamara Vikas, Hamara Niyojan, Abhiyan Mumbai. The report states that the Coast Road “will require massive
reclamation of land from the sea, shifting the present edge of the coast offshore by about 100 meters. This project
will have massive impacts on the environment and existing social ecologies along the coast, and completely
obliterate natural features such as rocky headlands, bays with sandy beaches, estuaries, coastal wetlands, marshes,
mudflats, all of which offer a diversity of habitats forming a fragile coastal ecosystem. The Joint Technical
Committee report for the coastal road explains that some of these diverse geomorphic features of the coast (it calls
them “sharp kinks”) which will be replaced by smoothened curves courtesy [of] the freeway will do much to
“improve the erosion protection” of the coast. It is surprising that the environmental and social impacts of this
controversial project which will completely transform the geography of the city and is faced with massive
opposition from coastal communities and environmentalists alike have been completely ignored in the situation
analysis report.”
178
In fact, the city’s initial Development Plan in 1964 first proposed a coastal road along the city’s edge with the
Arabian Sea. It did not come to pass for fifty years, in part due to coastal community resistance.
179
This include, from the southernmost tip of the city, the Cuffe Parade koliwada, Worli koliwada, Chimbai
koliwada, Khar Danda koliwada and Juhu koliwada, Moragaon koliwada, Versova koliwada and Madh koliwada.
180
An overview of the major issues in the struggle against the Bandra-Worli Sealink is provided in the judgment on
a case filed by the Secretary of the National Fishworkers Forum, Rambhau Patil; see Rambhau Patil vs Maharashta
State Road Development Mumbai. Corporation, WP 348.2000, 9 October 2000.

224

In the short term, when construction begins on the ramps and bridges, their livelihoods
will be disrupted. Then the appropriation of the coastal commons will occur and these
communities will lose their access to the sea. They will lose the area they use to dry fish, other
coastal resources, habitats and fish breeding areas will be affected.181 In the medium term, beach
erosion will occur as will loss of shore for ancillary activities such as bandars, or shore jetties
where boats are anchored, and machis, or fish markets that exist near the entrances of the Koli
communities. At the city level, flooding of low-lying areas will almost certainly also become a
regular occurrence. The project will also require road widening through urban villages
(goathans), affecting another community that has centuries-old ties to the land. Speculative
development will then continue to encroach on the lands by the sea. The longer-term effects in
terms of climate change and sustainability of the coastal communities are bleak as well. These
fisher communities are Mumbai’s original commoners who to this day defend their right to the
land, the neighborhoods they live in, their koliwadas, and the sea, lakes, rivers, ponds, rivulets
and creeks from which they derive their livelihoods.
A Parking Lot in Sanjay Gandhi National Park
Sanjay Gandhi National Park is the largest urban park in the country and nearly one-sixth of the
size of the city (forty square miles). It is a dense and diverse habitat of forest, three major lakes,
and creeks (nallahs), home to an incredible biodiversity and numerous endangered species of
plants and animals. It is also home to 1,795 Adivasi families in forty-three hamlets (padas)
mainly along the edge of the Park (SGNP, 2011).182 Indigenous tribes as well as lower-caste
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Men are typically engaged in occupations such as fishing, making and repairing nets, while women in the
community handle the domestic labor as well as marketing, curing and processing of fishes.
182
Edelblutte Émilie, Gunnell Yanni. 2014. “The tribal populations of Sanjay Gandhi National Park, Mumbai
(India): A brief political ecology.” L’Espace géographique. (Volume 43), p. 1–17.
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migrants hunt, gather, and forage food and fodder, fuel-wood, leaves, medicinal plants, flowers
(for instance, for Dadar’s large flower markets (phool galli)), and produce—all important
sources of food and incomes in the forests in an economy in which these groups often lack
essential connections and opportunities to participate in the formal economy. Fuel-wood and
fodder exist beyond subsistence economies, however, and also serve pavement dwellers and
street vendors in poorer neighborhoods and slums throughout the city. Foraging for grass in the
forests also supplies the tabelas (cow sheds) that in turn provide milk to many middle-class
households and dugdhalayas (milk centers), sweet shops, as well as small and large eateries.
They also supply Aarey Milk Colony, one of the oldest government-established dairies in India,
which is located inside Sanjay Gandhi National Park and provides for much of the city’s milk
and dairy consumption. As this semi-wilderness is either state or privately owned, Adivasi
communities are deemed “illegal” and their laboring activities are accommodated through a
system of bribes. Communizing private and public lands in this manner therefore entails systems
of corruption and monetary exchange that feed into larger systems of surplus extraction and
accumulation and remind us that no commons can exist apart from other value systems, and their
attendant economies and political forces.
The Development Plan proposed building a private parking lot near a new Metro station
in the middle of the Aarey Milk Colony. This proposed enclosure was on top of the previous
deregulation of the land’s NDZ notification, which meant that 150 of the 200 or so adivasipadas
for whom Aarey is a site for plantations, agriculture, grazing, and other primary activities have
been increasingly encircled by new luxury and leisure developments, such as golf courses,
resorts, and condominiums (which often masquerade aesthetically but not functionally as
beautified “green” and “open” spaces). These enclosures have been occurring despite the fact
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that deforestation and shrinking these spaces are in clear violation of forest and environmental
regulations. None of these adivasipadas were mapped in the existing land use maps prepared by
the Municipal Corporation. At the same time, the campaign identified the trap of NDZ
regulations in contexts where commoning communities may desire or require low-intensity
construction and development for improved amenities, infrastructure, and services. The double
bind of simultaneously defending and challenging regulations was a clear indication for the
Hamara Shehar campaign that a different relation of power through community planning was
needed.
Transport-oriented Development in Aarey Colony means the forests and those who forage
for fuel wood and fodder, will disappear in order to build a car-park near the new Metro station.
Similarly, essential mangroves, previously protected from development by the Forest Act, and in
fact administered federally by the Forest Department, are up for grabs. In most cases, bourgeois
environmentalists have found these commons to be “polluting,” “unhygienic,” or “disorderly”
and thus have wittingly or wittingly sided with development.
In March 2015, activists, environmentalists, area residents, and Adivasis came together to
protest the mass destruction of the National Park—referred to as the city’s green belt—through
the construction of the Metro 3 parking lot at the Aarey milk colony.183 NGOs and resident
associations formed Apna Mumbai Abhiyan and proposed taking the Mumbai Metropolitan
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Here is a fragment of a concerned letter that one citizen sent which indicates the cross-class alliance that emerged
in this moment: “I’m happy and grateful that some Bombay residents have come together to protest the setting up of
the metro 3 shed at the Aarey milk colony. Perhaps this is the first time people have gathered in this area to protest
the mass destruction of the green belt. These protests should have happened a decade ago. But those protesting
today, including me, were in many ways inadvertently complicit in this destruction. Each one of us, who has come to
live in Bombay, has bought property here or drives a car is adding to the pressure on housing and roads, which in
turn is leading to the destruction of the empty spaces, marshlands, man groves and green belts. Of course, this
pressure could have been dealt with in more responsible ways like it has been elsewhere with good city planning and
drastic changes in modes of travel. In India, thanks to corruption and greed and indifference, we have chosen to
ignore all standards and extend all boundaries. [ … ]” Nishtha Jain, “Bombay My City,” March 13, 2015
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Region Development Authority (MMRDA) to court for its decision to build an elevated Metro
line 2 between Dahisar and Mankhurd.
According to those mobilized by the Save Aarey campaign, the arguments that Aarey
needs development are both aesthetic and economic: the city government quite cynically says,
“If we don’t develop, can you promise that Aarey is not going to become a slum?” The
campaign’s response is: “then we can pose other questions: can you promise us that everyone
will have a job, afford housing, etc. in this city? If so, then we can talk about Aarey.” (Fieldnotes
March 19, 2015)

Other Worlds-Making
In illustrating the spatial needs and demands of various communities in the city, Hamara Shehar
did more than simply highlight and lend support to local struggles against the juggernaut of
developmentalism. In form, it implemented a different process and articulated an alternative
notion of planning based on “bottom up” democratic participation. In order to image what an
actual democratic plan would look like, it enrolled a number of marginalized communities in a
politics of democratic participation. The campaign thus offered a prefigurative politics at the
scale of one of the largest cities in the world.
In content, it provided an alternative notion of the plan itself, one in which the complex
spatial realities of the commons are recognized, included, valued, and therefore planned for. By
centering the city’s distinct commoning traditions, Hamara Shehar opened up a new vision of
what the plan could look like for a city in which there are many realities that can and must be
recognized. They demonstrate, if only partially, a radical proposition that may very well shape
the culture of planning in Mumbai and other cities as well: if we can get the commons right in
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the plan, we can perhaps plan for a great many forms of life beyond the market, existing and
possible. Thus, in the face of numerous challenges and limitations in its own organization,
Hamara Shehar offers in its form and content a vision of the development of a world in which
many worlds can fit.
Certainly, the determinations of land use were part of another type of world-making. The
capture of land has been a central facet of the juggernaut developmentalism that has shaped the
city since its the historic colonial imperial origins, as it was part of the capitalist class equation
that defeated the collective workers’ movement in the eighties, and remains a central part of the
story of Mumbai’s triumphant rise as a financial center. As this juggernaut points unwaveringly
to the “Shining India” to come, there are seemingly no contradictions that its territorial drive for
accumulation cannot roll over. In its wake already is a conflicted history of the city turned from a
seat of cosmopolitanism to communalism, and from a beacon of (industrial) modernity to layered
permanent condition of its city’s informal poor. Yet, when the populist campaign that sought to
transform the development plan process decided the technical rules governing land use were to
be its site of struggle, it had no choice but to reclaim the city in its totality. Its radical ambitions
in that sense sprung from the reality offered by the ground’s view. By the very nature of their
proposition to utterly change a deeply layered historic city of difference and dominance,
participants across Hamara Shehar realized that to demand a fair share of the city would require a
demand for everything. As romantic as it may appear, it is based in the cold facts of how land is
integral to a world of contentious dramas past, present, and future.
Previous development plans were consistently marked by a disregard for lived reality of
the city; a parochial vision about what the future of the city should be and who it would benefit;
bureaucratic delays; lack of participatory processes; corruption; and in some ways most
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demobilizing and depoliticizing, an overwhelming failure to actually implement the vast
majority—nearly 90 percent—of the plan itself. What is crucial to the development of Mumbai
then, is not only what did get implemented and what did not, but how much the course of
development proceeded along entirely other pathways.
This realization punctures the politics of participation in these plans. There seems to be
an enormous futility to development as a politics. If developmentalism is inherently
depoliticizing, perhaps one of the most direct ways it is so is in the failure to enact plans. One of
the significant things to consider, then, about Hamara Shehar Mumbai’s campaign to intervene in
the Development Plan 2014–2034 is how and why it sought to repoliticize the development. The
campaign not only sought to change the actual document of the Development Plan, but also the
entire planning process and culture, from the first mappings of the city, to the commitment the
city would make it to actually implement the plan itself. In this way, the campaign did two
significant things: first, it articulated and prefigured an alternative planning process when
otherwise faced with the nature of developmentalism; and secondly, it re-envisioned the urban
political project of the development Plans as a shared charter, a promise made about the
collective rights to the city, to be collectively enacted.

Countermunicipal Cartographies: Collective Imagination and Reason
The urban world in which we live and through which we maneuver is always in some ways
constituted through imagination. It is at least partially a re-creation, a robustly imagined one, of
the inner world we inhabit and of the shared worlds we regenerate with others: how we pursue
life, always in ways “thrown” together, engender an emotional city that we draw upon, and that
continues to anchor, soothe, agitate, challenge, threaten, arouse, satisfy, and torment ourselves
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and others. In creating a platform for collective spatial agency, Hamara Shehar fashioned in
Mumbai a possible institution of imagination. Its terrain is both the virtual and physical
world. Previously public spaces, public institutions such as municipal governments, and
the publicly available institutions of collective urban life and wellbeing (schools, ports, railways,
infrastructure, water and energy grids) are the domains through which the city is administered,
produced, and realized. In cities such as Mumbai, pervasive urban informality and the devolution
of public-oriented state and city planning preclude this possibility. Given this scenario, what
institutions actually make the city a space for its inhabitants? 184 New institutions such as Hamara
Shehar Mumbai are provisional answers to this question. And yet, Hamara Shehar is by no
means a singular institution in the traditional sense of the term; rather it self-consciously refers to
itself as people’s campaign whose objective is to contest and reclaim the urban planning process.
But its scope, vision, and heterogeneous participants offer a glimpse into how an organized
collective spatial politics can begin to reclaim the city.
The grassroots response to the Development Plan presumed that popular and direct
experiences of the city would translate into shared knowledge that can manifest and technically
shape the city according to a plural vision of what the city is and what it is to become.185 What is
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In The New Urban Question, Andy Merrifield asks: “How might the common urban affinities that cement people
together actually develop today? Where might these general affinities, and this general will, emerge? How can
particular wills be made aware of themselves as something more general, as a larger collective constituency that’s
something greater than the individual parts? What are the institutions through which affinity might develop?” (2014:
81–82).
185
The process of constituting collective reason, according to Spinoza, begins with common notions: “Common
notions, as assemblages, are a practical pivot, building blocks that arise on the terrain of the imagination to
constitute reason. The production of common notions shows that there is a “curious harmony” between the
imagination and reason. However, there remains a real difference between them. No matter how strong or intense
the imagination may be, we continue to regard it in a possible or contingent way. The specific property of reason is
to consider things as necessary. Common notions transform the fluctuation and contingency of imagination into the
permanence and consistency of reason. Necessity, presence and frequency are the three characteristics of common
notions. Reason is the imagination that returns, the refrain. It is an intensified imagination that has gained the power
to sustain its imagining by means of the construction of common notions. Common notions are ontological
mechanisms that forge being out of becoming, necessity out of chance. From the beginning, common notions and its
process of assemblage are part of an ethical project (becoming active, becoming adequate, becoming joyful), but
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essential in the transformation of imagination to constituted reason, is the process of activating
local knowledges and arriving at the recognition of their activity, their sufficiency, and increased
capacity to affect change.186 Therefore the first challenge in constructing popular interventions in
the Development Plan process was the articulation of one’s social worth and mattering as a
standpoint for participation. The entire process depends on the ethical construction of
participation, a process of becoming active, becoming adequate, and becoming increasingly
capable of affecting change. How “participation” is constructed is an ethical project that either
increases ones ability to act or diminishes it. The contentions around the Development Plan have
been waged on two axes, one questioning the “what” of development and one questioning the
“who” and “how.” It has been a question of material outcomes to the built and lived environment
of the city, but also about the political question of participation, how questions of development
will be posed and resolved.
In the span of five years, the people’s campaign created unprecedented momentum for
diverse peoples to critically participate in the shaping of the city through its development
planning. This participation included community consultations, ground “truthing,” marking
“errors” in the existing and proposed land use maps and “mapping” the lack of representation on
the plan alongside “professional mapping.” In the wake of a depoliticized and parochial
municipal government, the result that emerged was a counter-municipal platform of resistance to
Mumbai’s planning enclosure. It brought diverse experiences of the city together and in the
process contributed to a countercartography of the city based on share knowledges, values,

how can we recognize this process in properly political terms?” (Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship
in Philosophy, 1993 (102–103, 107))
186
This is what Spinoza refers to as joy. People’s daily experiences, for example in a bazaar, are more than enough.
They are important bases of understanding complex urban problems and offer vast reservoirs of tactical knowledge
of how to influence, maneuver, and mediate complex relationships toward acceptable outcomes for all—in short,
how bodies affect other bodies.
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desires, and demands. These include the everyday experiences of fisherfolks (kolis), street
hawkers, day laborers (naka workers), independent trade unionists, slum dwellers, informal petty
producers, Indigenous tribals (adivasis), women, rag pickers, migrants, students, women, and
environmentalists. Katz (2001) describes the creation of a critical topographic knowledge as a
distinct research method that aims to understand the histories and layered spatial relations
embodied in both the “natural” and social features of a landscape. In her words, “doing a
topography brings [these relations] into sharp relief to expose their tensions, contradictions, and
affiliations . . . and provides the ground—literally and figuratively—for developing a critique of
the social relations sedimented into space and for scrutinizing the material social practices at all
geographic scales through which place is produced.” (2001: 1228–1229)
Moreover, the process of building this counter-municipal cartography allowed for
disparate spatial experiences to “jump scales” (Smith 1992) in order to create a grounded
translocal municipalist politics. These various knowledges, values, and desires have never been
recognized as adequate aspects of planning. The city has never been officially “planned” with
them in mind, yet its “unofficial” development is predicated on them.
The campaign became the lived experience of over a hundred community groups and
other grassroots organizations, activists, researchers and experts, who together formed a vision
for the city made by and with some of its poorest communities, in which all their lives could find
a common future that is ecological, Indigenous, as well as diverse in its economies and cultures.
Maringnati (2011) argues for new ways of sharing information and experiences in the city, what
he calls a commoning of knowledge: “it is precisely through generation of knowledge that new
communities must be constituted and the communities so constituted must generate information
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that is oriented towards a new ethic of commons.”187 Hamara Shehar simultaneously retained a
state-centric strategy to use these encounters to shape a larger collective analysis of development
issues in the city and to concretely create documents of suggestions and policy proposals to the
Municipal Government. The campaign’s mobilizations changed state-society relations as they
sought to accomplish structural changes in how cities are governed and resources allocated. The
campaign’s contradictory avenues of engagement in “state spaces” in urban society suggest the
parallels between reform and collective self-representation.

Class, Mediation, and the Popular
Hamara Shehar’s analysis offered a view of the city differently-composed of laboring groups and
communities who had been denied several rights to the city. The people’s campaign centers on
the contradictions of popular engagement in the planning of Mumbai as they were rendered
clearly in the stakes of the drafting and implementation of the city’s twenty-year Development
Plan. Hamara Shehar helps us see how planning, even in pervasively underdeveloped megacities
such as Mumbai, is about the possibilities of shared life and the promises that can be made about
the future. Its role in facilitating a collective spatial consciousness is one of the most important
features of its interventions in the Development Plan process.
Yet the campaign’s invocation of the popular, and its address to the common people as a
basis for a shared political and spatial project, has certain drawbacks. While its analysis of the
developmental histories the city arise from the point of view of the popular classes, the tensions
between populism and the specific histories of working class struggle in the city raise difficult
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Maringnati states, “In cities like those of India, an engagement between the right to the city and the right of
commons – the right to oppose enclosure of shared resources in cities can open up several new possibilities for
creating better cities” (2011:68). The first step towards overcoming the challenges would be the production of new
critical knowledges based on principles of collaboration – in short a commoning of knowledge itself
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questions. The power of populism is its sublimating qualities, yet the combinatory effects of
composing “the people” also raise the danger of degeneration and corruption as well. Politicallymobilized desires can lose focus, be reoriented or captured by charismatic leaders, or be
blackmailed and recuperated by the ideologies and flexible accumulation strategies of the
political classes that have in large part already appropriated central urban planning and
development agencies.
In its rhetoric and in its actions, the campaign sought to mobilize a populist will that often
seemed to blur the necessary distinctions and antagonisms in the class-nature of the relations of
governance. In this sense, the campaign’s strategic demand to “participate” and to address both
“the people” and the formally democratic institutions of urban planning and governance relied on
an idealized notion of the state as an institution of public interest. Much of Mumbai’s
development history should suggest that the institutions of urban planning have made important
decisions based on powerful class-interests. Moreover, this agenda has only been interrupted by
episodic outbursts of ‘general popular urban anger’ and in extraordinary moments when the
collective character of the city is articulated through the combined structural power of various
segments of the working class. These histories tell us that developmentalism was most
effectively resisted when the division between ‘popular politics and ‘working class struggle’
were not significant.
In the contemporary case, however differentiated the popular classes were understood to
be, the campaign’s analysis did not adequately assess their nature in terms of a dynamic class
composition of the city. These are the fields of class relations and antagonisms within which the
campaign must necessarily base its analysis and its mobilizations. Yet the relations of production
of space and informality embedded in the class rule of juggernaut developmentalism directly
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destroys the potential of shared affinities of development. The basis of its unprecedented citywide mobilizations was rooted in a diverse and shared popular urban consciousness. Yet the
class character of movement in its “democratic aspirations” and “inclusion” in planning futures
limited the generalization of community and popular mobilization. Thus, while the aim to
intervene in the development plan would require mobilizing a material force capable of swaying
political influence away from existing urban accumulation strategies, its invocations of the
“people” were largely symbolic. This in part can be explained by the composition of the core
group of a campaign of middle-class activists, urban planners, and researchers, whose aspirations
for democratic institutions were not directly tied to working class experiences of these
institutions. As such, the rights to the city they mobilized were the products of extraordinary
community initiatives with (not simply on behalf of) the urban poor. Yet they mobilized as
citizens, as “people” and not as collective producers of a social process of spatial production.
The nature of democratic populism arising from the perspective of citizens in the city is
materially different than the egalitarian politics that might arise from the social sphere of
production, whether informal or otherwise, which struggle against capitalist restructuring in
urban space.
As a diverse city-wide platform, the Hamara Shehar campaign had enormous potential to
serve as a transmission belt of the material power, discontent, and real aspirations of various
workers in their capacity to wage struggles against their restructuring independent of the
representatives and the political classes (parties, bureaus, NGOs) that would seek to contain
them. Yet, the core group of the campaign did not express a strong analysis of the state.
Specifically lacking was its understanding of the state form of mediation, that is, how the state
manages class conflicts and antagonism in the urban field. As such, it was not always able to see
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how “popular” and “democratic” participation in the Development Plan might in fact mask the
recomposition of a sovereign political class and representatives of capital around what are
otherwise anti-democratic, generally unpopular, and exclusionary urban policies. The emergence
of a planning populism stemmed generally from a wave of anti-corruption sentiments that
specifically challenged the informality of the state and the lack of transparency of its legal
institutions. Nevertheless, in the emphasis on the deficient workings of the state, the people’s
process of participating in the Development Plan nonetheless reified the state and normalized its
development politics even as it criticized it. The ensuing loss of antagonism in the very
understanding of the state and capital in part explains why the campaign did not sponsor a more
militant approach among its constituencies nor enjoy the confidence of seeing its analysis,
proposals, and initiatives carried by a wave of urban uprisings.

Conclusion
Hamara Shehar’s strategic potential lies in its ability to create a general process that can unite
working class and popular politics, its ability to form a citywide alliance that can continue to
build a people’s vision of the city, can incubate many different projects and articulate many
alternative plans. The campaign has suggested that there are many residents who desire a new
social and political cartography of the city and its planning rules, in other words to change the
scale and the projection of the map. It is question of organization to mobilize these desires. The
way it is done in the five-year cycle of Hamara Shehar was a gradual collective building up of a
shared and imagined cartography that simultaneously built a network of urban relations. The
campaign has been a process. It was largely limited in its entanglements with the state forms of
mediation and its spatiotemporal coordination of participation and bureaucratic procedure. At
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times, this engagement left the campaign little time to continue fostering the shared imaginations
it encountered in the diverse communities it helped mobilize. In these communities, and across
the city, there are still many urban worlds lived and imagined. The political potential of these
everyday forms of imagination are unknowable outside of organization. Can the campaign
continue to construct a platform to share them?
While urban space, and specifically how it is conceived by state planning, has been the
contested terrain of the citywide mobilizations, the campaign has also been an urban movement
centered around time. Harvey (1996: 51–52) conceptualizes the city as a “production of specific
and quite heterogeneous spatiotemporal forms embedded within different kinds of social
action… [an] urbanisation constitutive of and by social processes.” Hamara Shehar has
attempted to challenge the state temporality of deadlines, extensions, and delays as well as state
and market visions of the future of the city. The political compositions of the campaign
manifested over five years as a series of temporary and nonlinear convergences of people and
their urban experiences. In each encounter, the citywide alliance constituted itself. What kinds of
political cultures and vocabularies these mobilizations give expression to, and how we might
understand their beginnings, effects, and unlikely durations will be part of the city’s historical
archive. New beginnings, brief conclusions, unexpected openings, and defeating closures are part
of the collective history of this unprecedented attempt at asserting the popular right to shape the
urban environment—all essential moments of political imagination and, it is to be hoped, the
inauguration of new urban realities to come.
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CHAPTER 7
Rethinking Subaltern Urban Theory:
Spatial Justice and Political Possibility
“The task, as it now stands, cannot, I think, be taken forward within the framework of the concepts and methods
mobilized in Subaltern Studies and certainly cannot be carried out by the original participants in that project. What is
needed is not an extension or reformulation of Subaltern Studies; what is needed are new projects. Even if the
specific project called Subaltern Studies begun thirty years ago has run its course, it has managed to scatter, reinvent
and insert itself in several subsequent projects. The questions it asked have now taken other forms; to answer them,
it is necessary to craft new theoretical concepts. Subaltern Studies was a product of its time; another time calls for
other projects.” —Partha Chatterjee, “After Subaltern Studies,” (2012: 49)

Subaltern Urbanism: An unruly formation of ideas
This chapter critically situates the ethnographic context of Mumbai’s recent urban social
mobilization in the existing literature on the politics of cities of the Global South, with particular
attention to subaltern urban theory. It explores the encounter between Subaltern Studies and
urban social theory to better assess how the Subaltern intellectual tradition can help us
understand the transformative potential of urban mobilizations around land, housing, livelihood
and planning in Mumbai and other Indian cities. In doing so, the chapter also considers the status
of post-coloniality and postcolonial urban studies in the contemporary urban world and asks: can
this body of urban theory, so animated by the assumptions of the Subaltern Studies project, help
us understand the transformations underway in such cities? Asking whether subaltern urbanism
can provide a bottom-up theory of urbanism is a likely starting point given that these ideas
greatly influence current habits of urban thought on South Asian cities.
By assessing what subaltern urbanism offers to the study of Southern cities and what
critical work it is able to do to render legible the forces shaping urban society in much of the
postcolonial world, the chapter shows how the ethnographic materials and analyses of Southern
urban social movements presented in this dissertation draw upon but also critically point beyond
subaltern urban theory. I make the argument that recent experiences of municipalist movements
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and urban politics in Mumbai contribute theoretically to understandings of grassroots and
popular politics in global South cities shaped through histories of colonial and capitalist
development, as well as interpretations of a planetary world of cities shaped by global populist
upsurges and polarizations. In assessing subaltern urbanism through the lens of the ethnographic
research presented in this dissertation, I find that despite its many contributions to urban thought,
subaltern urbanism lacks a critical approach to understanding antagonisms and conflict of
postcolonial capitalist development as central to the complex terrain of subaltern social
experiences.
Given the efforts of Subaltern Studies since the early 1980s to highlight the significance
of popular politics and mobilization from below in postcolonial India, my aim is to assess the
status of “subaltern urbanism” in enabling a theoretically and politically responsive theory to
today’s urban question. Subaltern urbanism may be understood as one offshoot amongst many of
the Subaltern Studies Collective that has “managed to scatter, reinvent and insert itself in several
subsequent projects”—a loose formation of ideas that attempts to theorize postcolonial cities and
its subaltern spaces and classes. An emphasis on popular politics, everyday “insurgence,” and
forms of informal life, as I discuss below, have been its hallmark features.
Even though subaltern urbanism is not itself a single coherent urban theory, its
conceptual background and its major theoretical propositions are nevertheless worth
exploring.188 In order to underline its concern with spatial politics and spatial justice, we must
first give shape to the loose formation of ideas that animate the subaltern urbanist literature.
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“The proliferation of scholars using adjectives such as insurgent and occupancy urbanism seek to open up new
windows onto those ways of inhabiting the city that run counter to or disrupt global urbanism. [But] like global
urbanism, subaltern urbanism is not a coherent theory” (Sheppard, Leitner, and Maringanti 2013:5). As Chibber
acerbically notes, just as the Subaltern Studies Collective eschews “clearly constructed propositions” and displays a
“reluctance to strive for coherence” (2013: 3), so too is it difficult to locate in subaltern urbanist literature major
theoretical propositions in clearly worked out principles or a coherent system.
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These are examined in three parts by (I) assessing subaltern urbanism as a geohistorical critique
of urban theory, (II) tracing its proposed methodological approaches, and relatedly (III)
evaluating its main political formulations. Doing so will reveal the spatial thought undergirding
subaltern urbanism, and particularly the limitations for understanding the diverse class projects
and politics embedded in histories of colonial and postcolonial development and the related
heterogeneity of popular mobilizations around present day planning and governance. Limitations
emerge in subaltern urbanism’s concern with metaphorical centers and margins, its spatial bias
toward methodological localism in conjunction with the abstract space of “worlding,” and its
critique of modernity through planning and other instruments of state-spatiality.

I. Geohistorical Critique
Following established critiques of coloniality, subaltern urbanism stresses attention to variation
in historical-epistemic conditions in the constitution of urban worlds and the necessity to
overcome dependency on Northern models in urban theory. Identifying the disjuncture between
the conception of Northern and Southern cities as the main locus of its geohistorical critique,
subaltern urbanism can be understood as a transposition of postcolonial theories brought to bear
on urban questions. Subsequently, an examination of the theories of urbanism, urbanization, and
urban development it offers as challenges to western urban theory would reveal the foundations
of a consistent and significant intervention in the field of urban studies.
Subaltern urbanism emerges in part as a response to a larger intellectual project of
Southern or nonwestern urban theory that seeks to invent new ways of imagining the twenty-first
century metropolis and rethinking the geography of urban thought given the challenges and
specificities of the contemporary moment. This project emerges as the urbanisation process has
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become increasingly “consolidated, intensified and accelerated” (Brenner and Keil 2006:5) under
conditions of globalization and financialization; or in Marcuse’s (2000) terms, when the “new
urban spatial order” has become the “new world capitalist order.”
Globalization has had profound implications for the structure and nature of urban society
in India, from the integration of Indian financial, labor, and capital markets into new global and
regional scales; the reorganization and disciplining of India’s labor force along new patterns of
rural-urban migration and within a new international division of labor; the circulation of new
aesthetic, image, and cultural flows tied to particular commodity logics; the rise of supraglobal
regulatory regimes imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank through
structural adjustment; the violent stirrings of ethnic and national chauvinism both articulated and
disarticulated from the state; the increased pressure of transnational competition amongst cities;
and the restructuring of state governments along urban land interests of local and transnational
capital.
Decolonization and post-Independence was undoubtedly a profound era of change in
Indian society, sparking the need for something called Southern theory to address problems
around colonialism itself. These have largely orchestrated around the following themes: the
continuities between the colonial and postcolonial state; and post-independence forms of
subordination and marginality on a world scale; the experience of loss and the unmaking of
institutions and social orders; discontinuous time and the ruptures of the post-colonial social
order in terms of nationalist ambition and ideals of progress; the significance of land in social
structure; and the possibilities of an alternative universalism, or multiple universalities.
The major questions of global urban studies emerged in response to these trends as
observed in numerous cities around the world. Subaltern urbanism interrogates critically the
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“location” of these forces as arising from the “west” but its tendency has been to look at the
heterogeneity of urban practices, identities, and processes as a way to reimagine the city
differently.189 Thus the project seeks to “go beyond the west” (Edensor and Jayne 2012).
Nonwestern urban theory argues that the very imaginaries of “east” and “west” are
profound structuring forces of historical difference. As stated, subaltern urbanism’s primary
concern is with representation: how certain urban formations are represented as “megacities” and
how its “subaltern classes” and “subaltern spaces” are represented. One of the founding premises
of “difference” that this approach takes is in locating the globalizing force of colonialism as
having significantly shaped nonwestern cities “differently” in the post-colonial period. The
implication is that “because the historical trajectories of capitalist development and nationalism
in South Asia departed so fundamentally from those of the West, the theoretical categories
derived from the Western experience can only mischaracterize them” (Levien 2013: 486). As
Simone states, “if colonialism is to be retained as a useful concept in understanding African
urban history, it requires appreciating the different influences that were brought to bear on
particular urban spaces” (2004: 19). Southern cities have unique encounters with and experiences
of colonialism, and postcolonial urban theory calls for an appreciation of these differences over
shared models for understanding how their legacies have in some ways cohered and propagated
global processes of urban restructuring.
Critiques of these discursive distinctions, even knowledge formations such as critical
urban theory, are vitally important, but in themselves do not nearly exhaust our need to
understand the diversity of patterns of urbanization that both distinguish and coarticulate the
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If globalization theory has in some ways yielded global urbanism, Subaltern and postcolonial theory has helped
shaped subaltern urbanism as a way to deal with the inadequacies of the former. But, as I go on to discuss, its spatial
thinking fails to offer new understanding of capital as a problem of spatiality and scale.
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west and nonwest. As I show in the case of Mumbai, “difference” importantly emerges through
site-specific pathways of economic development, the contingencies of planning as responses to
specific political agendas, as well as the timing, practices, and modes of incorporation into the
world economy. The development legacy of Mumbai is undeniably marked through its own
cultural and political specificities as well as specific historical relationships to imperial
dominance, colonial extraction, postcolonial economic dependency, and social polarization
imposed by the financial centers of global capitalism on the peripheries. But at the same time,
theorizing the contemporary urban condition and possible futures urgently requires an
articulation of the planetary connections between the development futures of Mumbai and other
cities in the world.190
Certainly, urban theory can learn immensely from Southern cities, but the one-way theory
of the Global South (in which “Euro-America is evolving toward Africa,” Comaroff and
Comaroff 2012) is misleading. In some cases, core cities are increasingly following a pattern of
development that can be traced to colonial origins in Southern cities, but their articulation in the
present, in terms of growing unemployment, carceral and security logics, states of exception,
declining infrastructure, deteriorating environments, collapsing social deals, institutional
weakness and instability, are altogether contemporary, connected, and commensurate challenges
for radical urban theory—in both its “western” and “nonwestern” approaches.

Subaltern Urbanism’s Spatial Critique of Modernity
Subalternists are critical of the presumption that “capitalism, liberalism and the other hallmarks
of modernity are dominant. . . [and that the] institutions that are dominant in official documents
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Moreover, singular attachments to colonial pasts as the markers of difference entrenches an insufficient, in some
cases implicitly conservative, view of the present.
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and in elite economic, political and social circles [are by extension] prevalent throughout
society” (van Dijk 2014:20, 21). In this regard, it aims to “fundamentally pluralize the history of
power in global modernity” (Chakrabarty 2000:14). So too does subaltern urbanism challenge
the presumption that the postcolonial city can be explained by development and modernity. A
rejection of ‘eurocentric’ models for urban development is tempered however by the need to
grapple with the difficulty of not having a vernacular vision of the modern city; that is until the
global city discourse of the 1990s rendered postcolonial cities globally connected.
Nevertheless, subaltern urbanism emphasizes the seemingly un-integrated and
ungoverned relationships and life practices that constantly leave their imprint on the lives of the
elite and on their institutions of government. Instead of poor and subaltern uses of the city being
taken as anachronistic to urban futures (defined increasingly by middle class and elite aesthetics
and ways of inhabiting the city), they are valorized in subaltern urban theory, taken to be
contemporary and significant elements of urban modernity as lived experience of the
contemporary city.191 Subaltern urbanism, like its Subaltern Studies predecessors, therefore also
marks an engagement with the historical archive in which subaltern figures are the primary
agents, read “against the grain” in an attempt to assemble a subaltern perspective.
Moreover, in its critiques of the instruments of modernity, subaltern urbanism assumes
development and planning is “an elite-organized ideology of refashioning society” (Patel 2010:
286)—often dismissing development and planning as one-dimensional sources of domination
whose power is articulated precisely through logics of exclusion. At the same time, a prevalent
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This tendency stands in contradiction with some of subaltern urbanists’ own formulations on marginalized
populations. Chatterjee asks, for example, “will [the dispossessed urban poor] accept their redundancy without
protest? Will they react to the new and glaring social disparities? If democracy has indeed taken root in India’s
cities, will political society provide the instruments for negotiating a controlled transition to a new urban regime or
will it explode into anarchic resistance?” (2004:188)
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motif is the allusion to, and celebration of, the continually thwarted planner through the
subaltern’s fickle and occasionally eloquent gestures of desire, ambition, and inventiveness that
overrun the ordinary and expected spatial rules of engagement. Ashis Nandy describes the
‘unintended city’ as
“the city that was never part of the formal ‘master plan’ but always implicit in it. This
unintended city consists of the growing number of poor housed in slums and streets who
provide the cheap labour and services without which the official city could not survive.
Exploited and disenfranchised, the existence of this other cannot be acknowledged by the
official city as part of itself. Seen from the lens of modernisation, the huge mass of
India’s urban poor appears ‘obsolete’ in the march of progress. But this ‘obsolete’
population refuses to “bow out of history,” and exhibits an “obstinate ability to return and
‘illegitimately’ occupy a large space in the public domain” (Nandy 1998:2, 3; quoted in
Prakash 2002).
This emphasis on insurgence against planning is especially true for the study of megacities, the
main stage for subalternist thought. Roy states “ontological readings of the megacity and its
urbanisms have repeatedly invoked the lifeworld of the informal….Here the slum economy is
interpreted as a grassroots uprising against state bureaucracy, a revolution from below,” but as I
argue in the case of planning in Mumbai, these must be recognized in a context of how the
history of uneven capitalist development has produced a pervasive lived informality for the poor
as well as a far-reaching elite informality predicated on appropriations and misdirection of law
and state administration (2011b: 227, 232, Cf Bayat 2007).
Gyan Prakash points to the new symbolic setting of the contemporary city in the national
imagination as shifting from “the erosion in the authority of the historicist narrative of Indian
modernity and the emergence of a new politics of urban space” (2002: 5).192 Yet subaltern
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This transition reveals the “general problem intrinsic to the nation-state’s historicist discourse of modernisation –
the inability of its linear narrative to accommodate the spatiality of historical processes, the uncomfortable
coexistence of the modern and the ‘obsolete’, the intrusion of the rural in the urban, the combined emergence of
official and unintended cities. The city’s historical geography of power, culture, and society resists its representation
as evolution and development.” (Ibid.)
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urbanism’s double-sided critique of modernity remains inadequate to the challenge of
understanding how political modernity itself is changing and how the urban has become a
profoundly important arena for conflicts and struggles over power. Though it has become a
terrain for the market subjugation, as I show in through the diverse campaign participants of
Hamara Shehar, it is rarely the case that those excluded from planning want to live without the
recognition and rights that city planning practices are meant to guarantee. Indeed, planning has
become increasingly an important realm of struggle, engagement, as well as refusal for
transforming the terms in which decisions are made, priorities delineated, and plans
implemented. As this dissertation has argued, the efforts of Hamara Shehar Mumbai to mobilize
both dissent and popular alternatives as interventions in the drafting of the twenty-year municipal
Development Plan have shown that a challenge to historically produced informality and
developmentalist planning can be challenged. By emphasizing a politics of symbolic refusal and
exception rather than a politics of urban struggle and reclamation on the terrain of modernity,
subaltern urbanist critique is immobilized by forms of neoliberal urban governance and marketoriented entrepreneurialism that have made planning much more problematically “inclusive”
even as it remains “exclusive.”

II. Methodological Approaches
Localism
Subaltern urbanists call for a decentered, multiple, situated theory and practice in place of what
they take to be universalizing and abstracting epistemologies prevalent in “western theory.”193
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Subaltern urbanism largely theorizes the object of its enquiry, i.e. the postcolonial city, and the ontology of its
agents (subalterns and dominant groups), as different from western theories of urbanism. Consequently, subaltern
urbanism rethinks the politics of urban life from the perspective of how the way dominant and subaltern groups
operate, relate, and struggle, is different from the usual (western) urban story. “Alternative theorizations will require
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Rather, subaltern urbanism attends to the neglected alternative histories rendered insignificant by
theories of contemporary globalization and urbanization, and seeks to foreground “the
heterogeneity and multiplicity of metropolitan modernities” and existing subaltern
cosmopolitanisms as a new approach to understanding nonwestern, noneurocentric urbanism
(Roy 2009b).194 The contention is that there are rich localizations of social, economic, cultural
formation, as well as political contestation sedimented in these cities that are obscured by an
overarching concern with what globalization theory typically offers. In doing so, however, their
spatial thinking is largely blunted by a lack of critical scalar politics with regards to
understandings of urban processes and the conditions of knowledge production about urban
society.
As such subaltern urbanism privileges everyday lived urban life and focuses resolutely on
tactics, encroachments and subversions, and accommodations, “explicitly or implicitly working
to disrupt mainstream global urbanism by attending to the tactics of survival and subversion
resorted to by subaltern or subordinated populations” (Sheppard, Leitner, and Maringanti (2013:
5). Therefore, its spatial imagination remains fixed in place, relying on local scales to challenge
the authority of larger ones. Yet this methodological “localism” limits the purview and fetishizes
the nature, relations, and coordinates of power to which subalternity refers. These coordinates of
power, their operations, effects, and relations challenge urbanists to better understand the critical
nexus of everyday life, institutions of the state, capital, and the conditions of possibility and

that urban scholars take seriously the distinct situated knowledges that emerge in and through Southern livelihood
practices. By “Southern,” we mean those, everywhere, whose livelihoods have been made precarious by
geohistorical processes of colonialism and globalizing capitalism.” (Sheppard, Leitner, and Maringanti 2013: 6). The
major claim here is that spaces of colonial and postcolonial modernity were, and continue to be, heterogeneous. In
this regard what is understood as the informal— its practices, meanings, and contestations—is, in many significant
ways, a long and contradictory path of governmental policies with checkered histories of resistance with regard to
planning and the economy that are indeed constitutive of the “modern” in postcolonial societies.
194
The geohistorical critique (representation/discourses of subjugation) suggests a methodology found in the
resurrection of subjugated, or subaltern, knowledges.
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strategies of organized collective action. But to their own detriment, subaltern urbanists make
few attempts to contribute to these questions precisely because they avoid these engagements,
considering them far too “contaminated already by elitism and grand theory.” (Ibid.)
The limits of subaltern urbanism’s tendency to “romanticize its localized otherness”
strangely align with the call to provincialize the geography of urban theory through a “worlding”
of subalternity (Sheppard, Leitner, and Maringanti 2013). The subaltern urban argument is that
global urban theory disavows the nature of nonwestern cities by allowing capital to take center
analytic stage as the main factor shaping modern urbanization, falsely assuming that capitalism
develops in all places in more or less the same way (Chattopadhyay 2012). Moreover, subaltern
urbanists’ claim is that global urban theory invalidates understanding of other forms of being-inthe-world, other itineraries of recognition available for understanding nonwestern cities
(Mayaram 2008, Ong 2011.)195 While the theorization of being-in-the-world is often intensely
localized in ethnographic accounts, I have illustrated in the previous chapters a different worldmaking process that has arisen in Mumbai—and that has inspired various scales of spatial
production—from diverse participants of grassroots mobilizations in a city-wide platform that
mobilizes spatial imaginaries across different locations in the city and region.

Difference and Process
‘Difference’ in the subaltern urbanist lexicon comes to mean a range of things—on one end,
“historical difference” judged on a world scale (the cause and effect of enduring epistemologies
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This worlding of subaltern urbanism is different than the critical philosophical/political economy approaches of
‘world-as-city’ theorization (cf Madden 2012) that consider the urban-world imaginary from the problematic of
planetary urbanization, which is “uneven and unequal and ranging across radically different social spaces, [and] has
covered the globe and brought ‘the most remote parts of the world into its orbit and woven diverse areas, peoples,
and activities into a cosmos’ (Ibid. 773).
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of coloniality), and on the other, a multitude of social differences understood as indexes of
inequality and injustice. But is the subalternists’ argument with the West or the “center,” which
continue to dominate the state of postcolonial urban theory today, adequate for an actual critique
of global capital and does the archeology of the South it offers in response help us to think about
the politics of uneven development and its connective conditions? Limitations arise in how
differences are understood as representations or discursive manifestations of colonial powerknowledge (in a critical Saidian tradition unhinged, for example, from the political-strategic antiimperial traditions of Frantz Fanon, CLR James, Walter Rodney).
Chibber argues that “to be universalized, capitalism need not revolutionize entire
cultures; it need only transform those institutions vital to its reproduction” (2013: 233–234). A
central dispute that subaltern urbanism has is precisely with this formulation of capital or
capitalism, and its urban forms, as indeed universalized. This leads subalternists to highlight
difference as evidence against universalization. The mutual misreading between subalternists and
their critics has to do with the contested assumption that universalization is tantamount to
homogenization; and the confusion between the relation between critical concepts, such as
global/globalization, universal/universalization, and generalization/universalization (Roy 2015).
Important theoretical sophistication has nonetheless emerged within the wake of
subaltern studies that shows precisely the nonunitary and unstable nature of capital’s energies as
it strives for, but cannot achieve universality (Gidwani 2008). Universalization, the “beingbecoming” of capital, as Gidwani shows, is an incomplete, and interrupted, process. The process
necessitates differentiation, the reorganization of certain differences and the consolidation of
others, the constant attempt to reorder the world according to hierarchies that may stabilize the
conditions of its own reproduction, even as these hierarchies are also (potentially and actually)
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the source of its own fundamental instability. These requirements are not guaranteed outcomes,
but rather its conditions of possibility. As Taylor warns, failing to take capital’s ontological
uncertainty as a starting point
“provides capital with the security of its logical categories, rather than emphasising the
inherent instability of them and the ways in which the circuits of capital constantly
attempt to secure their moorings in social relations and institutions whose provenance can
in no way be derived from capital. On the other, it serves to confine our understanding of
historical struggles by limiting them to the binaries of a world seen through the categories
of capital [and] consequently serve to rationalise – rather than contextualise and contest –
capital’s ‘voracious capacity to incorporate difference and marginalised others as a force
for legitimising the system’” (2010: 14).
This points to a new ontology of capital that takes seriously its effects on the social world but
does not take its logics as guaranteed, permanent, or universal. It marks an engagement with
capital’s lifeworld amongst post-subalternists that is desperately missing from subaltern
urbanists.
Subaltern urbanists quite often either avoid engaging with critiques of capital altogether,
or they compartmentalize them. The basis of this tendency in postcolonial theory can be traced to
the distinction Chakrabarty makes in Provincializing Europe between what he terms ‘History 1’
and ‘History 2.’196 Following Chakrabarty, we find in subaltern urbanism a parallel theory that
can be remapped as ‘Urban 1’ and ‘Urban 2’: the first are those historical conditions posited by
capital as “part of its [urbanizing] life process” and the second to those historical conditions
encountered by capital but not posited by it. That is, postcolonial cities are not the history of
capital alone, nor do they in the present bear the marks of capitalist spatialization only. Its
universalization is always incomplete, however destructive and dominant. This is a central
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Sheppard, Leitner, and Maringanti (2013) discuss the need to bring geography into the postcolonial historical
critique implied in Chakrabarty’s terms and have instead proposed the spatialized terms ‘Geohistory 1’ and
‘Geohistory 2’.
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contradiction of capital, something that needs more careful engagement and understanding from
perspectives on the ground of Southern and Northern cities alike.
Yet both subalternists and their most vocal critics tend to adopt a one-sided approach
with regard to the dichotomy (either we theorize History/Urban 1 or we theorize History/Urban
2) that obscures the complex-in-motion that is capital’s unstable life world and its urbanizing
tendencies.197 Subaltern urbanists offer a critical reading of the logic of development as
dependent on the “homogenous empty time” of bourgeois spatial thought, which mark
alternative concepts of time and space as categorically anterior to and subordinate to bourgeois
thought. However, they tend simply to read subalternity as the condition of “plenitude” and
“creativity” as substitute narratives that otherwise signify “lack” and “inadequacy.” This reflects
their profound skepticism of the representation of certain features of ‘third-world’ cities as
metonymically the illegal slum, the disorderly mega-city, or the “premature metropolis” (Bose in
Chatterjee 2004).198

Spatial and Scalar Unevenness
The subaltern urban literature has tended to reproduce the postcolonial perspective in the debated
limits of historicist theories of uneven development. In earlier debates, the laws that govern
historic stages of development were taken to operate differently in different nation-state contexts.
This drove assumptions about capital’s universalism as a rule from which to measure historical,
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Attending to the political economy of capitalist reproduction, Levien states, “so long as workers provide the
requisite surplus value, they can have all the cultural difference they want; indeed, capitalists often exploit such
differences to their advantage” (2013: 490). Chakrabarty conceded the same point decades ago in Rethinking
Working Class History when he wrote “perhaps we have long overestimated capitalism’s need or capacity to
homogenize the cultural conditions necessary for its own reproduction” (1989: xiii).
198
The methodological approach here is to focus on ontology while undertheorizing scale. This leaves subaltern
urbanists with a conception that there are ontologically discrete or autonomous domains of life, as opposed to social
life as constituted through overlapping scalar productions of difference.
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political, and cultural variation. As such, “transitions” to capital and “articulations” of
precapitalist modes of production with productive forces of capital were set against a master
narrative of capitalist development. Moreover, questions of spatial difference were often
subsumed within a territorial grid that took the nation-state as the unit of comparison.
Indeed, moving beyond top-down, capitalist-centric perspectives on uneven development
is an urgent task and something that can be common cause for new critical subalternist and
Marxist perspectives. A subaltern approach might for example emphasize the co-constructed
productions of urban spaces, and thereby engage with and reformulate a theory of unevenness
within an urban world dominated but not reducible to capital. Current subaltern urbanist
literature might in this way offer more than the usual postcolonial strategies of emphasizing
difference in representations of spaces that stop short of critiques of capitalist development’s
differentiating tendencies.
Yet in its inheritance of the tools of postcolonial theory, the spatial thinking of subaltern
urbanism have largely evaded radical scalar critiques and thereby obscured questions of
unevenness. As Smith (1992) argued, however, scale matters: “the construction of geographic
scale is a primary means through which spatial differentiation ‘takes place’; [moreover] the
production of geographic scale is the site of potentially intense political struggle.” He states,
“The continual production and reproduction of scale expresses the social as much as
geographical contest to establish boundaries between different places, locations, and sites
of experience. The making of place implies the production of scale insofar as places are
made different from each other; scale is the criterion of difference not between places so
much as between different kinds of places” (67).
The Subaltern Studies project increasingly gravitated toward postcolonial critique focused on
representations, as opposed to an anticolonial project critical of class and social power via
Gramscian-Marxist inspired Indian historiography, or spatial Marxist tradition of Lefebvre who
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defined colonization as “state-bound territorial relationships of domination.” As such, subaltern
urbanism involves the “rethinking” and “reworking” of forms of knowledge linked to colonialism
and western domination.
Given its lack of critical attention to issues of scale, we do not find a ready model for
how to move past descriptive accounts of marginalization as the primary manifestation of spatial
differentiation. The challenge is to unseat the hierarchies often implied in the politics of scale, to
understand how they interrelate and influence each other. By focusing on spaces of
representation while being blind to a politics of scale, subaltern urbanism fails to address both
the mechanisms that produce the spatial differentiation that in fact critically defines subalternity,
as well as a politics of struggle that has politically important implications for how Southern cities
are in fact transformed.
There is a missed opportunity here to attend to real structures of power in the world
system, to acknowledge and build upon translocal subaltern circulations of knowledges emerging
from manifold struggles. This is a different call than from those whose mandate is for more
empirical studies as a way to clarify variations in the urban world. Rather, as I develop in this
dissertation, the call is for a hermeneutics of struggle and their spatial-scalar politics as a means
to understand the urban condition. This new politics of urban space requires us also to think with
struggles at a planetary scale, an urgent task obscured by the perceived opposition of Southern
and Northern theory.

III. Political implications
These considerations on the spatial thinking behind the subaltern urbanist project allow us to
assess subaltern urbanism as critical urban theory and pose key questions about its political
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implications. One of the most important tasks of contemporary urban theory is to elucidate
power relations as they function in cities and make operable and inoperable certain kinds of
urbanism. Departing from understandings of “subaltern urbanism” as a literary device used to
focus attention to the nature of nonwestern postcolonial cities and to rethink and rework the
forms of knowledge available to understand these cities anew (Denis, Mukhopadhyay, and Zerah
2012: 52), we can interrogate the political implications of subaltern urbanism as an urban theory
of subalternity itself.
But just as subaltern urbanism is without a developed spatialized politics, its approach
has also largely avoided theorizing subalternity as articulated with certain spatioeconomic
patterns of capitalist development as well historically-specific power structures, relations, and
operations. As such, there has not been much in the way of analysis of how economic power is
constituted as social and political domination, or politics and class struggle conceived as
expressions of the unstable relations between social/political factors and economic development.
In short, subaltern urbanism largely remains a theory of social and political manifestations of
power, specifically with regard to marginalization and participation, but less an analysis of the
relationship between the social structures and political changes that condition subalternity.
By reframing the Indian urban question as one of governmental rule, Partha Chatterjee
(2004) proposes a spatiopolitical logic at work in postcolonial cities.199 Inherently fragmented,
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Through an inventive reading of Gramsci and Foucault, Chatterjee situates his critique in the geospatial present
of “most of the world,” as his book’s subtitle states. In practical terms, the “politics of the governed” typically
involves claims to habitation and livelihood by ‘groups of population whose very livelihood or habitation involve
violation of the law’.” (Roy 2011: 227) Thus, subaltern mobilizations, becomings, and expressions originate, and
almost invariably remain within the confines of “governmentality” and appeal to state exception. This is a far
different logic, the logic of the governed, as opposed to the logic of the citizen, for whom ‘civil society’ is the
domain of rights-bearing, enfranchised (bourgeois) citizens for whom the principles of liberal democracy prevail.
Yet a host of critical voices show how Chatterjee’s formulation fails to capture the actual on-the-ground dynamics of
the politics of contemporary subaltern groups in India (see e.g. Baviskar and Sundar, 2008; Shah, 2008; Sundar and
Sundar, 2012; and also Nilsen and Roy 2015).
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power in urban society operates in different domains—civil society, political society, and “an
outside beyond the boundaries of political society” (Chatterjee, 2008: 61)—in which new
techniques of governing population groups give rise to a mass politics that is differentiated and
contradictory on the basis of identity and interest groups. Chatterjee employs the analytic
“political society” to characterize this population:
“Populations are empirical categories of people with specific social or economic
attributes that are relevant for the administration of developmental or welfare policies….a
heterogeneous social, consisting of multiple population groups to be addressed through
multiple and flexible policies….This was in sharp contrast with the conception of
citizenship in which the insistence on the homogeneous national was both fundamental
and relentless….[Moreover] unlike citizenship, which carries the moral connotation of
sharing in the sovereignty of the state and hence of claiming rights in relation to the state,
populations do not bear any inherent moral claim” (Chatterjee 2004: 177).200
Subaltern urbanism overwhelmingly names the conditions of governmental rule over
differentiated population.201 However, for some, subaltern urbanism also describes a “great
transformation” of Indian cities, in which ‘the attempt to create a market-oriented society from
above compels a movement from below to moderate its severely dislocating effects’ (Ruparelia,
Reddy, Harriss, and Corbridge 2011:2). In this mode, the project is attuned to recovering the
political agency of various subaltern groups, marginalized not only by the state and economy, but
also by dominant left perspectives.202 The political consequences of the subaltern urbanist project
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But, as van Djik states, “recent research shows that political society is utilized by the state, private sector, and
middle-class actors as well as by poorer groups. Political society can function as a publicly disavowed, but
nonetheless active, auxiliary of state and capital interests as well” (2014: 25, 26).
201
For some, Challerjee’s political society signals a complete departure from the original approach of the Subaltern
Studies Collective. Aditya Nigam states, for example, that originally “[Subaltern Studies] was not so much about the
ways in which the colonial government and nationalist elites ‘managed’ subaltern populations but, on the contrary,
the ways in which, the subaltern escaped the mechanisms of control…. But then these were studies that came out of
the Gramscian-Guhaian phase of Subaltern Studies. It was in the second phase (the late subaltern studies) that what
Sumit Sarkar described as the ‘Disappearance of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies’ actually occurred. … Elite
knowledge and politics, and the Chatterjee-ian notion of governmentality-as-welfare, become the instruments of
discipline and control. (Nigam 2011).
202
Many of these subaltern—“the sexed and sexual subalterns,” “urban subalterns,” “rural subalterns,” “projectaffected subalterns,” the religious subaltern, etc. (comprised of women, transgendered people, Adivasis, informal
sector workers, Dalits)—have not only been marginalized in relation to the postcolonial state but have also occupied
a relatively peripheral position in dominant left politics since independence in 1947 (Omvedt 1993).
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therefore lie in more accurately defining the complexity of consolidation of governmental rule
and market society, its uneven processes and outcomes.

Bottom up urbanism
The response to the vast field of governmental rule has been formulated with regard to subaltern
politics through two divergent emphases: on the one hand micropolitics and the spatiocultural
formations of everyday life, and on the other, macro level analyses of the dialectic of power and
resistance. The inaugural statement of the Subaltern Studies Collective makes clear that the
politics of the project would rest on recovering and valorizing “the contributions made by the
people on their own, that is, independently of the elite” (Guha 1982: 3). In their emphasis on
“history from below,” the Subaltern Studies established a “reversal of perspective,” assigning
primacy to a manifold of resistance in order to rethink the unstable and shifting conditions of
power.203 The essentially antagonistic relations between subaltern masses and elites were
identified in the Collective’s early work through countless resistances and insurgencies against
subordination, economic underdevelopment, and cultural domination. The dialectical
relationship between domination and insurgency was a recurring object of analysis, and though
they sought to rethink the primacy of class, these dynamics were nevertheless understood as
articulations of a manifold of social struggle.
This “reversal of perspective” of the early Subaltern Studies project, with its emphasis on
an autonomous domain of politics, can be traced in the subaltern urbanist “from below”
approach, yet in curious new arrangements. Its most obvious continuities can be seen in the
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This approach is in fact part of a long arc of “Copernican Revolutions” in political thought made from the 1950s–
1980s by CLR James, Italian autonomists such as Mario Tronti, British social historians such as Christopher Hill
and E.P. Thompson.
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subaltern urbanist emphasis on spaces and forms of popular agency that “often remain invisible
and neglected in the archives and annals of urban theory” (Roy 2011b: 224). For scholars such as
AbdouMalik Simone, this is best addressed by attending to the self-activity of ordinary people as
expressions and negotiations of vernacular forms of power. Simone (2004), for instance,
challenges the ready assumption that most African cities are “dysfunctional arenas of the
political in the modern age” with weak states in conditions of constant emergency, and indeed
should not work. Yet, he reminds us, these cities do indeed work; and they are moreover the loci
of many forms of politics that produce a lot of energy but also a lot of wasted potential. He
emphasizes many such contradictions in this subaltern conception of the city in which
informality is not an aberration but a platform for emergent politics.204
Similarly, Pieterse sustains a subaltern focus on “cityness” itself: “on the inventiveness of
survivalist practices and the worldliness of African cities: the goal is not to romanticize life in the
periphery, life in the slums, but more to determine what people do in the city, what people do
with each other, and how these (non) relationships impact on the individual, the institutions of
the state—where they are present—and the making of the city itself” (2010: 213). This notion of
subaltern self-activity and invention is central to the notion of urbanism as a manifold of cities
within cities, “as the designs and struggles of many attempting to recognize each other as one,
always imposing themselves on the other, as well as finding ways to leave each other alone”
(Simone 2012: 46). Simone states
“far from being marginal to contemporary processes of scalar recomposition and the
reimagination of political communities, African cities can be seen as a frontier for a wide
range of diffuse experimentation with the reconfiguration of bodies, territories, and social
arrangements necessary to recalibrate technologies of control” (2004:2).
204

The dilemma that arises here is with parsing out a politics from these activities. Self-reliance may give rise to
many instances and networks of mutual support, sanitation, shelter etc., but they are also embedded in operations of
informal power that abuse and control others. Simone embraces this double-sidedness and therefore eschews
political evaluation.
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Thus, there is an emphasis on the contributions to urban society “made by the people on their
own,” an assertion that what subalterns do outside the realm of formal politics constitutes many
centers rather than the margins of city-making. This decentering and recentering, the arrival at a
multiplication of politics, is a welcome response to the erasures of top-down analyses of power.
The primacy and dynamism of everyday people situates their many maneuvers as the analytic
compass for navigating the mysterious realm of urban politics.
These transformations also point to the curious limits of subalternity as politics: while
emphasizing relations of control and escape, it simultaneously eschews a theory of urban
relations as viewed “from below,” mediated through processes of domination, marginalization,
exploitation, and subordination. Somehow along the way, the conception of politics as
antagonism is done away with, the simultaneously urgent encounters with domination and
resistance quietly uncouple. The expectation that some resistance is part of the story is still
acknowledged, yet the meaning of resistance changes. In suggesting that power, traditionally
conceived, is so porous to the point of irrelevance, it also tends to mystify the structural
conditions that in fact constrain them. Subalternists analyze the conditions of insurgence,
subversion, and escape, rather than insurrection and direct confrontations with power.
Absent critical interrogations of power, it is unclear whether this view from below can
accumulate even “incremental” radical change in the order of things, to move from the margins
to something more substantive, and what that would do to change relations of power. As long as
the “subaltern” remains a philosophical perspective, a critique of epistemology and ontology,
rather than a theory of subjectivity through struggle, within and against powers, the chances are
slim that we’ll find out. For Spivak, one stops being subaltern as soon as one acts politically to
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achieve representation within a hegemonic formation: “you name it in the hope that the name
will disappear” (1990: 158).

Absent antagonism
Whereas the conceptual operation of decentering class may open space to attend to other logics
of subordination, the simultaneous absence of antagonism as a component of its analysis limits
subaltern urbanism as a theory of politics and limits its ability to contribute to questions of
spatial justice. This is a departure from a Gramscian sense of politics in the following two ways:
(1) a notion of antagonism without class that amounts to popular politics; and (2) a notion of
class without antagonism that is theorized as the habitus of the dispossessed. Both represent the
limited ways in which agency and autonomy are routinely conceived in subaltern urbanist
thinking.205 We see that the question of political agency posed in this way is central to how
subaltern urbanism constructs an “urbanism from below.” Earlier, the Subaltern Studies
Collective grappled with how to theorize the limits to which the subaltern can or cannot be “the
subject of history” and what political possibilities arise from relations to elite and state politics
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“In the work of the Subaltern Studies Collective, the agency of change came to be located in this sphere of
subaltern politics. In this sense, subalternity became more than the ‘general attribute of subordination’; it also
became a theory of agency, that of the ‘politics of the people’” (Guha, 1988: 40, quoted in Roy 2011: 226). This line
of questioning about the inherent agency of the subaltern is not unique to the Subaltern Studies Collective. In his
apocalyptic account of a ‘planet of slums’, Mike Davis (2004: 28) expresses anxiety about the political agency of
slum dwellers and how they can be conceived of as history agents. According to Davis, “they have little access to
the culture of collective labour or large-scale class struggle.” Against such accounts, subaltern urbanism recuperates
the figure of the slum dweller as a subject of history” (Roy 2011:228). As we’ve seen, theorists of subaltern
urbanism more broadly recover and align the subaltern as the figure that makes the subaltern city. “Subaltern
urbanism then is an important paradigm, for it seeks to confer recognition on spaces of poverty and forms of popular
agency that often remain invisible and neglected in the archives and annals of urban theory.” (Roy 2011:224) The
tendency has been to “assign unique political agency to the mass of urban subalterns.” (Roy 2011: 235) But the
forms of agency that scholars have uncovered are conceptually limited. Subalternity is not an issue of autonomous
domains of life and politics, but rather a measure of the power of social life.
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(“it neither originated from elite politics nor did its existence depend on the latter” (Guha 1982:
4)).206

Popular Politics: A Modified Notion of Antagonism without Class
The world of the subaltern, and its containment in/as subaltern spaces and subaltern classes is
defined by a “terrain constituted by the apparatuses of governmentality that attach to the state”
(Nilsen and Roy 2015: 5 fn4). Thus, for Chatterjee (ibid.: 40), it is not a separate or autonomous
domain or realm of society, but actually its opposite, the thorough interiorization of subalternity
into state logics. This interpretation offers a notion of popular politics without antagonism and
supplants previous notions of the subaltern in the rubric of “from below” and “from above.”
Subaltern Studies famously shifted their inquiries from subjecthood to citizenship, fundamentally
redefining subalternity within a “new framework of democratic citizenship – complex,
differentiated, perhaps fundamentally altered from the normative ideas of citizenship in western
liberal democracies, but nonetheless citizenship, not subjecthood” (Chatterjee 2012: 46). One
outcome of the subaltern urbanist inheritance of this legacy is found in their notions of
citizenship as well as the production of gendered, ethnic, and spatial subjectivities. The definition
of the urban field through rights, recognition, and mobilizations are changing the meaning of
subalternity through popular politics. Politics arising from conditions of informal life, referred to
in terms of habitus, is conceived as the sole domain of agency in subaltern urbanist literature.
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This concept of the people and their autonomy interpreted rural land relations through a composition of people
who were in one way or another just outside the actual reach of the state. The notion of autonomy that emerged,
even if exaggerated, was theorized within a particular historical context. It is not the case that contemporary urban
society affords autonomy in that same regard. Rather, if we are to continue to speak of autonomy in relation to the
subaltern, we need to reimagine both terms. This is what a reinvigorated reading of Gramsci may allow us, as Nilsen
(2015) and Hart (2012) and others are pursuing; new discoveries along this route may reveal Gramsci’s influence on
autonomist traditions of workerism, post-workerism, and therefore its relevance for what suggesting what reading
the urban through a different notion of autonomy may also allow us to do.
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Habitus of the Dispossessed: A Modified Notion of Class without Antagonism
Attention to “habitus”—the embodiment of one’s micro power of culture, the interplay of
agency, and structure, the things we just do—has been a hallmark feature of subaltern urbanism
as a means to understand subaltern urban practices and spaces. The view from the bottom is
assembled through a macro-sociology based on individualistic actions, the logic of practice in the
formation of “habitation, livelihood, self-organization, and politics” (Roy 2011b: 224). It claims
that it is the very existence as informal life that constitutes political agency and identity.
Subaltern urbanists in this sense deploy the concept of autonomy emerging from the Subaltern
Studies Collective to describe informal and infra-politics on the “margins of rules and
organizational arrangements” of the informal economy as a “world underneath” in the shadow of
the state (Castells and Portes 1989, Centeno and Portes 2006), addressing survival strategies of
the poor to posit the informal as a realm that is populated by entirely different subjectivities and
politics.
By conceiving of habitus as an attribute of subordinated people who inhabit an
autonomous realm (bounded and distinct from the elites), subaltern urbanism reproduces many
of the characteristics of the Subaltern Studies Collective that have been amply criticized as a
one-sided concern with representation. This representation of subalternity as habitus
“…is problematic: contemporary subaltern/subordinated populations do assert and speak
for themselves, developing very complex trajectories connecting with one another, the
state and capital (Chari, 2012). It also encourages the erroneous reading that attributes
resistance, subversion, illegality, informality etc. exclusively to subalterns, underplaying
how pervasively and effectively the rich and powerful also engage in such practices (Roy,
2009a)” (Sheppard, Leitner, and Maringanti 2013:5, emphasis added).
We see in theories of informal territoriality and insurgence in such writers as Asef Bayat,
Soloman Benjamin, and AbdouMalik Simone a slippage between “habitus” and “agency” in
which the “marginalized and deinstitutionalized subaltern” crafts a street politics best understood
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a “the quiet encroachment of the ordinary,” “flexibility, pragmatism, negotiation, as well as
constant struggle for survival and self-development” (Roy 2011b: 228). The idea of the “habitus
of the dispossessed”—of a slum and informal habitus—is a key feature of subaltern urbanism in
which informal life is itself a political agency and source of identity (Ibid.). This is a subaltern
mode of spatial production, the production of subaltern space.207
Moreover, the fascination with improvisation and status quo subversion largely precludes
subaltern urbanists from understanding movements and contestations in Southern cities in
relation to radical urban movements in other parts of the world. When read as a theory of urban
mobilizations, politics, and movements, subaltern urbanism (e.g. Chatterjee 2004, Appadurai
2001) exists more or less in isolation from alternative traditions of urban social movements and
social histories that address “grassroots” democracy.208 Rather, typical theorization begins with
the recognition of something called a subaltern politics conceived of as categorically distinct
from and marginal to state and civil society procedures of doing politics. This may be the reason
why there are few who argue against this categorical imperative who do not abandon the
subaltern studies approach all together.209
The subaltern urbanist project might address the nature of power in contemporary urban
society by naming the conditions of subaltern alterity, that is, by naming cultural and political
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Insofar as occupancy urbanism is taken to be a distinctive form of political agency and urban strategy,
Benjamin’s (2008) analysis bears close resemblance to the Subaltern Studies Collective’s original conception of
agency as well as Chatterjee’s (2004) conceptualization of ‘political society’ as a space of politics formed out of the
governmental administration of populations but escaping such forms of developmentalism.” (Roy 2011: 228)
208
Social movement literature in the Indian context tends to be placed in rural settings or note specifically urban
contexts. The literature on anticaste movements which have taken up cities as their terrain have contributed largely
to our understandings of culture and spatial politics, subjectivity, and the urban condition. Strangely, this literature is
largely absent from the perspectives of subaltern urbanism.
209
One enduring criticism that must be extended to the urbanists approach of subalternism is with the concept of the
“subaltern” itself, “which collapses too many qualitatively specific relations of subordination and exploitation to be
useful for analytical purposes (a point made in different ways by Sivaramakrishnan 1995; Ludden 2001)” (Quoted in
Levien 2013: 491). This may account for the relative constraint with which urban scholars influenced by Subaltern
Studies in fact choose to name their work as “subaltern urbanism.” Only in some ethnographic writings on the
relationship of the state and subaltern politics is there a sense that the two are in fact co-constituted (Doshi 2011).
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forms of everyday life while also producing theories of the structures and forces that dominate
them.210 The circulation of urban revolts, rebellions, and revolutions in recent years, the
movement and occupation of the squares since Tahrir Square certainly, have largely failed to
inspire urban subalternists to develop new translocal and international urban theories of
encounter between the cycle of struggles throughout the world and the so-called subaltern
politics of the South.
The everyday “insurgence” emphasized by subaltern urbanists is nevertheless the biggest
marker of its borrowed or inherited habits of thought. The rebel or insurgent peasant of Guha’
work (1999) has more recently been redrawn as the urban “insurgent citizen” (Holston 2008).
The Subaltern Studies Collective, specifically through the work of Ranajit Guha’s Elementary
Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, sought to critique the category of the prepolitical, to show a pattern of peasant resistance in the face of growing capitalist power and
expand the idea of the “politics of the people” (indebted to but also critical of the English
tradition of history from below tradition, e.g. E. J. Hobsbawm’s Primitive Rebels). The dominant
view within subaltern urbanism holds that informality in postcolonial cities is defined by the
practices of the subaltern (Bayat 2000) and deep democracy as forms of mobilization ‘from
below’ (Appadurai 2001). Here agency, however limited, is found within the fabric of everyday
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The conditions of subalternity might be explained through various fault lines in society: for instance, the ravaging
effects of economic liberalization; state restructuring; or the denial of citizenship as the promise/premise of postIndependence Indian modernity. The nature of this denial, the differences it makes to variously marginalized and
disenfranchised groups, and the forms of political responses emerging from these groups, offer important insight
into the changing nature of the city too often obscured by dominant narratives. Nilsen and Roy (2015:12) suggest an
understanding of subalternity as: “(i) relational – that is, subalternity is above all a positionality of adverse
incorporation in a certain set of sociohistorical power relations, (ii) intersectional – that is, subalternity is constituted
along several axes of power, whose specific empirical form must be deciphered in concrete empirical settings, and
(iii) dynamic –subalternity does not preclude agency, but agency arises and develops within and in relation to
dominant discourses and political forms.” Subalternity is best understood in this approach as part of a larger critical
project, most specifically brought to bear by Black Marxism, of understanding the contours and ongoing
manifestations of “racial capitalism.” This is a necessary refinement to the evolution of the concept at the core of the
Subaltern Studies project.
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informality. Insurgency is not understood in narrowly economistic or political terms, but includes
otherwise unpredictable elements of consciousness. Unlike Guha, who took pains to emphasize
that insurgencies were consciously organized affairs, and not “spontaneous” or “prepolitical,”
many urban scholars suggest that spontaneity, not arising from consciousness but rather an
(informal) urban way of life, is inherently political, or even, post-political.
Roy challenges this view of informality and the notion of subalternity it implies, arguing
that informality be understood not as
“…a grassroots phenomenon, but rather as a feature of structures of power. . . It is
tempting to interpret the tactics and struggles of the urban poor in the cities of the global
South as instances of rebellion and mobilization. Are these ‘shadow cities’ not
revolutionary, examples of a ‘globalization from below’ (Appadurai, 2001; Neuwirth,
2004)? [Rather] these are examples of urban populism rather than of radical social
movements. Such forms of insurgence then do not and often cannot call into question the
urban status quo; they can imagine but cannot implement the just city. This is the
informal city, and it is also an insurgent city, but it is not necessarily a just city. It is a city
where access to resources is acquired through various associational forms but where these
associations also require obedience, tribute, contribution and can thus be a
‘claustrophobic game’ (Simone, 2004: 219, quoted in Roy 2009b: 84–85).”
Roy has rightfully pointed out that occupancy urbanism exists amongst elites, “development
mafias,” crime syndicates, real estate speculators and builders, local bureaucracies and police.
Indeed, “occupation” is a maneuver upon a contested political terrain that traverses repressive
institutional wills (e.g. police and military occupation), market logics (e.g. real estate
development), as well as attempts, individual and collective, to claim space as a relational
strategy to create publics, commons, spaces of struggle (e.g. occupation as social movement
tactic). Moreover, as Roy argues, “such forms of insurgence cannot be seen as the means to
justice in an unjust planning regime. Rather, from the very start, insurgent claims to land have
been nurtured and fostered by systems of deregulation, unmapping, and informality.” (Roy
2009b: 81) Roy’s challenge to subaltern urbanism is “to transcend territorial location, to

265

demonstrate various foreclosures that complicate political agency and to call into question the
conditions for knowledge” (Roy 2011a: 232).211

Conclusion
The question of knowledge production is so central to the intellectual thought of subaltern
studies. In what ways can we rethink it as a form of organization? Whatever their insights and
legacies, the Subaltern Studies project, importantly, was a collective endeavor. The fact that
individuals with different interests and talents came together to ask questions and begin to
answer them creatively remains important. It is in some ways also how the Hamara Shehar
campaign emerged: through a collective of individuals with different interests and talents who
came together to ask a practice but conceptually difficult question about how the city of Mumbai
could be planned for social justice.
It is unclear how the questions and urgencies that the current situation in Southern cities
will be addressed in a manner than may enable greater prospects for collective life if labor
continues to be separate from the field of urban experience, however. Subalternists are fond of
asking where theory is produced. It is my hope that this dissertation demonstrates that the
location of meaningful critical urban theory remains within the geography of urban struggles. As
I learned from and with Hamara Shehar Mumbai, collective forms of inquiry and mobilization
are therefore necessary to read the struggles in the experiences of everyday life and to search for
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Ananya Roy reminds us that the earlier figure of the subaltern that featured in the works of the Subaltern Studies
Collective was marked by its radical erasure from archival and ethnographic evidence. The subaltern could not be
granted recognition except as an absent presence, a trace of colonial and postcolonial rule. In its uptake in urban
studies, this figure is newly inaugurated alongside ground and theory: the figure of the subaltern inhabits a territory,
the slum or informal settlement above all, and thereby a distinct spatial identity, the slum dweller, which in turn is
aligned with a political identity. This status of this figure, ground, and theory is left open, unresolved: is the
subaltern city essentially that of the slum dweller?; and if so, is it the “majority” perspective, a view of the city from
the ‘demographic difference between the total Indian population and all those . . . described as the “elite” (Guha
1988: 44)?
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lessons. Campaigns such as Hamara Shehar represent the beginnings of such collective research
emerging within and in connection to a range of struggles and movements. This is where we
might find our best chance to develop better analysis and more hopeful visions to complex and
deeply historical urban questions. It remains to be seen how subaltern urbanists will learn from
these humble experiments with urban knowledge and political imagination.
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CONCLUSION
The New Urban Question in India
“A great city but a terrible place.” —Charles Correa (2011)

This dissertation contributes a new perspective on the development of Mumbai by critically
connecting its planning history within and against the development of the city’s working and
popular classes. I have shown how governmental rule, bourgeois and elite dominance, and
popular expressions amongst the working classes of Mumbai have long affected one another in
the development the city through the various class projects that have claimed it. In so doing, I
offer an historical understanding of the co-constitution of urban development and the
development of worker-capital relations.
I show how decisions over planning were, since the origins of the city, always contested
and the basis of shifting class relations, often involving alliances and ruptures within and across
class relations. Crucially, this history also demonstrates how the conditions of subalternity has
been continually produced as a class project—and has been resisted in various ways. As I trace
this history into the present, I demonstrate how the increasingly pervasive informality in the city
since the 1980s was the result of a myriad of strategies to break workers’ power and claims over
the city.
I situate this historical project within the evolution of what I refer to as “juggernaut
developmentalism” as a spatial ideology and highlight its depoliticiszing and fragmenting nature.
The dissertation identifies this developmentalism as the ruling ideology foundational to both
Mumbai’s developmental trajectory as well as global forms of accumulation. As this ideology is
the predominant way a range of postcolonial cities are enlisted into global forms of
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accumulation, I also situate the stakes of understanding the challenges confronting the project of
development. Indeed, through an ethnographic study of the recent cycle of populist and
municipalist interventions in city planning in Mumbai, I show how the prospects of social justice
in the city lie only in the recognition and direct confrontation of this juggernaut.
In addition to contributing a critical history of the development of Mumbai, this
dissertation develops a politics from below approach to urban subalternity. My central claims,
arising both from my historical investigation and ethnographic research, is that renewed
theorizations of subalternity are necessary and must start with the centering of class dynamics of
conflict, struggle, and antagonism. These relations of class, informed by historically and
ethnographically specific findings, must also integrate and navigate populism as a dominant yet
unruly expression of collective urban life. I offer an anthropological perspective on subaltern
urban politics that are also crucially struggles over the production of space and scale. While most
accounts of subalternity in urban contexts are spatially tied to a “localism” that categorically
subordinates subaltern politics to larger forms of spatial rule, my ethnographic research suggests
the importance of a subaltern politics of scale for situating the urban question in India. Similarly,
my approach refuses the defeatism of the prevailing subalternist literature that begins with a
politics of “exception” and governmental rule. It does so by decentering predominantly
biopolitical frameworks of popular politics in postcolonial cities. Instead, I reinterpret the
separations and antagonisms at the heart of postcolonial state-society relations by developing an
approach to subalternity that does not formally separate political from civil society as Chatterjee
does.
My ethnographic and historical findings also challenge both popular and academic
conclusions that the working-class character of Mumbai has been rendered immobile and that a
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spirit of xenophobia and ethnic chauvinist urban culture has since divided and ruled the city. I
specifically show how urban struggles in Mumbai are expansive expressions of class—and must
be read that way—and moreover, that contemporary struggles continue to rearticulate a legacy of
past workers’ struggles in the city. This notion of class is demonstrated as a class plurality that
despite intrinsic and historically-produced differences, can find common cause in the urgency to
intervene in the planning of the city; and perhaps can thereby also create the grounds for a multiclass alliance that can adequately confront the juggernaut of developmentalism.
It is in this manner that I interpret Mumbai’s historical and contemporary contributions to
the evolving conversation of the right to the city, with a strong orientation toward the many
different labors in the city. My orientation throughout the project has also been to read the past
and present struggles in Bombay/Mumbai with a faithful eye toward their contributions to the
city’s political cultures and its built environment. Using collectivist research methods and
drawing from an anthropological orientation toward social movements, I have endeavored to
conduct an ethnography of the contested city rooted in many specific ethnographic
understandings in the city. In so doing, it is my hope that I have offered an honest political
understanding of the critical situation facing the working and popular classes of Mumbai, and
that can also hopefully serve the collective thinking that is occurring in the city under extremely
challenging conditions of mobilization.
As I have shown in the preceding chapters, Mumbai’s political and planning histories
have since colonial times emerged through a relationship of extreme fragmentation from within
society, differently affecting populations of the governed and their relationship to the state.
Social differentiation has become an increasingly important object of concern of planning.
Planning indeed conceptualizes and orders things in time and space; it also projects and focuses

270

the diverse possibilities that time holds for space against an array of competing determinations.
As the critical history of planning in Mumbai presented reveals, these are contested enactments
of power—whether arising from colonial concerns over the contaminating effects of poor native
hygiene; statist intervention in the urban economy to render certain postcolonial ideals of the city
legible; to order the population into economies of labor; to enact “revenge” on a class of workers
that have developed collective power; or quite simply, to grab land and make profit. The
administration of space and the built environment became a central tool in the administration of
people who lived, worked, and otherwise inhabited the spaces of the city. During a momentous
century and a half of fire, famine, plague, strikes, and riots, urban planning came closer to its
central political task of mediating the urban roots of social and class revolt. This dissertation
shows how this reality came to be.
The obligations of the state to the masses of people were never fully articulated in terms
of social welfare. Urban governance has long been articulated through what Gilmore (2007:28)
defines as “state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated
vulnerability to premature death.” The independent workers movements as well as the
Communist Party in the 1920s onward, both of which pushed the anticolonial movement to
articulate proletarian interests in Independence, was significant also for pushing demands on the
colonial and postcolonial state to promote general welfare. The agenda for capitalists and
relatively autonomous state actors has since been to realign state agencies that are targeted for
welfare claims by various subaltern groups toward a larger urban political culture of
abandonment. This relationship, between society and the state shapes “people’s understanding of
themselves in the world—because norms change along with forms” (Gilmore 2007: 43, 44). At
the same time, “abandonment is far too complicated for any single ideologue, party, or election
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cycle to achieve; experience shows abandonment takes a long time and produces new agencies
and structures that replace, supplement, or even duplicate old institutions” (Ibid.) An aspect of
juggernaut developmentalism is the institutionalization of abandonment while producing a
depoliticized space of engagement in the city’s developmental future.
While class interests varied amongst different sections of the ruling elite, what has
cohered in the contemporary form of juggernaut developmentalism is an elite vision of the city
as first and foremost fulfilling a certain kind of economic and political rationale. An urban
development regime that would seek profit and accumulation of power and prestige over the
social development of the city and its people has presided over the city for significant stretches
of its history, ensuring that calculated efforts for redress and regeneration of the city, its people,
and its environment would remain stifled and inadequate. As a legacy of the colonial-era-born
juggernaut developmentalism, the long arc of development in Mumbai has also coincided with
an abandonment. Within the juggernaut we find the central characteristics of a liberal urbanism
whose hallmarks, however much they have transformed in the given historical context, are a “let
live and let die” approach to the city’s subaltern populations. Yet the city has always been
inhabited by people who would demand a city governed “otherwise” and have produced a
multiplicity of political expressions.
Few of these expressions in the recent history have cohered into a bloc capable of
challenging the planning regimes in place in Mumbai. Popular expressions are increasingly
associated with narrowly defined communal forms of politics, whereas progressive social justice
campaigns are canalized by a safe and non-confrontational infrastructure of non-profit
organizations that depoliticize the discourses and practices of social movements that attempt to
organize against long-term abandonment of infrastructure and other public goods. Urban
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struggles such as these would have earlier been regarded as “displaced class struggles,” not
without merit given the nature of work and housing informality that emerged after the dramatic
defeat of the mill workers of Bombay in the 1980s. With the previous era’s workers’ struggles
irreparably broken, and surviving solidarities scrambled across the city, a unifying militancy is
not likely to emerge from the fragmentary urban struggles in India today.
Even as urban informality is a mode of production of class fragmentation, many
contemporary struggles around informality are not, as they were for Castells, about collective
consumption. Indeed, the conditions of informality break the possibility of class project of
collective consumption. Focusing instead on governmental engagement with the state, these
urban politics, as Chatterjee (2004) states, typically retain no strategic or imagined possibility of
collectivizing demands on the state or for a citywide redress of lacking resources or facilities.
Yet contemporary struggles around informality in Mumbai and other Indian cities are
undeniably “placing” themselves on the urban terrain, and in a sense, and for better or worse,
have “replaced” class struggles of the lost city and its previous inhabitants. The first charter of
the recently-inaugurated Right to the City Campaign in India reflects this historical analysis in
their assessment of the nature of contemporary urban movements in India:
“One has been witness to renewed protests and contestations by the urban poor in the
form of the struggles of right to housing, access to basic services like water-education,
struggle of labouring classes and claim over dignified identity. At the same time one has
also witnessed the weakening and breaking down of traditional mobilizations of the
working class in form of trade unions. In many cases, these protests and mobilizations
have been successful in either achieving their goals or at least oppose and resist the
onslaught of the neo-liberal agenda that is backed by the traditional hierarchical
structures of our society. To an extent, the poor have been able to make city their home
though being excluded from its systems in greater or lesser degree.
At the same time it is important to realise that these mobilizations have not been
able to put up a comprehensive understanding around the urban space and the
interventions have been site specific. At times the groups are often pitted against each
other, the demands remain short sighted as the struggles are localized and there is an
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inability in forging a consolidated struggle across sites and issues.” (First Right to the
City Charter, Delhi, December 2015)
In the course of Mumbai’s history, one can see how development has profoundly determined the
character of urban life, its social organization and spatial consciousness. But in other instances, it
has been the other way around: social struggles and political forms break from certain
development pathways and establish new terrains in which the direction of development is
contested. These are decisive, if protracted, moments in the history of the city, and this
dissertation demonstrates the conditions of emergence of new social struggles around planning
today.
Hamara Shehar Mumbai reveals an alternative planning paradigm as a response to these
formations to challenge the regulatory frameworks and established doctrines of India’s postliberalization era. This dissertation also makes the case for articulating the right to the city as the
right to the commons as its many labors. As I discuss in detail in Chapter Six, but extend across
the whole of the dissertation, this commoning of knowledge is one of the key aspects of the
sociospatial horizon of justice animating the People’s Development Plan campaign. The
campaign waged by Hamara Shehar Mumbai allows us to interpret and understand urban
informality as a terrain of struggle. The campaign situates planning as both technocratic,
bureaucratic, state practice, as well as a mode of informal spatial production. Hamara Shehar
demonstrates how peoples’ participation is both prescript and postscript to planning. It is from
Hamara Shehar’s perspective that we may see how urban social movements precede and surpass
planning, and also locate the conditions of critique to rethink subaltern urbanism.
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New Municipalism
Since liberalization in the early 1990s, Mumbai has been at the center of many corporatesponsored reimaginings of the city and its role in new national aspirations for growth. The
discourse around becoming a “global city” has circulated widely and endowed urban planning
and governance with an urgent sense that market-led change is necessary and inevitable. State
and capitalist processes of urbanization have extended bureaucratic control and marketized
differential access to social services (Harvey 1989), at the same time as they have remained
fiercely exclusionary in the neoliberal era of Indian cities. As in many other parts of the world,
this has entailed entrenching, and indeed relying upon, salient social differences such as caste,
class, religion, race and gender to produce an uneven and unequal landscape of access to land
and services, while also structurally excluding large parts of society. This process has opened the
field of urban governance and planning to an unprecedented array of social conflicts seeking to
address fundamental questions about to whom the city belongs.
Municipalism is not the exclusive domain of progressive politics. It is rather an abstract
space of urban ideology to be contested, articulated, and organized. The ruling elites in cities like
Mumbai certainly have their own traditions of “municipalism” as well as an idea of what
municipal institutions should do and what the city should look like. Their capture of the
municipal state and their ability to wield its powers to establish norms and regulations of urban
development, as well as enervate it and bypass those very regulations, has long established in
Mumbai a complex situation of urban governance.
Relatedly, the “popular” and the “community” are also ideological categories of urban
politics. A progressive and radical municipalist agenda, which challenges market liberalism and
the uses of state institutions to implement neoliberal spatial reforms, cannot simply mobilize the
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“popular” and the “community” but must pass through them and reorganize them in the process.
Hamara Shehar attempts to reconstitute a “public realm of the city that is somehow expressive of
the people, expressive of the general will—a will, maybe, that incorporates an affinity of
common notions” (Merrifield 2013: 83). 212 The point is to find existing spaces activated by
people, and to invent different ones; ultimately to create a city “function” (ibid), a process of
difference confronting differentiation to produce, perhaps, a recognition function, a reclamation
function, a redistribution function, a reparation function.
The Hamara Shehar Mumbai campaign emerged against this backdrop in an attempt to
address the very conditions of urban differentiation that foster inequality and injustice in the city.
Its primary task has been to disarticulate from state indifference the potentializing power of
planning. As such, the campaign’s intersections with planning authorities suggest an
understanding of power not merely as a functional operation of power as difference, but a set of
mechanisms that can be used differently. The campaign’s wager is that planning can be used to
effect intentional outcomes toward what it refers to as an “equitable city.” Gilmore asks: “Where
are openings that ordinary people can enter to grasp and redirect a portion of the social wage?”
(2007: 53) The vision of a city differently arranged through popular input in planning for
equitable outcomes is the starting point of this dissertation’s inquiry into Indian urbanization and
its urban question. These visions emerged from ordinary people and communities that mobilized
a different imagination of planning and what it can do to address the uneven and altogether
212

In India, as elsewhere, urban campaigns and movements must first break the legacy of nationalist thought if they
are to establish such common notions. The national question has rescaled to the level of urban society, as such
scaled down to the “city” level, its politics and imaginings, as well as jumped to the urban, a scale that
simultaneously supersedes the nation-state. Indeed, the “city-region is now viewed as the fundamental unit of
economic development and potential environmental collapse.” (Merrifield 2013: xiv) The promises and perils of
development that fueled the building of the post-Independent nation have instantiated themselves on the urban scale.
It is arguably a profound reason why Indian cities, like other postcolonial cities, are not the premiere (actual or
theoretical) sites of revolt and rebellion, experimentation with democratic insurrection and militancy, when
compared to other contemporary cities as well as their own national arena during decolonization.
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lacking distribution of social welfare and social justice in the city. They show us that collective
imagination can be a meaningful material force in the shaping of city futures.213
The people’s planning campaign represents a new municipalist orientation whose
potential for unseating the most entrenched orthodoxies of planning and regimes of
administration in urban India is far from charted. But what it does represent is an experiment in
democratic municipalism and institutional imagination that can be understood as percolating in
various ways in “rebel cities” across the planet in the last decade, from Cairo to Barcelona and
Madrid, to Athens, to Buenos Aires, where what has been emerging are a number of “radical
innovation[s] of democratic institutions and a development of capacities to administer together
the common in which social life is written…[from] a coalition that expresses in subversive,
antagonistic form the plural ontology of society” (Hardt and Negri 2017: 228).
Plan-making, decision-making, and implementation put questions of urban development
squarely in the domain of state planning and urban governance. 214 But as an anthropology of
planning suggests, planning is also a process that is shaped by promises embedded in the
complex sociospatial relationships between residents of a city. As Friedmann states
‘By serving corporate capital, it is caught up in the vortex of unlimited economic expansion. By serving the
state, it works for the economy of destruction. Only by serving people directly, when people are organised
to act collectively on their own behalf, will it contribute toward the project of an alternative development’
(Friedmann 1987: 11).

Can disparate and subterranean stirrings of the imagination such as Hamara Shehar
Mumbai play a significant role in metropolitan planning? The answer lies in how it may inspire
urban movements that understand and address the nature of informality as well as the causes and

213

As Gilmore states, “the resilience of [grassroots] planning, its reworking into the landscape of community action
through both workshops and other kinds of political engagement, enables the creative imagination that selfdetermination requires.” (2007: 54).
214
Unlike in Kolkata, where a Communist-led government for three decades emphasized democratic
decentralization and bottom-up planning, if only in name, Mumbai has always been ruled from above by bourgeois
(colonial, industrialist, ethnic) elites.

277

possible remedies of fragmentation in social life and everyday political culture. These
fragmentations are class and ethnic schisms that sometimes are all the more immovable when
articulated as “community” or neighborhood place-based identities, or based on party patronage.
Can collective urban knowledge be the basis of a municipalist organization that can learn how to
govern without dependency on professionals?
At the heart of these stirrings in Mumbai are a number of communities who have faced
different aspects of the planning regime and also face different fates. Yet, the urge to resist the
direction of current planning and to propose something new is only possible through a careful
stitching together of these different perspectives into what they self-consciously refer to as a
“peoples’ plan.” Thus, the success of the campaign is a wager on two central strategies:
collective self-determination in development and the articulation and recognition of a plural
political community.
Nevertheless, challenging an elite urban world view, and specifically calling it into
question as an ideology, has been important work of the citywide grassroots campaign that has
emerged in Mumbai in recent years. As such, Hamara Shehar campaign’s vision and political
mobilizations have emerged as a countermunicipal cartography (collective productions of spatial
knowledge and politics) that inform alternative understandings of municipal forms of life. Can
the development of their power and collective self-determination critically come to define the
meaning of Mumbai’s urban development? The hope and the uncertainties that remain after the
city’s recent populist cycle of mobilizations and struggles lie on the threshold of an important
moment: where the juggernaut of developmentalism ends and the city’s desired futures begins.
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